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ABSTRACT 
 
Chinese activists came forth in unprecedented numbers to compete as 
independent candidates in the 2011-12 local people’s congress elections 
throughout China, directly challenging the ruling Chinese Communist Party 
within the electoral arena.  In response, the government threatened, harassed and 
obstructed the campaigns of these candidates, and as a result only a handful of 
independent candidates made it onto the official ballots, let alone win the 
elections. Despite their lack of success, independent candidates have been 
promoted by media sources as the latest movement with the potential to bring 
about democratic reform within China.  However, independent candidates as a 
collective have not been sufficiently analyzed in order to determine the extent of 
these candidates’ shared desire for democratic reform or their powers to effect 
such reform.  
Therefore, within the theoretical framework of electoral authoritarianism 
and utilizing a single-case, exploratory case study, this thesis explores the 
potential of the 2011-12 independent candidate movement to initiate democratic 
reform in China.  Relying upon the statements of the candidates as reported by 
English-language news media, I create a typology of the movement and examine 
the candidates’ goals and motives, as well as their interactions with the local 
people’s congresses and the Chinese Communist Party, in hopes of revealing a 
clearer picture of the balance of power between the movement and the current 
regime.  I conclude that due to the inability of independent candidates to win a 
significant number of seats, the limited power of deputies on local people’s 
	   ii	  
congress to effect structural change, and the lack of unity and organization among 
independent candidates, the 2011-12 independent candidate movement will not 
immediately result in structural democratic reform in China.  Nevertheless, I 
contend that the increased awareness of electoral rights and democracy in China 
as a result the independent candidate movement will, in the coming years and 
decades, compel the ruling Chinese Communist Party to take significant steps to 
appease the ever-growing demand for political participation in China. 
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Overview 
In the spring of 2011, protests swept across the Middle East, with tens of 
thousands of citizens in several countries occupying the streets for weeks and 
months at a time to demand democracy in their nations and the overthrow of the 
authoritarian regimes in power.  In time, the dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
and Libya all fell, leading to speculation of democratic revolutions in other 
authoritarian countries, such as China, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP 
or the Party) has ruled over a virtual one-party political system1 since coming to 
power in 1949 (Branigan, 2011a; Fallows, 2011; Johnson, 2011).   
Although calls for a “Jasmine Revolution” in China in response to the 
Arab Spring were met by limited mobilization of the public and a large police 
presence on the streets (Branigan, 2011a), the supposition of a demand for 
democracy in China is not unfounded.  A poll conducted in November 2011 by 
the Global Poll Center, part of the Chinese state-owned Global Times newspaper, 
found that 87.2% of Chinese citizens believe that “democracy is a good thing” 
(Huang, 2011).  These findings echo those of the World Values Survey (2011), 
whose most recent survey reports that as of 2007, 93.7% of Chinese citizens 
believe that having a democratic political system is either “good” or “very good,” 
and 80.9% assert that the ability of people to “choose their leaders in free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Although China’s constitution accounts for the presence of eight other 
political parties, these parties fall “under the leadership” (Constitution, 1982) of 
the CCP.  A full discussion of these eight parties occurs in Chapter 4. 
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elections” is an “essential characteristic of democracy.”2  This desire for 
democracy in China is not a new phenomenon. China has a history of democratic 
protests and movements, dating back to the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (Gu, 
2011), and more recently the Democracy Wall movement in 1978 (Brodsgaard, 
1981), the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 (Zuo & Benford, 1995), and 
Charter 08 led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo in 2008 (Freedom House, 
2011).  Yet, time and again, the CCP has met these democratic movements with 
harsh repressive tactics, including detentions and violence, limiting the activists’ 
ability to reach and appeal to the Chinese populace at large and therefore their 
potential to enact political change (Brodsgaard, 1981; Gu, 2011; Lawrence & 
Lum, 2011; Zuo & Benford, 1995).  
In spite of the known risks of speaking out against the regime, however, 
various political actors in China continue to bravely assert their severely restricted 
rights in order to contest the Party.  Most recently, a new breed of activists have 
emerged in China who utilize neither protests nor petitions in their fight for 
democracy, but instead are turning to the most fundamental instrument of 
democracy: elections.  Beginning in May 2011, Chinese democracy activists have 
come forth in unprecedented numbers to compete as “independent candidates” in 
the elections for the position of deputy on their local legislatures, the local 
people’s congresses (Xun, 2011b).  Independent candidates, by popular definition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  For this question on the survey, people were asked to rank the statement 
“people choose their leaders in free elections” on a scale from zero to ten as to 
whether the statement is an “essential characteristic of democracy,” with the rank 
of ten being that it is essential.  The 80.9% includes those that gave a ranking of 
eight, nine, or ten for the question (World Values Survey, 2011). 
	   3	  
are candidates who have not been officially nominated to run but have chosen to 
run on their on volition (Junzhi, 2010).  Therefore, by standing as independent 
candidates, these individuals directly challenge the established government 
practice of the utilizing elections as a façade to disguise selection of Party-
approved candidates to seats on China’s more than 32,000 local people’s 
congresses, the only official governmental bodies for which China has 
institutionalized direct elections for its delegates (Deng, 2011).  Consequently, 
these candidates have and continue to face threats, harassment, and persecution at 
the hands of local officials and the CCP (Buckley, 2011a; LaFraniere, 2011b; 
MacLeod, 2011b).  Further, only a handful of independent candidates have made 
it onto the official ballots, let alone win the elections (Moore, 2011).   
Despite their lack of success, independent candidates are being examined 
by media sources and academics alike as the latest movement with the potential to 
bring about democratic reform within China (Buckley, 2011a; Fan, 2011; Ford, 
2011; Junzhi, 2010; Yuan, 2011).  Yet, due to the relative recentness and 
obscurity of the phenomenon, the beliefs and goals of independent candidates as a 
collective have not been sufficiently analyzed in order to determine the extent of 
these candidates’ shared desire for democratic reform or their powers to effect 
such reform, leaving the international community unclear as to whether 
independent candidates do represent a possibility for future political change 
within China.  Therefore, in this thesis, I explore and analyze the 2011-2012 
independent candidate movement in China, within the theoretical framework of 
electoral authoritarianism and the structural context of China’s legislative 
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institutions, in hopes of uncovering responses to several questions about the 
movement that have up to now been left largely unanswered.  For instance, what 
do independent candidates hope to gain from participating in the elections?  Why 
do they run in face of such high personal risks?  Additionally, what specific 
actions have the government taken against independent candidates?  Do these 
actions highlight the government’s power or fragility?  And, most significantly, 
do these actions and reactions by both groups reveal “an opportunity for 
democratization” (Brownlee, 2007, pg. 24) in China?   
In essence, democracy is defined by the presence of free, fair and 
competitive elections as a means of peacefully alternating power within a nation 
(Diamond, 2008; Huntington, 1991; Zakaria, 2007).  Accordingly, the 
establishment of elections within authoritarian regimes would seem a logical 
method for initiating democratic transition.  However, elections within 
nondemocratic countries are often utilized to increase the stability and legitimacy 
of the ruling party as opposed to bring about democracy (Blaydes, 2006; Blaydes, 
2011; Geddes, 2006; Langston, 2006).  The existence of electoral competition in 
an authoritarian nation, therefore, does not inevitably necessitate an “opportunity 
for democratization,” defined by Jason Brownlee (2007) as “an opening in which 
the fundamental parameters of public life are uncommonly contested and 
vulnerable to change by the actors involved” (pg. 24).  Thus, the participation of 
independent candidates in the local people’s congress elections does not 
automatically equate to the advancement of democracy in China.   
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Nevertheless, elections constitute a crucial playing field for direct 
contestation of a ruling regime and provide insight into the division of power and 
support among political actors and institutions (Brownlee, 2007).  Therefore, by 
examining the independent candidates’ interactions and relationships with the key 
political institutions within the electoral arena, namely elections, the local 
people’s congresses, and the CCP, I hope to reveal a clearer picture of the balance 
of power between the independent candidate movement and the current regime in 
order to determine whether the movement presents the opportunity for future 
democratic reforms in China. 
Methodology 
In order to understand the impact and potential of the independent 
candidate movement within the context of China’s current political climate, in 
specific, and electoral authoritarian regimes in general, I utilize a single-case, 
exploratory case study.  John Gerring (2004) asserts that, “for methodological 
purposes a case study is best defined as an in-depth study of a single unit (a 
relatively bound phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of 
a larger class of similar phenomena” (pg. 341).  In choosing to approach this 
project as a single-case case study, I am thereby able to specifically and 
comprehensively examine the independent candidate movement in China as one 
“unit” within the “larger class” (Gerring, 2004, pg. 341) of electoral authoritarian 
regimes.  By doing so, I am able to illuminate the unique facets and particularities 
of this case, as opposed to conducting a broader overview of several similar cases. 
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However, while a single-case study allows me to conduct a thorough and 
detailed analysis of the 2011-2012 independent candidate movement, the results 
and conclusions drawn from the study will need to be further tested in order to be 
generalizable to other comparable cases.  Nevertheless, such an exhaustive 
analysis of the movement is desirable for this particular topic as the independent 
candidate movement is a relatively recent phenomenon upon which a significant 
amount of academic research in English has yet to be conducted and to which I 
hope to contribute through this study.  
The lack of extensive research on the movement is also why I chose to 
employ an exploratory case study.  According to Russell K. Schutt (2006),  
Exploratory research seeks to find out how people get along in the setting 
under question, what meanings they give to their actions, and what issues 
concern them.  The goal is to learn “What is going on here?” and to 
investigate social phenomena without explicit expectations.  This purpose 
is associated with the use of methods that capture large amounts of 
relatively unstructured information or that take a field inquiry in a new 
direction. (pg. 14) 
 
Hence, by undertaking an exploratory case study I am able to examine the 
interplay among several variables in order to ascertain what exactly is “going on” 
(Schutt, 2006, pg. 14) in the independent candidate movement, taking into 
account a number of factors so as to construct a comprehensive inquiry as 
opposed to singling out one specific causal variable for study.  For instance, I look 
not only at the demographics of the group of independent candidates but also at 
their interactions with the political institutions with which they are involved, 
namely the Chinese electoral organizational structure, the local people’s 
congresses, and the CCP.  Although examining the relationships between multiple 
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variables in one study is sometimes viewed as “sloppy” research, exploratory case 
studies are noteworthy and necessary studies not only as “preludes” to further 
research on new issues such as the independent candidate movement, but also in 
their own right as studies which promote a contextual, in-depth understanding of 
the complexities and dynamics of specific cases (Yin, 2011, pg. 29).  
As is encouraged when conducting case studies and exploratory research, I 
utilize mixed methodology for my study, drawing data from a variety of different 
sources -- qualitative and quantitative, as well as primary and secondary (Baxter 
& Jack, 2008; Schutt, 2006).  These sources include news articles, academic 
publications, survey data by organizations such as Freedom House and World 
Values Survey, and official Chinese governmental reports and laws.  While such 
an approach poses the danger of a researcher becoming “lost” in the amount and 
scope of data collected, resulting in a convoluted and incongruous analysis, mixed 
methodology allows me to investigate the independent candidate movement from 
multiple perspectives -- historical, institutional, social, statistical and political -- in 
order to reach what Baxter and Jack (2008) refer to as a “holistic understanding of 
the phenomenon being studied” (pg. 554).  Such convergence and triangulation of 
data from multiple, diverse sources also ensures the “rigor” and “trustworthiness” 
of the analysis through the comparison and contextualization of that data, 
reducing the possibility of a strong bias in my research and conclusions (Baxter & 
Jack, 2008, pg. 555).  
Robert Yin (2011) states that the “reliance on theoretical concepts to guide 
design and data collection remains one of the most important strategies for doing 
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successful case studies” (pg. 27).  Yin goes on to explain that theory is used in 
“defining the ‘case’ to be studied; identifying the criteria for selecting and 
screening the potential candidates for the cases; and suggesting the relevant topics 
of interest and, therefore, possible data to be collected” (pg. 27).  Therefore, I 
begin my analysis of independent candidates by first synthesizing a theoretical 
framework, drawing on two established bodies of literature relevant to the 
movement, that of modern democracies and electoral authoritarianism, before 
turning to the examination of the various institutions and actors involved within 
the independent candidate movement in order to determine the movement’s 
potential for driving democratization in China. 
Structure of the Thesis 
I begin my thesis by providing an overview of literature on modern 
theories of democracy in the Chapter 2, focusing specifically on the role of 
elections within both democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes in order to 
lay the theoretical foundation for the exploration of the potential for 
democratization in China in relation to the independent candidate movement.  
After first defining the concept of democracy and establishing elections as the 
defining feature of a democratic political system, I look at the utilization of 
elections in electoral authoritarian regimes.  Illustrating in this discussion that the 
presence of elections alone does not directly result in either regime stabilization or 
destabilization, I instead adopt Jason Brownlee’s (2007) theoretical approach for 
analyzing the impact of elections on the stability of authoritarian regimes as 
presented in his book Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.  
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Brownlee utilizes elections as instruments that “provide information about 
rulers, their critics, and the support competing factions command in the wider 
population” (pg. 9) and “provide a useful lens for gauging the distribution of 
power between a regime’s coalition and its foes, even when they are corrupted by 
fraud and interference” (pg. 9).  In this way, Brownlee positions the institution of 
election as a crucial playing field for political contestation but requires the 
examination of the “interaction between political institutions and political agents” 
(pg. 27) within the electoral arena in order to determine the “presence or absence 
of opportunities for democratization” (pg. 27) in authoritarian regimes.  I employ 
Brownlee’s theory to organize the remainder of the thesis, emphasizing the 
relationship between political actors and institutions within the local people’s 
congress elections in order to examine the significance of the independent 
candidate movement within China’s political system.  
After providing the theoretical basis for my research, in Chapter 3, I 
examine the current status of the political system in China in regards to Robert 
Dahl’s (1971) definition of democracy.  Accordingly, I look at the existence of 
free, fair and competitive elections within China as well as the presence of the 
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.  Through this examination of China’s 
democratic status, I position the independent candidate movement within China’s 
current political context and establish a baseline from which any possible 
democratic reform as a result of the movement may occur.   
In Chapter 4, I further contextualize the independent candidates’ 
participation in the local people’s congress elections by sketching a brief 
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historical overview of the history of elections in China.  Subsequent to providing 
a timeline of elections over the past century, I examine the function of these 
elections within China’s political system, demonstrating that by limiting 
competition and tightly controlling the electoral processes elections in China are 
currently used to strengthen the power of the CCP and not to devolve power to 
Chinese citizens.  Against this backdrop, in the following chapters I undertake a 
more detailed inspection of the processes and actors involved in these elections in 
order to explore whether independent candidates’ participation represents a 
significant opportunity for democratization from within the electoral arena. 
In Chapters 5, I enter into an examination of the key political institutions 
of China’s political system.  I detail the functions and powers of the CCP, the 
eight democratic parties, the Chinese government, the courts, and the legislature.  
I draw data for these analyses from both primary and secondary sources, 
including various Chinese laws, governmental reports, and academic books and 
journals, with the intention of providing a comprehensive background of these 
institutions in order to more fully understand their roles in and enabling and 
restricting effects on the independent candidate movement.   
In Chapter 6, I focus in on the local people’s congresses, the political 
institution to which independent candidates are attempting to be elected.  I outline 
the roles of deputies on local people’s congress and discuss the status of local 
people’s congresses within China’s political system.  Also in this chapter, I 
specifically highlight the electoral procedures and regulations for standing as a 
candidate in the local people’s congress elections as well as the forms of control 
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and manipulation employed by the CCP in order to deter individuals, such as 
independent candidates, from running in the elections and to direct the outcome of 
the elections. 
In Chapter 7, I begin my analysis of the independent candidate movement.  
I first define the term ‘independent candidate’ and then provide a history of 
independent candidates’ participation in local people’s congress elections between 
the years 1980 and 2007.  Since the term ‘independent candidate’ does not exist in 
Chinese electoral law and there are no official state statistics kept on independent 
candidates, the majority of the data for this section is drawn from previous 
academic studies as well as news articles on independent candidates and local 
people’s congress elections.   
In Chapter 8, I turn to the 2011-2012 independent candidate movement 
and create a collective profile of known independent candidates from this election 
cycle.  Due to time, language, and monetary restraints, I was unable to travel to 
China to conduct interviews with the independent candidates themselves for this 
study.  Therefore, in analyzing the independent candidates as political agents I 
rely upon the profiles and statements of the candidates as documented and 
reported between April 2011 and February 2012 by the news media, including, 
but not limited to articles from the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Radio 
Free Asia, The Guardian, and Reuters, as well as by news blogs such as The 
Diplomat and China Digital Times.  
I first construct a demographic profile of the candidates, looking at their 
age, gender, occupation, and geographic region, in an effort to answer the 
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question, “Who are independent candidates?” I then categorize their stated goals, 
aims, and beliefs regarding the elections, democratization and political reform in 
China, in order to answer the questions, “Why are they running for election?” and 
“What do they expect from running?”  Through these categorizations, I formulate 
a typology of the independent candidate movement, offering a comprehensive 
examination of the movement as presented by English-language media and in turn 
revealing a clearer picture of the political environment of China3. 
However, as Brownlee (2007) emphasizes in his theory on 
democratization in authoritarian regimes, the will and actions of political agents 
are not the only factors necessary to determine opportunities for democratization; 
instead, one must examine the actors’ interactions with political institutions in 
order to determine how the each will fare in realizing their goals.  Therefore, in 
Chapter 9, I chronicle the reported actions and reactions of the government in 
response to the independent candidates, once again as documented by the media.  
I look at the type of their responses, including their use of laws and regulations as 
well as threats and violence in an effort to deter these candidates, and the impact 
these action have had on the electoral success of the independent candidates.  By 
detailing these occurrences and their outcomes, I emphasize the extent of the 
CCP’s control and manipulation of the electoral system and the copious obstacles 
independent candidates must overcome in order to be elected.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	   It must be noted, however, that since my research does not rely on full 
interviews but instead on presumably filtered information as chosen and presented 
by the specific author or publication of the article or blog, the creation of 
complete, unbiased profiles of each candidate was not possible.	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In Chapter 10, I discuss the implications of the relationships between 
independent candidates and the three key political institutions with which they 
interact during the local people’s congress elections, drawing conclusions as to 
what their interactions with electoral organizational structure, the local people’s 
congresses, and the CCP reveal about the balance of power in China and the hope 
for future democratic reform.  I highlight the failure of independent candidates to 
increase their electoral success despite a growth in participation, the division 
among independent candidates in terms of their goals and motives in standing in 
the elections, particularly regarding democratization, and the lack of organization 
and coordination across the movement as a whole. I argue that these issues 
underscore the dominance of the CCP in the political system in China and the 
unlikelihood of the CCP willingly or peacefully relinquishing their hold on power 
anytime soon. 
Therefore, I conclude that the 2011-12 independent candidate movement 
will not immediately or directly lead to structural democratic reform in China.  
Nevertheless, I contend that the full impact on the independent candidate 
movement on the advancement of democracy in China will gradually manifest in 
the coming years and decades. While independent candidates failed to win a 
significant number of seats on the local people’s congresses, they did succeed in 
their goal of significantly raising the awareness of electoral rights and democracy 
in China through their campaigns.  Furthermore, in spite of the government’s 
suppression, the independent candidate movement continued to grow in the 2011-
12 elections, as it has since 1980. Consequently, the independent candidate 
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movement is likely to keep expanding in future elections, resulting in a further 
increase in public knowledge of political rights and democratic practices and 
ideals, eventually compelling the CCP to take significant steps to appease the 
ever-growing demand for political participation and representation in China. 
Democracy and the Role of Elections in Democratization 
According to popular democratization theory, instituting elections at a 
local levels often leads to a “spill over” effect, eventually resulting in political 
contestation and democratization at higher levels and ultimately at the national 
level of government (Dahl, 1971; Xia, 2008).  Henry Rowen (1996) drew from 
this theory on the democratization when he asserted that China’s “record over the 
past fifteen years and the experiences of other countries in East Asia suggest more 
competition in local and provincial politics, ultimately reaching the National 
Congress” (pg. 6) is the likely path for the evolution of democracy in China.  
Young Nam Cho (2009) echoes Rowen’s assertion in his book Local People’s 
Congresses in China: Development and Transition, stating that “a democratically 
elected and operated legislature is crucial to a modern democratic political 
system, and China is no exception” (pg. 165).  If these claims are accurate then 
the independent candidate movement, which is pushing for free, fair and 
competitive elections for the local legislatures, has true potential to lead China 
toward democracy.   
However, before determining whether or not such potential exists, more 
fundamental issues must first be addressed.  First, if democracy is the aim of this 
movement, then it is crucial to define what is meant by the concept of democracy.  
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And secondly, since the independent candidate movement has centered its 
attention and actions on elections as means of pursing its aims, as opposed to 
protests or petitions, I also detail the role elections play in both democratic and 
nondemocratic countries before turning to my analysis of the political actors and 
institutions involved in the movement. 
Defining Democracy 
Although in classical theory democracy is defined as “the will of the 
people” (Huntington, 1991, pg. 6), in modern political theory, the definition of 
democracy has been much debated.  Some scholars assert that democracy, as a 
political system, is defined by the presence of free, fair, and open elections 
(Huntington, 1991; Zakaria, 2007), while others argue that the definition must 
also include the guarantee of a substantial number of rights, freedoms, and 
requirements in addition to free and fair elections, such as an independent 
judiciary, established rule of law, institutionalized political checks and balances, 
as well as the freedom of speech, assembly, petition, and religion, among others 
(Diamond, 2008, p. 21).  One of the most widely accepted and broadly used 
definitions of democracy by political scientists and sociologists can be found in 
Robert Dahl’s Polyarchy (1971).  
Dahl explains that pure democracy is, in actuality, an ideal that demands 
complete public inclusivity and political liberalization, an ideal that no country 
has reached up to this point in history.  Therefore, what people deem a democracy 
is instead what he terms a “polyarchy.”  Polyarchies, according to Dahl, are 
“regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly 
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inclusive and extensively open to public contestation” (p. 8).  In particular, 
polyarchies require eight distinct guarantees: 
1. Freedom to form and join organizations, 2. Freedom of expression, 3. 
Right to vote, 4. Eligibility for public office, 5. Right of political leaders to 
compete for support, 5.a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes, 6. 
Alternative sources of information, 7. Free and fair elections, 8. 
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference. (1971, p.3) 
 
Dahl’s definition provides sufficient requirements to ensure the free, fair, and 
competitive nature of elections and to distinguish democracies from other forms 
of government without including too many conditions so as to exclude the vast 
majority of governments in existence today (O’Donnell, 2010).   
Despite their differences, there is one steadfast characteristic present in 
each definition of democracy: the existence of elections as a legitimate means of 
peacefully transferring political power.  Democratic governance is essentially 
constituted of a government that is not only representative of its citizens, but also 
responsive to their wants and needs, and elections are presently the only known 
method of effectively achieving that goal (Hyman, 2010).  As declared by 
Huntington (1991), elections are “the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine 
qua non” (p. 9), as well as “the way democracy operates” (pg. 174).  In 
established democracies, elections are an instrument of representation and 
accountability; they provide citizens not only the means of choosing politicians 
who most accurately embody their beliefs and their notions of a good leader, but 
are also a legitimate way to remove leaders who they view to be ineffective, inept, 
or unrepresentative (Geddes, 2006).  
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It must be emphasized, however, that democratic governance does not 
necessarily entail “good governance.”  Labeling a government “democratic” 
should not be conflated with other measures of political development, such as 
whether or not a government is politically stable, institutionalized, or liberal, all 
of which are characteristics as opposed to forms of governance (Cho, 2009; 
Huntington, 1991; Xia, 2008).  For instance, 
Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, 
shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable 
of adopting policies demanded by the public good.  These qualities may 
make such governments undesirable but they do not make them 
undemocratic. (Huntington, 1991, 10) 
In fact, democratic elections hold the possibility of creating extremely adverse 
social and political environments.  For example, when elections occur in countries 
undergoing modernization that have yet to establish and institutionalize political 
organizations, they more often aggravate ethnic, social and religious tensions and 
cleavages than stabilize or alleviate them (Zakaria, 2007).  According to 
Huntington (1968), in modernizing countries, “elections serve only to enhance the 
power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the 
structure of public authority” (pg. 7), potentially resulting in a far more violent, 
reactionary, and intolerant environments than existed prior to the elections, such 
as in Yugoslavia after Tito, Indonesia after Suharto, and many fear Egypt after 
Mubarak (Zakaria, 2007).    
Such a distinction between “good governance” and “democratic 
governance” is of crucial importance in this study as I seek to explore the 
potential for democratization in China, for which the necessary indicator is 
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presence of free, fair, and competitive elections.  It has been argued that, “from 
the perspective of governance, during the past two decades, China has focused on 
political stability and government effectiveness” (Xia, 2008, pg. 22) and that “the 
changes in Chinese politics during the past quarter century are, for the most part, 
comparable to the worldwide efforts to bring about good governance” (Xia, 2008, 
pg. 21), creating a relatively stable regime with complex and firmly established 
political institutions.  Yet without the institutionalization of elections, China 
cannot be said to have undergone significant democratic development, and the 
citizens of China remain left without sufficient means for political accountability, 
participation, or contestation.  
Elections in Nondemocratic Countries 
Elections, however, do not only occur in democratic countries; the vast 
majority of authoritarian leaders around the world, including the CCP in China, 
hold elections in some manner (Blaydes, 2011; Brownlee, 2007; Geddes, 2006).  
In such electoral authoritarian regimes, elections are usually nowhere near free or 
fair, but instead “are marred by repression, discrimination, exclusion, or fraud” 
(Schedler, 2006, pg. 12), and are not intended to serve as a legitimate method for 
electing or removing leaders as in democratic nations (Blaydes, 2011).  Instead 
established literature on electoral authoritarianism explains that elections in 
nondemocratic nations function in two distinct way, either as “instruments of 
authoritarian rule” (Schedler, 2006, pg.3) or as “instruments of democracy” 
(Powell, 2011).  
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The argument of elections as “instruments of authoritarian rule” (Schedler, 
2006, pg.3) asserts that the majority of authoritarian regimes that hold elections 
are, in fact, not in transition towards democracy and that the function of elections 
in such environments actually has “nothing to do with democracy” (Blaydes, 
2011, pg. 5).  Instead, these scholars contend, countries are “simply successful, 
well-institutionalized authoritarian regimes” (Geddes, 2006, pg. 6), within which 
elections are but one institution utilized by the regimes to stabilize and perpetuate 
their rule (Blaydes, 2006).  For instance, many authoritarian rulers use elections to 
establish regime legitimacy, both internationally and domestically.  With 
increasing demands from the international community and organizations to 
democratize, elections give authoritarian regimes a democratic façade under 
which to function without having to enact any further meaningful democratic 
reforms (Blaydes, 2006).  Domestically, incumbents gain legitimacy by subjecting 
themselves to electoral competition and then winning those elections, though this 
is often accomplished through extensive manipulation and fraud.   
Nevertheless, through the elections, the ruling party is able to demonstrate 
the extensive power and resource disparity present, often leading to the 
demoralization of the opposition and establishment of the ruling party as the “only 
game in town” (Geddes, 2006, pg. 5).  Moreover, elections are a rare means for 
authoritarian leaders to gather information and feedback regarding their 
performance and support, as well as that of their opponents (Blaydes, 2006; Case, 
2006; Geddes, 2006).  For instance, the results of local and provincial level 
elections reflect the “competence, connections, and commitment” of ruling party 
	   20	  
officials throughout the country (Blaydes, 2011, pg. 59).  In this way, the ruling 
party is able to remove and replace incompetent officials or promote skilled and 
promising ones, while also gauging the capacity and support of the opposition 
(Blaydes, 2011).   
Furthermore, elections also serve to lessen tensions among these 
competing political elite.  As Lisa Blaydes (2011) explains, “the existence of a 
relatively even-handed mechanism for providing benefits keeps the regime’s 
coalition invested in the authoritarian system” (pg. 63).  Elections become a sort 
of “market mechanism” (Blaydes, 2011, pg. 63) through which political elite 
compete for the benefits afforded to elected public officials, including monetary 
benefits as well as protection against allegations of corruption and graft (Blaydes, 
2006).  Elections ensure the loyalty of the elite even when they lose specific 
elections because they recognize that “there is a fair chance they will win posts 
and privilege in the future, but if they leave, a high probability exists that they 
will win nothing in the cold outside” (Langston, 2006, pg. 60).   
Additionally, elections sooth the demands of those on the outside of the 
ruling party desiring political inclusion and participation (Dahl, 1971); they allow 
disgruntled citizens to let off steam and “send a signal to the regime,” without 
necessitating the ruling party to relinquish its power (Blaydes, 2006, pg. 4).  
Through vote buying, elections also present citizens with the potential for material 
gains for participating in elections (Blaydes, 2011).  In these numerous ways, 
elections depart from their role as “instruments of democracy” (Powell, 2000) and 
instead work to stabilize and strengthen authoritarian regimes. 
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From the perspective of elections as “instruments of democracy” (Powell, 
2000), the establishment of elections in authoritarian nations is viewed as a 
catalyst for regime change.  Elections, it is argued, spur further democratization in 
a number of ways.  First, and perhaps foremost, elections transform citizens into 
political actors (Schedler, 2006).  By providing citizens with a relatively low-risk 
means to register their dissatisfaction with the ruling party, elections mobilize 
individuals more than other high-risk acts of political participation (Langston, 
2006).  Additionally, elections supply citizens with not only a channel for political 
participation but also a lesson in democracy.  They expose citizens to democratic 
ideas and processes that, it is believed, will inspire citizens to increasingly 
demand more, as well as more legitimate, democratic reforms and openings for 
political participation and representation (Blaydes, 2011).   
Moreover, elections enable collective political opposition by supplying 
individual actors a “focal point” (Langston, 2006, pg. 72) around which they can 
organize into a united oppositional force and mobilize against the regime 
(Blaydes, 2011; Schedler, 2006).  In addition, elections increase the likelihood of 
fractures within and defections from the ruling party “because they lower the 
costs for minority factions within the authoritarian coalition of leaving the regime 
and continuing a political career” (Langston, 2006, pg. 72).  As opposition to and 
the likelihood of voting against the regime rises among the citizenry, the benefits 
of remaining within the ruling party decrease for potential defectors.  Elections 
provide dissenters an existing institution through which they can accrue 
supporters and establish legitimacy, without having to “ask their supporters to 
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commit great sacrifices to evict the hegemonic party: no one has to die for his or 
her country” (Langston, 2006, pg. 60).  In these ways, through their potential to 
increase political involvement and opposition, elections pose significant political 
risk to authoritarian rulers, even when rulers are guaranteed to win (Blaydes, 
2011; Carothers, 2010). 
Certain scholars have suggested an “Asian exception” (Diamond, 2008, 
pg. 208) to role of elections as “instruments of democracy” (Powell, 2000), citing 
nations such as Singapore, Vietnam, and China, in which elections take on the 
former function of serving authoritarian rule and are utilized as façade for “a 
resilient form of capitalist-authoritarianism” that is championed as a “different 
path than ‘Western’ liberal democracy” to a thriving, stable nation (Diamond, 
2008, pg. 211).  However, Ming Xia (2008), in his book The People’s Congresses 
and Governance in China, provides Taiwan as a regional example of progressive, 
bottom-up democratization that began with elections for sub-national level 
legislative bodies and resulted in the eventual establishment of elections for the 
nation’s top leaders, including its president.  In Taiwan, Xia argues, the local level 
legislative elections served to “provide for people civic training of participation 
and representation, prepare them for dissenting voices, and even offer institutional 
accommodation for organized opposition forces” (pg .256), which led to the 
demand for and development of political contestation at higher levels and within 
other branches of government.  
Larry Diamond (2003) also offers Taiwan as an example of grassroots 
democratization through elections, emphasizing the role of independent 
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candidates in the process.  Diamond explains that, 
In Taiwan, elections gradually became more competitive over time, 
drawing in local elites to the ruling party and refurbishing its legitimacy, 
as the ruling party gained in self-confidence and political capacity.  Over 
time, independent candidates gradually cohered into an opposition 
network, the dangwai, and then, more than three decades after the 
inception of limited elections, into an officially tolerated opposition party, 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). (pg. 328) 
 
Henry Rowen (1996) asserts that China will follow a similar path of 
democratization as other Eastern Asia countries, such as South Korea, where local 
political competition in due course progressed up to the national level.  In this 
way, elections at the local level have the potential to function as a structured and 
institutionalized starting point from where further democratization can occur.  
However, if elections in nondemocratic nations strengthen the regime in 
some circumstances and the opposition in others, then it poses the question as to 
whether the presence of elections can actually be considered a source or cause of 
democratization (or the lack there of) in authoritarian regimes, or instead if there 
are other decisive factors at play for which elections are merely “ambivalent 
tools” (Schedler, 2006, pg. 15).  Jason Brownlee (2007), in his book 
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, provides such an alternative view 
of elections within the framework of authoritarianism and democratization.  
While acknowledging the significance of elections, Brownlee contends that since 
elections in authoritarian regimes can be, as Andreas Schedler states, either 
“regime-sustaining” or “regime-subverting” (Snyder, 2006, pg. 223), that 
elections in and of themselves “are not an independent causal factor” (pg. 32) in 
what he deems “opportunities for democratization” (pg. 24).  According to 
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Brownlee (2007), an opportunity for democratization is “an opening in which the 
fundamental parameters of public life are uncommonly contested and vulnerable 
to change by the actors involved” (pg. 24).  While these “opportunities” do not 
guarantee that a regime will undergo future democratization, they are nonetheless 
“structural openings,” as a result of which there exists the potential for democratic 
reform to occur (Brownlee, 2007, pg. 24).  Yet for Brownlee, the presence of 
elections does not constitute such an opening.   
Alternatively, Brownlee (2007) asserts that elections should be 
categorized “as symptoms, not causes, of regime change or regime durability” 
(pg. 10).  Brownlee contends that analyses of authoritarianism must examine the 
“interaction between political institutions and political agents” (pg. 27) within the 
electoral context in order to determine whether an opportunity for democratization 
exists.  He states that elections “reveal political trends” (pg. 9), “provide 
information about rulers, their critics, and the support competing factions 
command in the wider population” (pg.9), and offer “a useful lens for gauging the 
distribution of power between a regime’s coalition and its foes” (pg. 9).  In this 
way, Brownlee positions elections not as predictors or as catalysts of regime 
change, but as descriptors of the current state of politics within authoritarian 
countries through which information about political institutions and actors is 
uncovered.  Therefore, although the existence of the institution of elections is not 
determinative of the presence or absence of opportunities for democratization, the 
electoral arena is the key playing field within which the interaction of institutions  
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and actors occurs and the “question of how rulers and their challengers fare” (pg. 
24) during in these interactions is answered.   
Thus, accepting that elections can either result in regime stabilization or 
destabilization and therefore by themselves cannot be considered a cause of 
democratization in authoritarian regimes, I employ Brownlee’s theory of 
analyzing the linkages between political actors and institutions within the 
electoral playing field in the remainder of this study in order to determine whether 
the independent candidate movement represents an opportunity for 
democratization.  More specifically, I look at the interaction of independent 
candidates with the various political institutions with which they interact by 
taking part in the elections, specifically the institutions of elections, the local 
people’s congresses, and the CCP, so as to establish whether the independent 
candidate movement can be characterized as “an opening in which the 
fundamental parameters of public life are uncommonly contested and vulnerable 
to change by the actors involved” (Brownlee, 2007, pg. 24), as demanded by 
Brownlee’s definition of an opportunity for democratization.  
In summary, a democratic political system is defined by the presence of 
free and fair elections as a means of peacefully alternating political power, as well 
as by the freedoms of speech, press, and association, which are necessary to 
guarantee the legitimacy of the elections.  Through these elections, citizens are 
provided a channel for political participation and representation.  However, 
elections are also prevalent in nondemocratic regimes, including China, and can 
function as either instruments of authoritarian rule, bolstering the ruling regime, 
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or of democracy, leading to further democratization within those regimes.  Since 
elections in authoritarian nations have the potential to stabilize or destabilize 
ruling parties, the existence of elections alone is not sufficient to instigate future 
democratic reform.  Instead, as Brownlee (2007) asserts, the interactions and 
balance of power between political actors and institutions within the electoral 
arena must be thoroughly examined in order to conclude whether an opportunity 
for democratization exists.     
In the next chapter, I utilize Dahl’s definition of democracy to analyze the 
current political status of the People’s Republic of China.  I look specifically at 
the presence, or lack there of, of free and fair elections and the freedoms of 
speech, press and association in China, concluding that China does not fulfill any 
of Dahl’s requirements of a democratic nation. 
The Democratic Status of China 
In order to fully comprehend the potential of the independent candidate 
movement to affect the democratic development in China, the Chinese political 
system must first be looked at through the lens of democratic theory.  By 
examining the state of China’s current political system in regards to its fulfillment 
of the requirements of democracy, the movement is better contextualized and a 
baseline is established from which any possible democratic reform may occur.  As 
the definitions of democracy are numerous, this analysis will rely on Dahl’s 
(1971) much-utilized definition of “polyarchy.”  Accordingly, in this chapter I 
evaluate the status of China’s political system with respect not only to the 
presence of free, fair, and competitive elections, but also the right to the freedoms 
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of speech, press and association, in order to ensure the fair and competitive nature 
of those elections. 
According to outside observers, China is deemed an “old autocracy” 
(Schedler, 2006, pg. 3), and a “closed regime” (Synder, 2006, pg. 224).  The 
Constitution of China (1982), officially defines China as “a socialist state under 
the people’s democratic dictatorship” (Article 1).  Although seemingly 
contradictory, the term “democratic dictatorship,” coined by Mao Zedong during 
his speech at the 28th anniversary of the CCP on June 30, 1949 (Halsall, 1997), is 
in actuality a very useful term in describing the political system in China; for, 
even though the Chinese government is a self-proclaimed dictatorship, it is also 
keenly aware of the necessity of incorporating democratic elements into its 
governance in order to maintain national and international legitimacy.   
Consequently, the government and the Party are never short of democratic 
rhetoric.  For instance, the Constitution asserts that in China, all power “belongs 
to the people” (1982, Article 2).  Additionally, in 2005, the Chinese government 
published an official White Paper entitled Building of Political Democracy in 
China, which proclaims that democracy is “the common desire of people all over 
the world” (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China [Information Office], 2005, Preface) and that, 
China's democratic system has been continuously improved, and the forms 
of democracy are becoming more varied. The people are exercising fully 
their right to be masters of the state. The building of political democracy 
with Chinese characteristics is progressing with the times, exhibiting great 
vigor and vitality. (Information Office, 2005, Preface) 
Further, in 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao stated during an interview that the “need for 
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democracy and freedom are irresistible” in China (Moore, 2010); he echoed these 
sentiments again in 2012 stating that “China’s democratic system will, in 
accordance with China’s national conditions, develop in a step-by-step way.  No 
force can stop this” (“Highlights – China Premier Wen Jiabao’s comments”, 
2012, para. 34).  Yet despite the government’s democratic rhetoric, China today 
does not meet Dahl’s criteria of a polyarchy.  
The key component of Dahl’s definition of polyarchy, as well as the 
majority of the definitions of democracy, is the existence of free and fair 
elections; and in respect to this aspect of the definition, China fails horribly.  As 
in most authoritarian regimes worldwide, China does hold elections.  However, 
the majority of elections that take place in China occur for positions on Village 
Committees.  Village Committee elections have been institutionalized in every 
province in China, equaling more than 600,000 Village Committee elections 
every three years.  Yet, Village Committees are considered “mass organizations;” 
and although there has been extensive debate and discussion as to the 
democratizing effects of Village Committee elections4, such as the political 
empowerment of citizens, citizens’ recognition of their citizenship, and increased 
accountability of committee officials, technically these elections are not a part of 
the formal government apparatus (O’Brien & Han, 2009).    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  O’Brien and Han (2009) not that “Observers have rightly noted that 
village elections exert some influence over political life in the Chinese 
countryside” (pg. 367), citing Lianjiang Li (2001), John Kennedy, Scott Rozelle, 
and Shi Yaojiang (2004), Brandt and Turner (2007), Schubert and Xuelian (2007), 
and Melanie Manion (2006). 
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The only direct elections that occur for official government positions are 
at the two lowest levels of the people’s congresses; all other legislators are elected 
from a list of Party-approved candidates by the deputies of the people’s congress 
the level below their own.  The people’s congress deputies also elect the heads of 
the government and courts at their corresponding administrative level, including 
governors, deputy governors, mayors, deputy mayors, president of the people’s 
court and the chief procurators (Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses 
and Local People’s Governments of the People’s Republic of China, 1979, Article 
7).  And even though there has been a succession of top leaders in China since 
Mao’s death in 1976, “in the years and months leading up to the choice of the 
leadership, there [have] been no public primaries, pre-selections or run-offs, and 
none of the noisy, blood-and-thunder clashes that are familiar events in the lead-
up to western electoral contests” (McGregor, 2010, pg. 3).  Officially, the 
National People’s Congress selects all top-level government officials including 
the president, premier, state councilors, and ministers (Constitution, 1982, Article 
62).  In practice, however, all of these selections are made from a limited list of 
government and Party elite determined by China’s nomenklatura system5 (Edin, 
2003; Manion, 2008).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  According to Maria Edin, China’s nomenklatura system, which is 
principally controlled by the Party’s organization department, consists of “a list of 
leading positions over whose appointments the Party exercises full control…and 
constitutes the basis of control of the CCP” (2003, pg. 44).  Melanie Manion 
(2008) explains that the nomenklatura system, “gives Party committees the 
authority to appoint, promote, demote, transfer and remove officials of even 
moderate importance.  Nomenklatura authority over leaders extends one level 
down: the Central Committee appoints provincial leaders, municipal Party 
committees appoint county leaders,” and so on down the line (pg. 611-12).  In this 
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The few elections that do occur are not free and fair, despite the laws that 
exist to govern them.6  Although over the past two decades elections in China 
have become more competitive, now with more candidates up for election than 
positions available, the CCP still has strict control over the nomination process, 
limiting candidates to those of whom they approve (O’Brien & Han, 2009).  And 
in spite of reforms and improvements in certain provinces,7 an absence of private 
voting booths for most elections and the widespread utilization of proxy-voting 
and roving ballot boxes continue to “threaten ballot secrecy”, inhibiting both the 
fairness and competitiveness of the elections (O’Brien & Han, 2009, pg. 364).  
Other issues, including “vote-buying, literacy tests for candidates, interference in 
recall efforts, and…threats and intimidation” towards voters, are prevalent during 
electoral processes throughout the county (O’Brien & Han, 2009, pg. 367).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
manner, Manion states, the nomenklatura system “makes Party committees the 
‘selectorates’ (and principals) of formally elected congress and government 
leaders one level down” (pg. 612). 
 
6  The laws that lay out the electoral procedures and regulations are: The 
1998 Organic Law of the Village Committees of the People’s Republic of China, 
the 1979 Electoral Law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s 
Congresses of the People’s Republic of China, and the 1979 Organic Law of the 
Local People’s Congresses and the Local People’s Governments of the People’s 
Republic of China.  In addition, Kevin O’Brien and Rongbin Han (2009) point out 
that “by the mid 2000s, nearly every province had issued electoral regulations that 
matched, or went beyond, the national law, and detailed implementation 
guidelines had also been formulated by many prefectures, counties, and township” 
(pg. 363). 
 
7  Election reforms are perhaps most evident in the province of Fujian, which 
Kevin O’Brien and Rongbin Han (2009) refer to as “a national pacesetter” (pg. 
365). In Fujian, by 1997, 95% of elections held used secret ballots and, by 1998, 
only 3% of the villages within the province permitted proxy voting.   Other 
provinces in which elections reforms have been successfully employed include 
Chongqing, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi (O’Brien & Han 2009). 
	   31	  
Accordingly, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (2011) Democracy Index 2011: 
Democracy under stress ranks China 141st out of 167 countries, placing it in the 
realm of authoritarian regimes. 
When the definition of democracy is expanded to include all of Dahl’s 
(1971) requirements for a polyarchy, including the right to the freedoms of 
speech, press and association, China is unable to fulfill the vast majority of these 
obligations as well, demonstrating the county’s lack of significant democratic 
development.  Although the Constitution guarantees universal suffrage (1982, 
Article 34), the right to “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of 
association, of procession and of demonstration” (1982, Article 35), and even “the 
right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary” (1982, 
Article 41), in practice, these rights are consistently violated by the government.  
For instance, through legal and registration regulations, surveillance, and 
persecution, the government severely restricts and blatantly prohibits the 
organization of certain of political, religious, and civil society groups, such as the 
Falun Gong8 and the China Democracy Party9.  And while the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  The Falun Gong is a “quasi-religious movement” (Leung, 2002, pg. 764) 
which is defined by as “a discipline of life based on borrowed terminology and 
concepts of the schools of Buddhism and Taoism” (Leung, 2002, pg. 764).  Falun 
Gong was labeled an “evil religious sect” and de-registered as a social 
organization by the Chinese government in 1997.  In 1998 and 1999, Falun Gong 
adherents organized a series of sit-ins as well as a protest of more than 10,000 
Falun Gong practitioners, resulting in fear among the government that the protests 
would become a political movement and subsequently the severe persecution of 
Falun Gong members that continues today (Leung, 2002).  
 
9  The China Democracy Party (CDP) was established in 1998 by a group of 
students and activists as an opposition political party.  Shortly after its formation, 
party committees emerged at the local, provincial and national levels, resulting in 
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permits the occurrence of hundreds of protests or what are commonly called 
“mass incidents” in China each year10 (Dui Hua Foundation, 2012; Freeman, 
2010; Wedeman, 2009), demonstrations of a political, religious, or subversive 
nature, such as the infamous Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, are quickly 
suppressed and result in the detention of protestors (Leung, 2002; Wright, 2002; 
Zuo & Benford, 1995).  The Dui Hua Foundation’s (2012) database of political 
and religious detainees reports that as of December 2011, China had 4,972 non-
violent political and religious prisoners.   
Access to information and freedom of the press are also extremely limited 
in China.  Reporters Without Border (2012a), a nonprofit organization whose 
annual Press Freedom Index assesses the degree of freedom that journalists and 
media have in countries around the globe, ranks China 174th out of 179 countries 
on its 2011-2012 index.  Since all media outlets in China must be owned or 
sponsored by government agencies, the CCP maintains considerable control over 
the dissemination of information, with many media sources, including the Xinhua 
news agency, acting as direct mouthpieces of the CCP.  Journalists who stray too 
far from the Party line or broach any controversial topics in their reporting are 
quickly silenced (Bennett, 2011; Reporters Without Borders, 2012b).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a crackdown on the party and its members by the Chinese government.  Nearly all 
of the leaders of the CDP were imprisoned and the party was run underground 
(Wright, 2002). 
 10	  	   Between June 2009 and December 2011 the Dui Hua Foundation (2012), a 
nonprofit humanitarian organization that has maintained a database of mass 
incidents in China since 2007, documented 3,460 mass incidents. However, the 
vast majority of these incidents are in protest of specific issues or government 
actions, such as pollution, the lack of public safety measures, or corruption, with 
no subversive intentions and only 988 of the 3,460 resulted in detentions.	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Although the Internet now provides Chinese citizens with the freedom of 
expression never before experienced by previous generations, in addition to 
alternate sources of information to state-owned news sources, particularly through 
the use of the Twitter-like microblogging website Sina Weibo, it is still broadly 
restricted and subject to constant monitoring and censorship (Esarey & Qiang, 
2008; Qiang, 2011a).  According to the OpenNet Initiative (2009), China 
conducts “one of the largest and most sophisticated [Internet] filtering systems in 
the world” (pg. 1).  Through what has been come to be known as the “Great 
Firewall,” the Chinese government restricts access to undesirable content and 
websites, blocking searches for specific words and phrases and deleting “illegal” 
web posts.11  Nevertheless, China’s over 500 million Internet users (“China’s 
Internet users”, 2012) are more and more utilizing the Internet as an outlet for the 
expression of dissent and dissatisfaction and a channel for political activism, 
sparking widespread debate as to whether the Internet has the potential to lead 
China down a path of greater liberalization and democratization (Esarey & Qiang, 
2008).  
However, journalists and netizens who dare to cross the CCP are met with 
equally repressive tactics to those employed against “subversive” protesters.  
Reporters Without Borders (2012b) reports that as of March 2012, China had 30 
journalists in prison, more than any other country in the world; that number does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  According to Article 15 of the Measures for the Administration of Internet 
Information Services illegal web content is includes, but is not limited to 
“information that goes against the basic principles set in the Constitution; 
information that is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state; and 
information that disseminates rumors, disturbs social order, or undermines social 
stability” (Shie, 2004, pg. 532). 
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not include the additional 68 jailed netizens, making China “the world’s biggest 
prison for journalists, bloggers and cyber-dissidents” (para. 1).  Such severe 
restrictions of association, assembly, speech and press enable the government to 
more easily influence and manipulate the electoral process as well as inhibit the 
organization or momentum of any sort of opposition.  
Clearly, independent candidates must overcome severe structural obstacles 
in their campaign for political participation and China must undergo significant 
and extensive political reforms before it can be said that any democratic 
development has occurred in its borders.  The freedoms of speech, press, and 
association are extremely limited and those who speak or act out again the CCP 
are subjected to punishment and persecution.  The only direct elections that occur 
within China take place at the lowest levels of government and are overtly 
manipulated by the ruling party.  Nevertheless, elections do occur on a regular 
basis.  Therefore in the next chapter, I take a more nuanced look at elections in 
China.  I examine the evolution of elections in China during the past century, 
focusing on the development and reform of electoral laws and the current use of 
elections by the CCP as tools to stabilize and legitimize the Party’s rule. 
A Succinct History of Elections in China 
Despite its undemocratic present state, over the past century China has in 
fact experimented substantially with democracy in general and elections in 
particular.  In 1912, just one year after the fall of the Qing dynasty, China held 
elections for its National Assembly and House of Representatives, in which 40 
million voters participated (Brown, 2010), “inaugurating the first, albeit short-
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lived, phase of competitive politics in modern China” (Fung, 2000, pg. 3).  
Between 1912 and 1949, various levels of elections were intermittently held 
throughout China, including provincial and village elections in addition to 
parliamentary elections (Brown, 2010; Nathan & Shi, 1997).  Furthermore, this 
period maintained “relative freedom of the press, political organization, and 
academic investigation and debate” (Nathan & Shi, 1997, pg. 65).   
Even though the elections were dominated by the ruling Kuomintang party 
(KMT), wrought with corruption, voted on by only elite males, and limited in 
geographical scope due to the continuous fighting of warlords an later the 
outbreak of war (Eastman, Che’en, Pepper, & Van Slyke, 1991; Fung, 2000; 
Nathan, 1986; Nathan & Shi, 1997), Frank Dikötter, author of The Age of 
Openness: China Before Mao, argues that China in the 1930s was “politically 
more democratic than many comparable regimes in Europe at the time or than the 
People’s Republic has been” (Brown, 2011, pg. 9).  As late as 1944, in the midst 
of a war with Japan and on the brink of civil war, China under the KMT had a 
relatively free and active press and civil society and was proclaimed to be “a 
nation which will carry the light of democracy to the millions of East Asia” 
(Brown, 2011, pg. 9).  However, in 1949, the civil war between the KMT and the 
CCP resulted in the fleeing of the KMT to the island of Taiwan and the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China under the rule of the CCP led by 
Mao Zedong, plummeting China into an almost 30-year period of ever-increasing 
tyranny (Brown, 2010). 
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Although China under Mao is remembered for extreme collectivization, 
repression, and famine, glimpses of democratic practices still surfaced 
periodically throughout his dictatorship.  For instance, Mao allowed for the 
continued existence of eight democratic parties founded prior to 1949, though in a 
limited manner (Brown, 2010).  Further, in 1953, the Electoral Law of the 
National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses of the People’s 
Republic of China was enacted, mandating direct elections for members of the 
township level people’s congresses and indirect elections for all other higher-level 
congresses (Nathan, 1986; Shi, 1997).  Between 1953 and 1966, six rounds of 
people’s congress elections took place (Nathan, 1986).  These elections, however, 
ceased in 1966 with the start of the Cultural Revolution12, during which Mao 
further consolidated his power and abolished the people’s congresses (Shi, 1997; 
Xia, 2008).  Nevertheless, even this extremely repressive period in modern 
Chinese history resulted in the emergence of “semi-democratic” organizations and 
groups that paved the way for progressive and reformed-minded leaders such as 
the future president, Deng Xiaoping (Brown, 2011, pg. 17). 
China under Deng saw a slue of reforms, both economic and political, 
reviving the CCP with renewed legitimacy that had been lost under Mao.  These 
reforms included the reestablishment of the people’s congresses, liberalization of 
electoral laws, and expansion of elections throughout China (Shi, 1997).  In 1979, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a “complex social upheaval” 
(Spence, 2001, pg. 791) that called for the renewal of communist and 
revolutionary ideals, was later referred to as the “decade of chaos” due to the 
disintegration of all levels of political institutions; the widespread killing, 
persecution, and imprisonment of those who opposed Mao and his ideals; and the 
country’s immense economic losses (Brown, 2011, pg. 17). 
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just three years after the death of Mao, the government adopted the Electoral Law 
of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses of the People’s 
Republic of China ([Electoral Law], 1979) as well as the Organic Law of the 
Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the People’s 
Republic of China (1979), which instituted a competitive electoral system in 
which the number of candidates is greater than the number of positions available, 
members of township and county level People’s Congresses are directly elected, 
and the candidate nomination process is more transparent and open (Womack, 
1982).  
The subsequent people’s congress elections which were held from 1979 to 
1981 were “not only the first nationwide direct elections for people’s congresses 
in thirteen years, but also the first nationwide elections based on universal 
suffrage for offices above the lowest level since China had become a republic in 
1912” (Nathan, 1986, pg. 196).  In 1982, the writers of the new constitution 
included an article mandating elections to determine the chairmen and members 
of Village Committees.  In 1986, the conservative leader Peng Zhen supported the 
drafting of the Organic Law on Village Elections, which was passed in 1987.  
However, since Village Committees are “primary mass organizations of self-rule” 
(Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the People’s Republic of China, 
1998, Articles 2) that do not function within the formal government, the elections 
for the county and township levels of the people’s congresses remained the only 
institutionalized direct elections for official government positions (Hsieh, 2003).  
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Although elections continued throughout the 1990s, the decade did not 
build upon Deng’s politically liberalizing reforms of the 1980s.  Instead, due to 
emerging threats to its political power, including but not limited to the Tiananmen 
Square protests in June of 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, even as 
the government increased its promotion of economic reforms, the CCP became 
adamant about “carefully restricting all moves to allow these [economic] reforms 
to migrate into the political control of the country” (Brown, 2011, pg. 24).  But in 
spite of the CCP’s crackdown on political reform, by 1994, elections had become 
more competitive, with more candidates than positions, and by 1998, the official 
Organic Law of the Villagers Committee of the People’s Republic of China had 
passed and Village Committee direct elections had begun to advance to the 
Township Committee level (Brown, 2010; Lisheng, 2006).  
In December 1998, Buyun Township in Sichuan Province became the first 
township to hold direct elections for a township government officials; months 
later, in early 1999, Dapeng Town in Guangdong Province also held township 
elections.  However, the further expansion of these isolated experiments with 
direct township elections to other towns for the 2001-02 elections was halted 
when in October 2001, the CCP Central Committee published a report entitled 
‘Opinions of the NPC Party Core Group on Conducting Well the New Round of 
Town and Township Elections’ which overtly prohibited direct elections at the 
township level (Lisheng, 2006). 
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to experiment with variations of indirect elections for township committees13, 
presently “village elections are stuck firmly where they have been for some years” 
(Brown, 2011, pg. 3), meaning that today, local people’s congress deputies are 
still the only official government officials that are elected by their constituents. 
While the CCP prohibited the expansion of village and local people’s 
congresses elections to higher levels of government, over the past decade, the 
Party has begun experimenting substantially with limited elections in a different 
political arena, in what has come to be referred to as “intra-party democracy”  (Li, 
2009; Martin, 2010, pg. 17).  Among other reforms initiated exclusively within 
the Party, through intra-party democracy the CCP has instituted a system in which 
top Party officials are selected through limited, yet competitive elections14.  The 
elections are limited in the sense that, as the term “intra-party” implies, they occur 
only within the CCP and are voted on by Party committee members, not by 
constituents.  However, the elections do require that there are more candidates 
than number of seats (Li, 2009; Martin, 2010).  Through these internal elections, 
the Party “aims to enhance the rights of ordinary members of the CCP, including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  In compliance with the government’s mandate against direct elections at 
the township level, neither Buyun Township nor Dapeng Town held direct 
elections for the 2001-02 elections.  However, officials in Sichuan Province 
continued their electoral experimentation by implementing a variation of indirect 
elections referred to as “public recommendation and public selection,” for which 
“the name of the winner of the direct election participated by all eligible voters is 
to be given to the Party Committee, which passes it over as the only candidate to 
the People’s Congress for formal elections” (Lisheng, 2006, pg. 505).  
 
14  According to Cheng Li’s (2009) analysis of intra-party democracy in 
China, intra-party democracy is constituted of five key areas: 1) Multi-candidate 
inner-party elections; 2) Decision by votes; 3) Institutional regulations and 
informal norms; 4) A comprehensive supervision system and; 5) Transparency of 
Party affairs. 
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the right to access information, participate in decision-making, take part in 
elections, and supervise the Party” (Li, 2009, pg. 10).   
While intra-party democracy has not been institutionalized Party-wide or 
at every level, multiple-candidate elections have occurred throughout the past 
decade for Party Central Committee as well as for local, municipal, and 
provincial-level Party officials in multiple provinces, most notably in Hubei, 
Jiangsu, and Guangdong (Brown, 2010; Li, 2009; Martin, 2010).  Nevertheless, 
top Party leaders, including the president, vice-president, premier, vice-premier, 
and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, are still strategically 
selected through an opaque process by a small group of elite Party members. 
Moreover, while these intra-party reforms are considered significant steps in 
transforming the Party into a “more open, competitive, and representative” 
institution, they still exclude the vast majority of the Chinese populations from 
these democratic practices and their benefits (Li, 2009, pg. 8). 
 To this day, the only directly elected government officials are the deputies 
of the local people’s congresses, and despite their limited scope, there has been 
extensive speculation as to their democratizing effects.  Many scholars have 
touted the existence of any level of elections in China as significant steps toward 
democracy, espousing that once Chinese citizens have been exposed to the ideas 
and practices of democracy and citizenship that they will push for even more 
democratic reforms (Brown, 2010; Li, 2003; O’Brien, 2001).  However, others, 
including John Fu-sheng Hsieh (2003) in his article “Democratizing China,” 
advise caution in such assertions.  Hsieh explains that elections in the 1980s were 
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supported by the CCP not to promote democracy but to pacify rural China 
following the devastation of the Cultural Revolution and to “mobilize people to 
carry out predetermined party goals, to socialize them into official norms, and to 
legitimate the rule of the CCP” (Hsieh, 2003, pg. 395).  In this sense, elections are 
not considered “instruments of democracy” (Powell, 2011), but instead 
“instruments of authoritarian rule” (Schedler, 2006, pg. 3), for they allow for the 
CCP to increase the public’s trust in and relationship with government officials 
(Manion, 2006; Nathan, 1986; Schubert & Xuelian, 2007) and improve the quality 
of governing by holding officials accountable through the possibility of removal 
by election (Kennedy, Rozelle, & Yaojiang, 2004; Li, 2003; Martin, 2010), all 
without surrendering the Party’s power or control of the system (Li, 2009). 
Elections are manipulated in order to strengthen the power of the CCP, not 
to devolve power to Chinese citizens. As Michael F. Martin (2010) explains, 
elections in China, 
have not, for instance, led to the establishment of opposition political 
parties, opened political and policy processes to broader public debate, or 
provided predictable and regularized methods for selecting the next top 
leaders.  Despite the above reforms, then, the process of political 
succession in the PRC is still characterized by uncertainty.  Decisions 
often are made through a combination of internal campaigning, behind-
the-scenes manipulation, negotiation, and compromise among 
approximately 30 top senior leaders. (pg. 17) 
 
So, while elections can be viewed as a lesson in democracy, their existence alone, 
as in many other authoritarian nations, does not necessitate a transition to 
electoral democracy in China.  
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Elections and electoral law have undergone considerable development 
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  Nevertheless, 
direct elections today remain confined to the lowest tiers of the government and 
have yet to lead to any significant democratic reform in China.  Therefore, in 
order to explore whether independent candidates’ participation in these elections 
represents a real opportunity for democratization that has up till now been eluded 
by the CCP, a more detailed examination of the institutions and actors involved in 
these elections must be undertaken.  In the following chapter, I outline the key 
political institutions that make up China’s current political system, namely the 
Chinese Communist Party, the eight democratic parties, the Chinese government, 
the courts, and the legislature, in order to provide further political 
contextualization of the independent candidate movement within China. 
China’s Political Institutions 
In 1949, just over 40 years after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty15, the 
People’s Republic of China was established under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the charismatic Mao Zedong.  Since then, China has 
transformed from a nation fractured by decades of fighting warlords, foreign 
invasion, and civil war into a stable, wealthy and powerful nation with a highly 
complex, institutionalized political system.  The CCP remains the ultimate 
authority in China, commanding power over the executive, legislative and judicial 
bodies at the national, provincial and local levels (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2009; Martin, 2010).  Although “there is no such thing as government policy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  The Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) was the last dynasty of China (Spence, 
2001). 
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independent from the CCP” (Zhu, 2006, pg. 538), each branch of the government 
nonetheless plays a unique role within China’s political system and is “infused 
with a number of bureaucratic and non-central government actors that influence 
and sometimes determine government policy” (Martin, 2010, pg. 1).  Therefore, 
in order to analyze the balance of power and the opportunity for democratization 
in China based upon the participation of independent candidates in the local 
people’s congress elections, it is necessary to examine the structure of the 
political system in China in order to identify the power, functions, and 
significance of the key political institutions, specifically the CCP, the eight 
democratic parties, the Chinese government, the courts, and the legislature, with 
which independent candidates interact. 
The Chinese Communist Party  
Despite the existence of China’s many political institutions, ruling power 
in China lies almost completely with one single body: the Chinese Communist 
Party.  The CCP was formed in 1921 as a Marxist-Leninist party, assumed power 
of China in 1949, and has remained the ruling power of China ever since.  The 
preamble of the Constitution (1982) states that the Chinese people fall “under the 
leadership of the Communist Party of China,” positioning the CCP as the nation’s 
ultimate authority.  The CCP also considers themselves the defenders and 
protectors of the people of China (Brown, 2010), and the official CCP website 
asserts, “The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the Chinese working 
class as well as the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.  It is the core of 
leadership” in China (“Communist Party of China in Brief”, 2009, para. 6).  
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Today, the CCP’s power infiltrates nearly every social, economic, and political 
institution throughout the country, from the media and the banks, to universities 
and business corporations and enterprises (Martin, 2010; Zhu, 2006). 
The CCP is a hierarchical party with organizational structures at the every 
administrative level of China,16 mirroring those of the government and legislature 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009); and with more than more than 76 million 
members, plus an additional 84 million members in its China Youth League 
(Brown, 2010), the CCP has more members than any other political party on the 
planet (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009).  At their respective levels, CCP 
officials serve to supervise members of the government and legislature and “to 
ensure that the Communist Party central policy is not being violated and that the 
‘political direction’ of China, across its vastly contrasting different areas, is 
consistent” (Brown, 2010, pg. 26).  The “central policy” and “political direction” 
of the Party are determined by the Party’s Central Committee, which is made up 
of 204 members and 164 alternates and meets approximately twice per year in 
order to decide upon policy priorities (Brown, 2010, pg. 25-6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  	   “The administrative division of the People's Republic of China is as 
follows: (1) The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government; (2) Provinces and 
autonomous regions are divided into autonomous prefectures, counties, 
autonomous counties and cities; (3) Counties and autonomous counties are 
divided into townships, nationality townships and towns. Municipalities directly 
under the Central Government and other large cities are divided into districts and 
counties. Autonomous prefectures are divided into counties, autonomous 
counties, and cities. All autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and 
autonomous counties are national autonomous areas” (Constitution, 1982, Article 
30). 
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Selected from the Central Committee is the Politburo, “the chief decision-
making body” (Martin, 2010, pg. 4) in China’s political system.  The 25-member 
Politburo assumes the powers of the Central Committee when it is not in session 
(Brown, 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009) and deals particularly with 
changes in policy and urgent or high-level matters.  Above the Politburo is the 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the “summit of decision-making” (Brown, 
2010, pg. 25) and the “most powerful political institution in China” (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2009, pg. 6).  The PSC, which is presently comprised of nine 
elite Party members including President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao 
and Premier Wen Jiabao, has the ultimate say in all government policy decisions – 
political, economic, and social – essentially determining the course of China’s 
progression as a nation.  
Democratic Political Parties  
Unbeknownst to many, the CCP is not the only official political party in 
China.  In addition to the CCP, there are eight other “democratic parties”17 
(Constitution, 1982, Preamble) that, according to the Chinese constitution, 
function under a “system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation” 
that is “led by the Communist Party of China” (1982, Preamble).  All eight of the 
democratic parties were founded prior to the CCP’s ascension to power in 1949 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  	   The eight democratic parties in China are: Revolutionary Committee of 
the Chinese Kuomintang, China Democratic League, China National Democratic 
Construction Association, China Association for Promoting Democracy, Chinese 
Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Dang, Jiu San Society 
and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. These eight parties were 
formed prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949; no other political parties 
are permitted in China today. (Information Office, 2007)	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and due to their alliance with the Party and its cause during Communist revolution 
were permitted to retain their membership and continue functioning within 
Communist China (Information Office, 2007) “under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China” (Constitution, 1982, Preamble).   
In China’s political system today, the democratic parties fall below the 
CCP in size, status, and power.  Membership of the democratic parties is 
significantly less than that of the CCP; there are approximately 840,000 members 
between all eight parties (Xinhua, 2011), the smallest party, the Taiwan 
Democratic Self-Government League (TSL), with just over 2,000 members, and 
the largest party, the China Democratic League (CDL) with more than 180,00 
(Information Office, 2007). While the vast majority of top government positions 
belong to CCP members, as of 2011, approximately 32,000 non-communist party 
members occupied government leadership positions at or above the county level 
(Xinhua, 2011), and currently more than 800 of the almost 3,000 members of the 
National People’s Congress belong to the democratic parties (McLaren, 2012).  
According to the Chinese government, these parties “exist neither as 
political opposition forces nor as parties out of office” (Gov.cn, 2007), but instead 
“work hand in hand” with the CCP (Information Office, 2007).  They do not hold 
any real governing power, but maintain mainly a consultative position within the 
political system.  These eight parties, together with the CCP and other “mass 
organizations” (Information Office, 2007), form the members of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the institution through 
which the CCP consults with, and also supervises, these other politically active 
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organizations (Information Office, 2007).  Although the democratic parties are 
also invited to meet with the CPC Central Committee on various occasions and 
are asked to submit policy proposals to the Central Committee, they do not hold 
any decision-making powers.  While supervision is deemed to be another key role 
of the democratic parties, Zhang Xiansheng, a spokesman for the CPC Central 
Committee clarified at a press conference in 2011 that “China’s non-communist 
parties intend to help the CPC improve its ruling and avoid mistakes via 
supervision” (Xinhua, 2011), positioning the democratic parties as “friends” of 
the CCP in all aspects of their work (Xinhua, 2011) and China a one-party state in 
all but its name. 
The Chinese Government  
Second only to the Party is the Chinese government.  In spite of reforms 
initiated under the 13th Party Congress in 1987 with the intent to clearly separate 
the Party from the government, they are still closely intertwined, with CCP 
members appointed to the most senior government positions and government 
officials working closely with (or being supervised by) Party officials at 
equivalent levels (Brown, 2010; Martin, 2010).  Nevertheless, government 
officials play crucial roles in determining and administering policy in their 
regions (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009).  According to Article 105 of the 
Constitution (1982), the “people’s governments at different levels are the 
executive bodies of local organs of state power as well as the local organs of state 
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administration at the corresponding level.”18 Led by governors, mayors, county, 
district, and township heads, the government bodies  
conduct the administrative work concerning the economy, education, 
science, culture, public health, physical culture, urban and rural 
development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, 
judicial administration, supervision and family planning in their respective 
administrative areas; issue decisions and orders; appoint, remove and train 
administrative functionaries, appraise their work and reward or punish 
them. (Constitution, 1982, Article 107) 
 
In essence, local governments manage the everyday functions of their regions, in 
specific, and China as a whole (Brown, 2010). 
 The chief body within the Chinese government is the State Council. Under 
the Constitution, “The State Council, that is, the Central People’s Government of 
the People’s Republic of China, is the executive body of the highest organ of state 
power; it is the highest organ of state administration” (1982, Article 85).  The 
State Council is presided over by the premier (currently Wen Jiabao) and 
comprised of approximately 50 other members, including vice-premiers, state 
councilors, ministers in charge of commissions and ministries, and the secretary 
general of the State Council (Constitution, 1982, Article 86; Martin, 2010).  The 
State Council serves effectively as a cabinet to the Chinese government, similar to 
the cabinet of the President of the United States, and is responsible for the 
coordination of the nationwide government apparatus, including the government’s 
29 ministries (Brown, 2010; Martin, 2010).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  	   “China officially has 34 provincial-level governments; over 300 
prefecture-level governments; nearly 3,000 county-level governments; and over 
40,000 township-level governments” (Martin, 2010, pg. 15). 
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Like other government and Party organizations, the ministries are 
structured to have offices and officials at all administrative levels (Martin, 2010).  
Although the power of the ministries is inferior to that of the Party, the ministries 
nevertheless possess “tactical influence over policy” through their abilities to 
interpret and then carry out what are often vague policy objectives defined by 
higher powers (Martin, 2010, pg. 8).  Other than the premier who is nominated by 
the president, all other members of the State Council are nominated by the 
premier, before being approved by the NPC and appointed by the president 
(Constitution, 1982, Article 62).  Accordingly, “aside from a few largely symbolic 
exceptions, every senior government minister or official is a party member” 
(McGregor, 2010, pg. 16).  Currently, the premier, secretary-general, all four 
vice-premiers, all five state councilors (Gov.cn, 2006), and 27 of the 29 ministers 
(Brown, 2010) are CCP members. 
The Courts  
The creation of a legal and judicial system, including the establishment of 
national and provincial courts, as well as a Supreme Court, the education and 
training of several hundreds of thousands of attorneys and lawyers nationwide, 
and the writing (or re-writing) and enforcement of the rule of law, has been one of 
the key reforms in China since the start of its ‘reform and opening-up’ period 
beginning in 1979 (Brown, 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009).  As the 
“judicial organs of the state” (Constitution, 1982, Article 124) the people’s courts 
are responsible for overseeing the actions of the governments and legislatures at 
the respective administrative levels (Constitution, 1982, Article 128).  Yet despite 
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its prescribed powers and significant reforms, the judiciary branch, much like the 
executive and legislative branches, does not function independently of the CCP, 
resulting in the absence of any true separation of powers in China.  Judges, with 
the understanding that they “would never be able to challenge the CCP and 
overrule any of its decisions” (Brown, 2010, pg. 28), hold fast to the Party line 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009).  Though courts demonstrate greater 
independence when dealing with commercial or private matters, the CCP often 
provides judges with direction and instructions on specific rulings, especially for 
sensitive or high profile cases (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
2011).  Moreover, due to the courts lack of autonomy and the prevalence of 
corruption and torture surrounding criminal proceedings, trails usually occur out 
of the public eye and “often amount to merely sentencing announcements” 
(Freedom House, 2011, para. 25).   
The Legislature  
The people’s congresses form the legislative branch in China, with the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) acting as the national parliament (Brown, 
2010).  According to the Constitution, within China’s democratic dictatorship the 
people’s congresses serve as “the organs through which the people exercise state 
power” (1982, Article 2), establishing the people’s congresses as the only 
governmental institutions that are, by law, representative of and accountable to 
the citizens of China.  Members of the people’s congresses are selected through 
“democratic elections” (Constitution, 1982, Article 3) in order to ensure that they 
“are responsible to the people and subject to their supervision” (Constitution, 
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1982, Article 3).  In practice, however, the direct election of deputies by their 
constituents occur only at the two lowest-level congresses, while all congress 
above the county level are elected indirectly by the congress the level below their 
own19 (Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s 
Governments of the People’s Republic of China, 1979, Article 5).  According to 
the Electoral Law (1979), any individual nominated by a political party or 
organization or by a group of ten voters can stand for election. In practice, 
however, the CCP candidate pre-approves the vast majority of candidates and 
tightly controls the electoral process, limiting the competiveness of the elections 
(Hsieh, 2003; Kwong, 2008). 
As the legislative bodies and “organs of state power” (Constitution, 1982, 
Articles 57 and 96), the law bestows people’s congresses with substantial power.  
Through the Constitution, as well as the 1982 Organic Law of the National 
People’s Congress and the 1979 Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses 
and Local People’s Governments, the people’s congresses are charged with the 
power to: ensure implementation of and citizens’ adherence to the rule of law; 
make policy decisions regarding “major issues in political, economic, educational, 
scientific and cultural affairs, public health, protection of the environment and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  	   Under Article 5 of the Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and 
Local People’s Governments of the People’s Republic of China (1979), “Deputies 
to the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities 
directly under the Central Government, autonomous prefectures and cities divided 
into districts shall be elected by the people's congresses at the next lower level; 
deputies to the people's congresses of counties, autonomous counties, cities not 
divided into districts, municipal districts, townships, nationality townships, and 
towns shall be elected directly by their constituencies.” 	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natural resources, and civil and nationality affairs, in their respective areas”20 
(Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments 
of the People’s Republic of China, 1979, Article 8); elect members to “all 
administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs of the state”, including but not 
limited to governors, mayors, prefects, presidents of the people’s courts, and 
deputies to the people’s congresses at the level above their own(Constitution, 
1982, Article 3); supervise the actions of those organs through the examination of 
reports and budgets of the standing committees, people’s governments, people’s 
courts, and people’s procuratorates, and the ability to dissolve the decisions and 
actions of those bodies; and protect the rights of citizens and organizations in their 
administrative areas (Constitution, 1982; Organic Law of the Local People’s 
Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the People’s Republic of China, 
1979).  
Yet, despite their extensive de jure powers, in reality, the people’s 
congresses have been viewed as “largely symbolic” institutions (Freedom House, 
2011, para. 10), serving as little more than a “rubber stamp” of Party policy (Pei, 
2006, pg. 57).  For instance, on only a handful of occasions over the past three 
decades have people’s congresses at any level vetoed a bill put forward by the 
executive bodies or a work report given to them for approval by judicial bodies, 
and the removal of government officials, especially without the approval of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	   While the people’s congresses at and above the county level have the 
ability to decide on these issues, the congresses below the county level are limited 
to making decisions on the	  topics of the economy, cultural affairs and public 
services in their areas (Article 9, Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses 
and Local People’s Governments of the PRC).	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CCP, is extremely rare (Pei, 2006).  Moreover, until the last decade, the people’s 
congresses’ law-making powers were also severely restricted.  Due to the 
authority of the CCP, they were unable to autonomously initiate policy, requiring 
Party approval for the vast majority of their legislative decisions (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2011; Pei, 2006).  For instance, up till the 
mid-1990s practically every bill put forth by the Shanghai legislature had to be 
approved by the local Party committee before any of the bills could be deliberated 
by the legislature (Cho, 2009). 
However, during the past two decades, people’s congresses, particularly at 
the local level, have begun to transform from “hand-raising machines” into 
“supervisors and reflectors” (Cho, 2009, pg. 5).  For example, though almost all 
government-proposed laws and reports are still passed by the people’s congresses, 
they are no longer always passed unanimously.  Individual legislators have 
become more forceful in their supervisory roles, questioning and even voting 
against policy or reports of which they disapprove (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2009).  Additionally, the legislatures have more aggressively reprimanded, and at 
the local level even removed, incompetent or corrupt officials (Pei, 2006).  The 
increasingly assertive nature of legislators is due in large part to the Party’s 
extraction of itself from direct participation in local legislative affairs.  With more 
than 50,000 people’s congresses throughout the country that have grown in ability 
and competence over the past three decades, the CCP simply no longer has to 
capacity to directly manage or examine every bill at every level, taking on instead 
a more supervisory role.  Further, today over half the laws passing through local 
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people’s congresses pertain to economic policy and do not require the same 
attention from the Party as more politically sensitive issues and the dramatic 
reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s (Cho, 2009).  As a result, people’s 
congresses are now viewed as “important political forces” (Cho, 2009, pg. 6) and 
“major actors in decision making” (Pei, 2006, pg. 57) in China.  
In brief, China’s current political system is highly developed and 
comprised of numerous institutions, including eight democratic political parties, 
local and national government branches, and judicial and legislative branches.  
All of these institutions, however, fall “under the leadership” (Constitution, 1982, 
Preamble) and ultimately the control of the Chinese Communist Party.  Of the 
various institutions in China, two are of particular importance in the analysis of 
the independent candidate movement: the local people’s congresses and the 
elections for the local people’s congresses.  Therefore, in the next chapter, I first 
analyze the development of the local people’s congresses in regards to their power 
to and autonomy in carrying out their official roles in order to explore 
independent candidates’ potential for enacting change once elected as deputies.  I 
then turn to the elections for deputies to the local people’s congresses, examining 
the Electoral Law (1979) and the government’s manipulation of the law in 
practice, exploring the laws, regulations, and obstacles independent candidates 
face during their candidacies. 
Local People’s Congresses 
There are two key political institutions of relevance to the independent 
candidate movement that must be further examined in order to analyze the 
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movement’s potential for democratization within China.  The first is the local 
people’s congresses, which are the local legislative institution to which 
independent candidates hope to be elected, and the second is the elections for the 
local people’s congresses, namely the structures and regulations through which 
independent candidates must navigate in order to be elected.   
As stated by political scientist and China scholar Young Nam Cho (2009), 
“democracy necessitates important policies be decided in accordance with popular 
will and civil right be protected from the encroachment of state power” (pg. 166). 
And given that ideally parliaments, including the people’s congresses in China, 
are designed to exemplify these democratic principles of popular representation 
and participation through the democratic enactment of laws, supervision of other 
governmental bodies, and the election of their members (Cho, 2009), the 
legislature’s development of these roles and responsibilities, even at the local 
level, has been deemed “a barometer of democratic progress” (Xia, 2008, pg. 7). 
Therefore, examining the local people’s congresses is “very useful for evaluating 
whether bottom up democratization or political decay has crept into the Chinese 
body politic” (Xia, 2008, pg. 7).  As Cho (2009) asserts, “democratization in 
China requires further legislative development” (pg. 165).  Therefore, this chapter 
will explore both the development and functions of the local legislature in China 
and its electoral institutions as a means for fully understanding the roles they play 
within the independent candidate movement. 
 
 
	   56	  
Recent Development of Local People’s Congresses in China 
People’s congresses at any administrative level fall below the CPP and the 
government in both power and status, and within the people’s congress hierarchy, 
local people’s congresses occupy the bottom rung (Cabestan, 2006; Cho, 2009).  
As of 2011, China had more than 30,000 townships and 2,000 counties, each with 
a local’s people’s congress at the corresponding level (Deng, 2011).  And with 
between 40 and 450 deputies per local people’s congress, depending on the 
population of the township or county21 (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 9), there are 
more than 2 million deputies at the local level alone (Deng, 2011).  Consequently, 
local people’s congress deputies are limited in influence and power simply due to 
the sheer number of deputies within the system.  
Moreover, being a deputy on a local people’s congress is not a full-time 
position or career as with legislators in the United States.  In China, “being a 
deputy both at the local and national level is an unpaid part-time job that includes 
one or two congress meetings a year” (Cabestan, 2006, pg. 54).  Furthermore, 
although the creation and significance of laws has dramatically increased over the 
past few decades, these laws are not always carried out consistently or effectively 
(Cho, 2009).  Decisions on high-level politics or policy remain firmly in the hands 
of the Party, with the responsibilities of local legislatures still restricted to local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Townships range in population from less than 2,000 to more than 90,000 
and the number of deputies in each township people’s congress ranges from 40 to 
130, depending on the population.  Counties range in population from less than 
50,000 to more than 1.6 million and the number of deputies in each county 
people’s congress ranges from 120 to 450 depending on the population (Electoral 
Law, 1979, Article 9). 
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concerns, such as transportation or education issues within their county or 
township (Shi, 1997).  
Even though local people’s congresses hold a relatively low position 
within China’s political system, over the past two decades, the legislative system 
in China has continued to gain influence and authority.  Local people’s congresses 
have transformed from “rubber-stamps” of Party policy into significant players in 
local politics and have attained considerable independence from both the CCP and 
local governments in regards to their four key functions: legislation, supervision, 
representation, and appointment (Cabestan, 2006; Cho, 2009; Xia, 2008).   
In terms of legislation, local people’s congresses have recently begun to 
take on a more assertive role in the lawmaking process. Since there still exists 
within China an unofficial “90 percent rule” (Cho, 2009, pg. 25) according to 
which approximately 90 percent of the laws proposed are put forth by government 
ministries under the leadership of the Politburo, and of those laws proposed 
approximately 90 percent are passed by the legislatures, the role of local people’s 
congresses in regards to legislation is, therefore, not creating or drafting laws, but 
limiting the government’s power by amending or vetoing the government-
sponsored bills.  Nonetheless, in order to increase their capacity in these duties, 
local legislatures have instituted a number of practices, “confronting 
governments, when necessary, instead of tamely conceding to or cooperating with 
them” (Cho, 2009, pg. 19).  For instance, as opposed to passing laws after a single 
reading, since 1998, “all draft laws have to be deliberated at least twice and read  
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three times in plenary sessions or standing committee meetings” before being 
passed (Cho, 2009, pg. 29).   
Additionally, the use legislative hearings by local people’s congresses to 
solicit the opinions of the public on draft laws has been introduced nationwide 
following their sanctioning under the 2000 Legislation Law (Paler, 2005).  These 
public hearings, as well as the recently established practice of publishing draft 
laws in local newspapers, have begun to provide citizens with a means of political 
participation and the local people’s congresses with the public support necessary 
to justify amending or rejecting government- or Party-sponsored laws (Cho, 2009; 
Paler, 2005).  These practices have strengthened the local legislature’s capacity 
and, accordingly, their status in the lawmaking process in China. 
Supervision has also become a central responsibility of local people’s 
congresses since a change in Party policy in the late 1990s that established 
“legislative supervision as a useful means of checking and preventing corruption 
in governments,” as opposed to a method of challenging the Party line (Cho, 
2009).  With the support of the Party, local legislatures adopted new measures to 
supervise the local governments and courts, such as: audits of the local 
government’s budgets; monitoring court proceedings, including observing the 
trial, examining court files and documents, and conducting interviews; reviewing 
work reports produced by local governments; calling joint meetings between the 
local legislatures and local governments; and even dismissing corrupt or 
unfavorable local officials (Cho, 2009).  As a result, an increasing number of 
governmental and judicial decisions have not only been overseen and reviewed by 
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local people’s congresses but have also been reversed or thrown out due to their 
involvement (Xia, 2008).  Yet, despite increased capabilities, supervision by local 
people’s congresses is nevertheless still carried out according to Party policy, 
reducing its potential to effectively restrict or balance China’s political powers 
(Cho, 2009).   
A third crucial role of local people’s congresses is that of representation.  
As elected members of the local legislature, deputies are intended to represent the 
beliefs and concerns of their constituents.  Throughout the last decade, the CCP 
has encouraged increased interaction between deputies and voters in order to 
establish a link for communication between the Party and the Chinese people 
(Cabestan, 2006), a channel through which the concerns of the people can reach 
the CCP (Cho, 2009) as well as augment the authority and legitimacy of local 
people’s congresses and deputies (Cabestan, 2006).  So, even though voters 
realize that deputies to the local people’s congresses cannot directly impact high-
level policy, they take advantage of opportunities to communicate with their 
deputies with the expectation that by doing so their issues and concerns at the 
local level will be addressed and that those regarding provincial or national policy 
and laws will be passed along to higher-level officials (Shi, 1997). 
The final, but perhaps most significant role of local people’s congresses in 
regard to the independent candidate movement and progression of democratic 
reform, is that of appointment of legislative officials at higher administrative 
levels.  According to the Electoral Law (1979), deputies to people’s congresses 
above the county-level are to be elected by the people’s congress at the level 
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directly below them.  So, directly-elected deputies at the county-level are 
therefore responsible for the election of prefecture-level people’s congresses, 
giving county-level people’s congresses the opportunity to vote for candidates 
other than the Party-preferred or nominated candidates, electing instead 
candidates they deem more qualified or popular.  In this way, county-level 
deputies technically have the ability to alter the makeup of upper-level people’s 
congresses, which have considerably more power in creating laws and policy.  
Recent calls by the Party for more “competitive elections” have led to an increase 
in the number of official Party-nominated candidates who fail to win the elections 
(Pei, 2006, pg. 53).  Local deputies have also begun nominating and successfully 
electing their own candidates.  Yet even so, the vast majority of Party-nominated 
candidates still win these indirect elections, ensuring the continued adherence to 
official CCP policy within higher-level legislatures (Pei, 2006).  
This relative increase in autonomy and power of local people’s congresses 
in their roles of legislation, supervision, representation and appointment is due to 
a number of factors.  First, as stated earlier, with the ever-increasing legislative 
activities of the local people’s congresses, the CCP no longer has the capacity to 
directly monitor and control every law due to the sheer volume of laws that pass 
through each of the tens of thousands of people’s congresses throughout China.  
This escalation of legislative activity was initiated with the start of the ‘reform 
and opening up’ period beginning in 1979 (Cho, 2009).  Since then, governance 
has increasingly been executed through the rule of law, a policy formalized at the 
15th National Congress in 1997 (“The 15th National Congress”, 2007), bringing a 
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new focus to legislative activity in China.  Moreover, with China’s 
implementation of a market economy in the 1990s, its membership with the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 (McGregor, 2010), and its anti-corruption 
campaign begun in 2010 (Information Office, 2010), the rule of law has become 
progressively more essential to its efforts not only to govern and spur economic 
activity, but also to supervise and regulate the government itself (Cho, 2009; 
Information Office, 2010; McGregor, 2010).  
Secondly, the rapid economic growth and development brought on by 
these economic reforms “has turned Chinese society from one that was tightly 
controlled by the state, into one that is increasingly autonomous, pluralistic, and 
complex” (Pei, 2006, pg. 1).  Between 1981 and 2007, on average China’s 
economy grew by 10% each year.  Domestic private enterprises led by local 
entrepreneurs were the key contributors to that exponential growth (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2009).  Consequently, elite businessmen, professionals, 
technocrats, and intellectuals have gained significant status and influence within 
China, attracting the positive attention of the Party.  Over the past decade, the 
CCP has strategically attempted to recruit these ambitious elites into their ranks, 
altering the demographics of the Party and in turn of the local people’s 
congresses, infusing them with assertive, ambitious deputies unafraid to take a 
stand on issues due to their privileged status within the Party (Cabestan, 2006).  
Simultaneously, another category of deputies, mainly ethnic minorities, 
women, intellectuals, and non-partisan citizens systematically conscripted into the 
people’s congresses by the Party in order to meet government-mandated quotas 
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implemented so as to make the people’s congresses appear more representative, 
have also begun to assert themselves as deputies (Xia, 2008).  The growing 
influence of these “independent-minded”22 deputies (Xia, 2008, pg. 145) is a 
result of a number of factors.  First, these deputies have gained the popular 
support of their constituents due to their willingness to “deviate from the old mold 
expected by ruling party elites” (Xia, 2008, pg. 145); such deputies, including Wu 
Qing of the Haidian District People’s Congress and Feng Youwei of the Shenhe 
District People’s Congress, have openly taken a stand on controversial issues, 
such as corruption, government supervision, and even democratic reform, by 
casting negative votes and giving speeches during congress sessions, organizing 
protests, and encouraging voter knowledge and awareness of these issues (Xia, 
2008).  
Despite their unconventional and often contentious stance on sensitive 
issues, the Party and governmental officials have tolerated, and even supported 
the actions of these “independent-minded” deputies (Xia, 2008, pg. 145) due to 
the need of the Party to retain them in the ranks of the people’s congresses in 
order to fulfill the government quotas and maintain their image as representative 
institutions.  This acceptance is also a result of the political benefits garnered from 
deputies willing and able to put in time, energy, and skill (particularly in the case 
of intellectuals) into their positions, as well as presence of more liberal-minded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  “Independent-minded” deputies, as termed by Ming Xia (2008, pg. 145) in 
his book The People’s Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a network 
mode of governance, are distinct, but not necessarily mutually exclusive from 
“independent candidates.”  “Independent-minded” deputies may have been 
nominated or supported by the CCP during their candidacies whereas independent 
candidates are not. 
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political leaders who are open to talk of reform, including current Premier Wen 
Jiabao (Cabestan, 2006; Xia, 2008).  Accordingly, there has been “a momentum 
in the election of these bodies that some would call a ‘virtuous circle’ of 
incremental political reform” (Cabestan, 2006, pg. 46).  For, as the democratic 
consciousness of the Chinese public continues to rise, so does the public support 
of these deputies, who as elected officials are given the power to not only carry 
out the will of their constituents but also to elect other deputies with similar goals 
and ideals to higher-level congresses, leading to the potential for change 
throughout the political system (Xia, 2008). 
The power of “independent-minded” deputies to enact change within the 
legislative system demonstrates the ability of individual deputies to influence 
policy and reform, even when they occupy a low-status position.  As Robert Dahl 
(1971) emphasizes, “at the very least, then, the beliefs of political activists are a 
key stage in the complex processes by which historical sequences or subcultural 
cleavages, for example, are converted into support for one kind of regime or 
another” (pg. 124).  Thus, the potential for reform-minded candidates, such as the 
independent candidates, to bring about gradual democratization in China should 
not be discounted (Xia, 2008).   
However, Brownlee (2007) asserts that, just as elections alone will not 
bring about regime change, neither will the spirit of political activists.  Instead, 
the study and analysis of modern authoritarian regimes requires looking at the 
“interaction between political institutions and political agents” (pg. 27).  
Therefore, to determine the prospect of such elections to bring about 
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democratization in China, the electoral process through which reform-minded 
candidates, including independent candidates, must navigate in order to be elected 
to local people’s congresses deserves further analysis. 
Local People’s Congress Elections 
By law, deputies for local people’s congresses at or below the county level 
(from here forth referred to simply as “local people’s congresses”) are the only 
government officials directly elected by their constituents in China.  The elections 
for local people’s congress take place every five years23, with previous elections 
occurring in 2002-03 and 2006-07 (Cabestan, 2006).  The 2011-12 election cycle 
began May 7, 2011 and will continue through 2012, in the end electing over 2 
million deputies for a total of more than 32,000 county and township level 
people’s congresses (Deng, 2011).  Espoused by the Chinese government as an 
example of democracy in action within China, in practice, the elections are far 
from free and fair.  Although voting is universal and generally conducted secretly, 
the electoral organizational structure itself is arranged and managed so as to limit 
competition against government-preferred candidates and provide the CCP with 
substantial control over the process and the results (Kwong, 2008).  As such, over 
the last three decades these elections have been instruments of the CCP’s 
authoritarian rule, a method for the Party to distribute benefits to Party members 
as well as to monitor the performances CCP government officials, removing or 
demoting corrupt or incompetent members and promoting skilled and effective 
members. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  	   Prior to 2004 duties at the local level served only three-year terms, as 
opposed to the current five-year terms (Cabestan, 2006).	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The government’s manipulation of local people’s congress elections 
encompasses nearly every aspect of the process, but is most notably embodied by 
the election committee.  When it comes to organizing and directing local people’s 
congress elections, election committees are considered “all powerful” (Liu, 2001, 
para. 13).  The committees, which are comprised of government-approved 
members of the local Party committee, government, and people’s organizations 
within each electoral district, conduct the entire electoral process within each 
electoral district, from organizing electoral districts and voter registration, to 
orchestrating candidate selection and vote counting (Electoral Law, 1979; Liu, 
2001).  Since the committees are funded by the government and fall “under the 
leadership” of the standing and election committees of the county-level people’s 
congresses (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 7), their decisions in these matters are 
therefore subject to substantial influence by the government and its preferences 
(Kwong, 2008).  
Prior to the start of the elections, the election committees carry out two 
key processes: zoning of electoral districts and voter registration.  Article 24 of 
the Electoral Law (1979) calls for electoral districts to be divided “according to 
the voters’ residence or on the basis of production units, institutions and work 
units,” so that the voters are or can become familiar with the candidates for whom 
they will votes (Liu, 2001).  It also states that candidates for the township or 
county be divided relatively equally among the districts, with “one to three 
deputies to be elected from each district” (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 24).  
However, despite these legal regulations, zoning of electoral districts is 
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occasionally utilized to increase the advantage of government-preferred 
candidates by separating non-preferred candidates from their potential supporters, 
placing them instead in electoral districts with large government offices or 
government-run businesses, which provide an insurmountable voter base for the 
government-sponsored candidate (Yuan, 2011).  
Voter registration is also conducted by the election committee according 
to electoral district, and must be completed, and the list of registered voters 
published, 20 days before the election take place (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 
27).  All citizens over the age of 18, whose political rights have not been revoked 
due to criminal proceedings, are eligible to register to vote in the electoral district 
in which they have residence or are registered to work (Electoral Law, 1979, 
Articles 3 and 26).  As with district zoning, the voter registration process is often 
directed in a manner to bolster the success of candidates supported by the CCP.  
For instance, information regarding the location and deadline for registration is 
discriminately distributed throughout the districts, enabling the electoral 
committee to recruit only “obedient” voters who will vote for the Party-preferred 
candidates (Yuan, 2011, pg. 114).  Moreover, due to the often-delayed publication 
of electoral districts, many voters fail to register in time.  This practice also 
obstructs candidates hoping to stand in the election because citizens must first 
register as voters before being able to stand as candidates (Yuan, 2011).  While 
voters can submit objections against the registration process or the final voter list, 
those objections must be taken to the government-controlled election committee 
to be resolved.  And although the committee’s decision on the objections can be 
	   67	  
appealed and taken to the people’s court for a final judgment, as discussed earlier, 
the judicial system within China does not function independently of the Party 
(Electoral Law, 1979, Article 28).   
The election process itself takes place in three distinct phases: candidate 
nomination, final candidate selection, and direct elections of the candidates.  
During the first phase, candidates are put up for nomination for the election within 
each electoral district.  According to the Electoral Law (1979, Article 7), any 
person over the age of 18, whose rights have not been taken away by criminal 
proceedings, are eligible to be nominated as a candidate.  Candidates can be 
nominated in one of three specific ways: by a political party (either the CCP or 
any of the eight democratic parties), by a people’s organization, such as the Youth 
League, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the All-China Women’s 
Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000), 
or by a group of ten individual voters in their electoral district24 (Electoral Law, 
1979, Article 29).  Although the nomination process has the potential to produce a 
wide variety of candidates from various backgrounds and of various beliefs and 
therefore truly competitive elections, in practice, the CCP orchestrates much of 
the process in order to benefit its preferred candidates.  Often, the CCP will 
“recommend” or insist on pre-approving the candidates to be nominated by the 
other political parties or people’s organizations (Kwong, 2008).  In other 
instances, the CCP confers with the democratic parties and people’s organizations 
to put forth a joint list of candidates, all of whom must, inevitably, be approved by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  	   Prior to 1982, nomination by a group of individuals only required three, as 
opposed to ten, individual supporters of the nominee (Xia, 2008).	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the Party (Xia, 2008).  In these ways, the CCP ensures the nomination of its 
desired candidates and in turn strongly influences the ultimate outcome of the 
election by guaranteeing these candidates a pre-established voter base of loyal 
Party cadres (Kwong, 2008).  
Although these “official” (Manion, 2000, pg. 774), Party-recommended 
candidates still have the possibility of competing against candidates nominated by 
a group of ten or more individuals, such voter-sponsored nominations are rare due 
to the difficulty of coordinating and organizing a successful nomination for what 
is usually a little-known candidate within townships and counties with 
populations of up to one million people and in which official candidates have 
financial and organizational support (Xia, 2008).  For example, although 
candidates Xu Chunliu and Xu Xiangyu from Beijing were able to gather far more 
than the 10 required signatures for nomination in the 2011-12 elections, collecting 
over 20 and 100 signatures respectively, their efforts were not able to match those 
of the Party-supported candidates in their districts who, through their association 
with local government agencies and firms, were able to secure the support of 
thousands (Hancock, 2011; Pedroletti, 2011).  In the case of Xu Xiangyu, local 
officials gave gifts, such as cigarettes and wine, and paid residents up to 100 yuan 
to vote for the Party-nominated candidate, extravagant expenses for votes that Xu 
could not match (Hancock, 2011). 
After being initially nominated, preliminary candidates are then subjected 
to a second and much more opaque round of candidate selection.  During the 
second phase, beginning 15 days before the day of the election, the electoral 
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committee deliberates over the initial, informal list of nominated candidates in 
order to determine the official final list that will be voted upon in the election 
(Electoral Law, 1979, Article 31).  This selection phase was established in order 
to decrease the list of often tens of thousands of initial candidates into a more 
“manageable number” of final candidates from which the voters able to choose 
(Kwong, 2008, pg. 6).  For instance, in the Beijing People’s Congress elections in 
2003, a final list of 5,000 candidates was selected from an initial 50,000 
candidates (Kwong, 2008).   
In compiling the final candidate list, the electoral committee, by law, must 
consider a number of factors.  First, in order for the elections to meet the 
requirements of competitive election as prescribed by the Electoral Law (1979, 
Article 30), “the number of candidates for deputies to be directly elected by the 
voters shall be from one-third to 100 percent greater than the number of deputies 
to be elected.”  Secondly, the election committee must fulfill specific quotas as to 
the number of men and women, religious and ethnic minorities, workers from 
various professions, CCP and non-CCP members, and rural and urban candidates 
that are to appear on the final list in order for it to be considered representative of 
the constituency (Cabestan, 2006; Electoral Law, 1979, Article 18 and Article 20; 
Xia, 2008).  Finally, the election committee is required to confer with “voter 
groups” within the electoral district in order to determine the most popular and 
qualified candidates (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 31).  Conducted behind closed 
doors and decided upon solely by the government-sponsored election committee, 
the formation of the final candidate list in the second phase is often viewed an 
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opportunity for the government and the CCP to legally “weed out unwanted 
candidates” who managed to make it through the nomination process (Kwong, 
2008, pg. 7), ideally leaving only candidates deemed desirable by or 
unthreatening to the Party on the final list.   
The last phase of the electoral process is the elections themselves.  The 
election committee is to publish the final list of candidates a mere five days before 
the elections (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 31).  However, the law forbids 
candidates to campaign during these five days (Cabestan, 2006; Manion, 2000).  
Instead, in order to gain popularity and secure votes, candidates must rely on the 
election committee’s “briefings” of the candidates to the voters prior to election 
day or simply on the voters’ previously established knowledge of the candidates 
from past leadership positions (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 33).  In turn, voters 
are left dependent upon the biased candidate descriptions provided by the election 
committee or upon name-recognition, as opposed to the candidates’ beliefs, 
qualifications, or platform, in order to determine for whom to vote.   
Although with the amendments to the Electoral Law in 2010, more 
committee-organized face-to-face opportunities between voters and candidates are 
encouraged, they are still are not required, and individual campaigns are still 
illegal (De Lisle, 2010).  As a result, official candidates, who are given more 
favorable descriptions by the election committees and have greater name-
recognition due to the likelihood that, as Party members, they were active in 
village or local politics and leadership prior to the elections, are more often 
elected (Cabestan, 2006; Manion, 2000; Xia, 2008;).  For example, in the 2006-07 
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county people’s congress elections in Wuxiang, Jiaoqu and Xianghuan counties in 
Changzhi City, Shanxi Province, every single one of the 1042 Party-nominated 
candidates were elected to the congresses (Yang	  &	  Lu, 2007).  
The elections are conducted according to a majority electoral system25. 
Article 41 of the Electoral Law (1979) states that in order to win the elections a 
candidate must “have obtained more than half of the votes cast by the voters that 
take part in the elections,” and in the cases in which “the number of candidates 
who have obtained more than half of the votes exceeds the number of deputies to 
be elected, the ones who have obtained the more votes shall be elected.”  On the 
occasion that the number of candidates who received a majority of the votes is 
less than the positions available, a second election is held.  The Electoral Law 
(1979) also outlines a number of regulations in order to ensure the validity of the 
election results.  For instance, Article 36 requires that elections be conducted by 
secret ballot and Article 52 prohibits the “use of violence, threat, deception, 
bribery or other illegal means to disrupt an election or interfere with a voter or 
deputy in the free exercise of this right to vote and stand for election” as well as 
the forgery or falsification of any electoral documents.   
Yet, despite these restrictions, violations of these laws are systemic, 
occurring each electoral cycle and deterring voters from voting for anyone other 
than those who have been made known to be the official and preferred candidates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  As defined by Charles King (2000), a majority electoral system requires 
that “candidates achieve a majority of votes in order to win.  ‘Majority’ is 
normally defined as 50%-plus-one-vote.  If no candidate gets a majority of votes, 
then a second round of voting is held…In the second round of voting, only a 
select number of candidates from the first round are allowed to participate.” 
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(Cho, 2009; De Lisle, 2010; Kwong, 2008; Xia, 2008; Yuan, 2011).  Vote buying 
is rampant (Fung & Gao, 2012); Party-supported candidates have been reported 
paying up to 9000 yuan, or approximately $1,400, per vote, which for many 
workers in China is more than multiple months’ salary (Osnos, 2012).  Heavy 
presence of police and Party officials at voting sites is also a common tactic to 
intimidate voters, with officials at times watching voters over their shoulder as 
they fill out their ballots (Hancock, 2011; Chinese Candidates Harassed, 2012; 
Yuan, 2011).  In more severe violations of the law, candidates are detained 
(Beech, 2011; “Beijing’s Independent Candidates”, 2011; Jiang, 2011e; Qiao & 
Fung, 2011; Yuan, 2011), beaten (China Forbidden News, 2011b; Jiang, 2012; 
Yuan, 2011), or their families and supporters threatened (Jiang, 2011k; Jiang, 
2011j; Yuan, 2011). 
However, in an electoral institution that is so “tightly controlled” by and 
manipulated to the advantage of the ruling party, “any crack…has a potential to 
open up the entire process and start tearing down autocracy” (Xia, 2008, pg. 110).  
For instance, when an official candidate loses an election, the loss signals not 
simply an individual failure, but failure of the entire system that was organized to 
ensure the candidate’s victory.  A lost election for the CCP is an indicator of the 
incompetence and ineptitude of local Party and government officials, and since 
those local officials are selected by Party officials at higher levels it is also seen as 
an indicator of weaknesses and failings all the way up the Party hierarchy (Junzhi, 
2010, pg. 326).  Moreover, losses by Party-nominated candidates imply that the 
Party is out of touch with the wants, needs, and beliefs of its citizens and therefore 
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“may be a harbinger of future unrest” (Manion, 2000, pg. 780-81).  Consequently, 
candidates who win without the support of the Party, such as independent 
candidates, are considered significant threats to the Party’s hold on power (Xia, 
2008), and therefore constitute what Brownlee (2007) termed an “opportunity for 
democratization” (pg. 24) in China.  Nevertheless, as Brownlee notes, the 
presence of an opportunity for democratization does not necessarily necessitate 
future democratization.  Therefore, in order to determine whether the current 
independent candidate movement has the potential to bring about further 
democratic change within China, the movement itself and the actors within it 
must be fully examined. 
In summary, although the local people’s congresses occupy the bottom 
rung of China’ political system, over the past two decades they have gained 
considerable power and independence, more assertively fulfilling their roles of 
legislation, supervision, representation, and appointment.  This development can 
be attributed to several factors including the increased emphasis on the rule of law 
due to China’s economic development and the inclusion of elite and 
“independent-minded” (Xia, 2008) individuals into the ranks of the local people’s 
congresses.  Yet, while local people’s congresses have developed in terms of role 
fulfillment, the elections for deputies to the local people’s congresses are still 
controlled and manipulated by the CCP, limiting the possibility of candidates not 
supported by the government, so-called “independent candidates,” of winning the 
elections. 
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The next chapter looks at the participation of these independent candidates 
in the local people’s congress elections.  I begin by defining the term 
“independent candidate,” and then move into the history and development of the 
independent candidate movement from 1980 through 2007.  I detail the successes 
and failures of the independent candidates up until the 2011-12 election cycle, 
highlighting the obstruction of their candidacies at the hands of the government. 
Independent Candidates in Local People’s Congress Elections 
Independent candidates began standing for election in the 1980-81 
elections following the start of the ‘reform and opening up’ period and under the 
enactment of the 1979 Electoral Law and Organic Laws (Junzhi, 2010; Yuan, 
2011).  Despite their limited electoral success and suppression by the CCP, 
independent candidates have continued to assert their right to stand for elections 
over the past three decades, with an unprecedented wave of independent 
candidates coming forth to campaign for the 2011-12 local people’s congress 
elections.  These candidates, who have and continue to face threats, harassment, 
and persecution at the hands of the CCP throughout their campaigns, are being 
touted as the latest movement with the potential to bring about democratic reform 
within China, even though only a handful of independent candidates have made it 
onto the official ballots, let alone win the elections.  While the media over the past 
few months has profiled various individual independent candidates in their 
struggle for the right to political contestation, the beliefs and goals of independent 
candidates as a collective have not been sufficiently analyzed by either the media 
or the academic community in order to determine the extent of these candidates’ 
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shared desire for democratic reform or their powers to enact such reform once 
elected, leaving the international community unclear as to whether independent 
candidates do represent possible future political change within China (Buckley, 
2011a; Fan, 2011; Ford, 2011; LaFraniere, 2011b; MacLeod, 2011b; Moore, 
2011).  This chapter therefore will examine the history of independent candidate 
movement before turning to an analysis of the current set of independent 
candidates.	  
Data on independent candidates, in general, is rare. The CCP has banned 
any official surveys on the candidates, resulting in an absence of any nationwide 
statistical information (Yuan, 2011).  In addition, during the 2006-07 local 
people’s congress elections the CCP explicitly prohibited any reporting on 
independent candidates, eliminating the possibility of gathering information from 
news and media sources during this time (Fan, 2011).  Moreover, the information 
on independent candidates that does exist is often inconsistent and incomplete, 
with numbers and accounts of the candidates varying between reports.  This 
discrepancy in data is due to a two key of factors: one being the difference in 
defining and identifying independent candidates and the other being that 
independent candidates “could emerge or disappear during any procedural step in 
an election” (Yuan, 2011, pg. 136), making the computation or even estimation of 
their exact total number extremely problematic to determine.   
The two most complete accounts of independent candidates in the English 
language come from He Junzhi (2010) and Zaijun Yuan (2011), who conducted 
interviews and research within China in order to create typologies of independent 
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candidates from past elections and to analyze the possibility of independent 
candidates to bring about democratic reform in China.  Li Fan (2006; 2011), a 
researcher and director of the World and China Institute, a nonprofit, 
nongovernmental research institute in Beijing, China, who is considered a leading 
expert on elections in China, has also published reports on and participated in 
number of interviews regarding independent candidates.  I draw the majority of 
the data from these sources for my review of the definition of independent 
candidates and a brief overview of the history of these candidates since the 1980s 
before presenting my own analysis of the current independent candidate 
movement.26  
Defining the Term “Independent Candidate” 
The term ‘independent candidate’ is not an official term and is not found 
within Chinese law.  In fact, in June 2011, an official from the National People’s 
Congress published a statement in the Chinese newspaper the People’s Daily, a 
mouthpiece of the Communist Party, stating that “there are no so-called 
‘independent candidates,’” and that “ ‘independent candidates’ have no legal 
basis” in the Chinese political and electoral system (Wines, 2011, para. 8).  
Despite its lack of legal standing, the term ‘independent candidates’ has wide 
popular usage both within and outside of China and independent candidates 
themselves have become increasingly significant in the political scene since their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  	   Two books, The Memoir of Elections in Shenzhen in 2003 (Tang Juan, 
Zou Shunin, 2003) and The Memoir of the District and County People’s Congress 
Elections in Beijing in 2003 (Zou Shubin, 2004), have been published in Chinese 
which document the 2002-03 local people’s congress elections in general and 
independent candidates specifically.  However, due to my lack of knowledge of 
the Chinese language I was unable to utilize these sources for my analysis. 
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first appearance in local people’s congress elections in the 1980s (Xun 2011b).  
As explained by China scholar He Junzhi (2010), one of the few academics to 
publish works on independent candidates in the English language, independent 
candidates differ from other candidates in that they are not pre-selected for 
nomination by a party, organization, or by voters, but instead they themselves 
aspire to run for public office and “mobilize the voters to nominate them as initial 
candidates” (Junzhi, 2010, pg. 322-23).  The designation of independent 
candidates, however, does not refer to the candidates’ party affiliation as it does in 
the United States; independent candidates may or may not be CCP members 
(Junzhi, 2010), however the majority are not.  Only three of 96 documented 
candidates from the current election cycle are known to be CCP members (Beech, 
2011; Beach, 2011a; Branigan, 2011b).   
Zaijun Yuan (2011) provides a broader definition of independent 
candidates in his book The Failure of China’s “Democratic” Reforms.  Yuan 
states that, “the term ‘independent candidates’ includes both voter-nominated 
candidates and self-nominated candidates” (pg. 105).  By including all voter-
nominated candidates, Yuan labels every candidate put up for nomination by a 
group of ten or more voters an independent candidate.  Yet, Junzhi points out that 
many voter-nominated candidates are in fact selected by voter groups that are 
organized and supported by the CCP, therefore disqualifying those candidates as 
truly independent. Hence, Junzhi asserts that the distinguishing factor of 
independent candidates is that they are not nominated or pre-selected by any 
party, organization, or group of individuals, but that they, of their own will, 
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decide to seek out a nomination and attempt to do so without the pre-approval of 
any established group.  
History of the Independent Candidate Movement 1980-2010 
Independent candidates began standing for election for public office in the 
early 1980s in response to the initiation of liberalizing political reforms under 
Deng Xiaoping and the re-institutionalization of people’s congress elections in 
1979.  During the 1980 elections, the independent candidates that stood for 
election were mostly university students and teachers from cities including 
Beijing, Chongqing, and Changsa (De Lisle, 2010; Junzhi, 2010; Yuan, 2011); 
motivated by the ideals of the recent Democracy-Wall movement27 and the 
emerging possibility of democratization in China under Deng’s reforms, these 
intellectuals were eager to assert their new right to run for public office under the 
1979 Electoral Law (De Lisle, 2010; Yuan, 2011).  Like all candidates at the time, 
independent candidates were permitted by law to conduct campaign activities; 
some, like Hu Ping at Peking University, campaigned on platforms of radical 
democratic reform (De Lisle, 2010).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  The Democracy Wall movement, beginning in 1978 but reaching its peak 
in 1979, openly criticized the Cultural Revolution and called for political and 
economic reforms, as well as human rights.  Members of the movement were 
mainly ex-Red Guards who formed unofficial networks and groups and utilized 
posters, pamphlets, and magazine articles to spread their message.  The movement 
was initiated in Beijing but spread to other cities throughout China, including 
Shanghai, Wuhan, and Guangzhou.  However, as the activists within the 
movement became braver began openly calling for democracy and making sharp 
personal attacks against the current leader, Deng Xiaoping, resulting in their arrest 
and the dissolution of the movement (Goldman, 1999). 
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Although Yuan (2011) reports that a total of more than seven independent 
candidates won deputy positions in the 1980 people’s congress elections, these 
successes by independent candidates are not recorded by either Fan or Junzhi.  In 
fact, Jacques De Lisle’s (2010) report on independent candidates based upon a 
panel discussion with Li Fan and Jiang Shan, a former independent candidate 
from 2006, among others, states that authorities interfered in the elections in 1980 
in order to ensure that independent candidates, such as Hu Ping, did not win seats 
on the local congresses.  Despite the discrepancy in reporting, the independent 
candidates’ radical campaign platforms in the first local people’s congress 
elections created a feeling of unease and apprehension among the CCP and 
resulted in actions by the government to quickly stifle the propagation of 
democratic ideals (Fan, 2011).   
In 1982, the Electoral Law was amended, eliminating the clause in Article 
30 that stated “all political parties, people’s organisations and voters can take any 
method to promote candidates,” ultimately prohibiting campaigning by candidates 
(Yuan, 2011, pg. 134).  While this amendment had little effect on Party- and 
organization-nominated candidates whose voter-base was pre-arranged by local 
“power holders” who could guarantee the loyalty of those under them, to 
independent candidates the change was a significant blow (Yuan, 2011, pg. 121).  
The success of independent candidates in the 1980 elections was based on their 
ability to attract voters through their campaign (Yuan, 2011, pg. 134).  The 1982 
amendment, however, “ruined the legal basis of the independent candidates’ 
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election campaigns,” leading to over a decade of elections in which independent 
candidates saw little if any success28 (Yuan, 2011, pg. 121). 
In 1998, independent candidate Yao Lifa, a school teacher and 
government official in the education bureau in Qianjiang City, Hubei Province, 
was elected deputy to the municipal people’s congress in Qianjian, in what is 
widely regarded as the first electoral win for an independent candidate in a local 
people’s congress election in China (Brown, 2010; De Lisle, 2010; Xia, 2008).  
Yao had unsuccessfully stood for election in 1987, 1990, and 1993, before finally 
winning in 1998.  Upon his success, Yao became a fervent pro-democracy 
advocate and activist, inspiring courage among his supporters and fear among the 
CCP (De Lisle, 2010; Xia, 2008).  Although Yao lost his runs for reelection in 
both 2003 and 2006, since his initial win in 1998, the independent candidate 
movement has been on the rise (Brown, 2010).  Later in 1998-99 election cycle, 
encouraged by Yao’s success, three independent candidates ran and won in 
Qianjiang City (Yuan, 2011).  
When independent candidate Wang Liang won a seat on people’s congress 
in the Futian District of Shenzhen at the start of the 2003 election cycle, the 
independent candidate movement was re-ignited and the participation of 
independent candidates skyrocketed (“Beijinger’s get greater poll chances”, 2003; 
“Shenzhen’s elections”, 2003).  Media articles published during the 2003 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  While Yuan (2011) reports that well-known independent candidate Zeng 
Jianyu, a worker from Luzhou City in Sichuan Province, won district congress 
elections in Luzhou in 1992 and 1997, once again, neither Li Fan or He Junzhi 
note record of his wins, though Junzhi (2010) does acknowledge him as a 
prominent independent candidate during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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elections, both in China and internationally29, document the participation of a total 
of more than 60 independent candidates in the cities of Beijing and Shenzhen and 
throughout Hubei Province (“Beijinger’s get greater poll chances”, 2003; 
Magnier, 2003; Lim, 2003; “Shenzhen’s elections”, 2003; “The landlords grow 
teeth”, 2003; Yardley, 2003).  Scholars, however, assert that over 100 
independent candidates participated in the elections, chiefly in these same regions 
(De Lisle, 2010; Yuan, 2011).  Relying on the largest reported turn out of 
independent candidates in these three main regions, 42 independent candidates 
participated in Hubei Province (Fan, 2006; Junzhi, 2010), 10 in the city of 
Shenzhen, Guangdong Province (Fan, 2006), and 23 in Beijing (“Independent 
candidate elected in Beijing”, 2003).   
As opposed to the 1980s and 1990s when the majority of independent 
candidates were students or teachers, in the 2003 elections independent candidates 
came from a wide variety of backgrounds, including peasants, farmers, white-
collar workers, lawyers, and Village Committee members, in addition to a number 
of university students and teachers (Fan, 2006; Yardley, 2003).   Of these 
approximately 100 independent candidates, a total of five were elected to seats on 
their local people’s congress (Fan, 2006), including Wang Liang in Shenzhen 
(Cabestan, 2006, pg. 48), Lu Banglie in Hubei Province (Fan, 2006, pg. 359), and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  During the 2003 elections, the magazine The Economist published two 
articles about independent candidates in China, BBC News published two articles, 
and the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Miami Herald each published 
one article.  The China Daily, which according to its website is “China’s national 
English-language newspaper,” also published three articles on independent 
candidates in 2003. 
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Xu Zhiyong (“Independent candidate elected in Beijing”, 2003) and Nie Hailiang 
in Beijing (“Landlords grow teeth”, 2003).  
In accordance with Jiang Zemin’s call for the improvement of the 
“systems of democracy,” including “democratic elections and decision-making,” 
at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 (Feng, 2006; Jiang, 2007), complaints by 
independent candidates regarding their unfair treatment in the elections and the 
opaque election proceedings resulted in amendments to the Electoral Law in 2004 
(Junzhi, 2010; Yuan, 2011).  These amendments included the establishment of a 
preliminary election on the occasion that “a relative consensus cannot be reached 
on full candidates for deputies” by the election committees (Electoral Law, 1979, 
Article 31), a step viewed to be positive by independent candidates as preliminary 
elections are considered “more democratic and fair than ‘deliberation’” (Fan, 
2011, para. 8).  The amendments also added a provision that stated that the 
election committee “may” organize meetings to “brief voters” on the candidates 
(Electoral Law, 1979, Article 33), though the language requiring such briefings 
was not added until 2010.  Although this amendment does not explicitly legalize 
campaigning by candidates, which was outlawed in 1982, it does allow, if not 
encourage, face-to-face meetings between candidates and voters, providing 
independent candidates greater ability to publicize their campaigns (Fan, 2011; 
De Lisle, 2010).   
Encouraged by the amendments and the minor but nevertheless notable 
success of independent candidates in 2003, potential independent candidates, as 
well as democracy activists and scholars, had high hopes for further democratic 
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electoral progress and reform in the 2006-07 elections (De Lisle, 2010; Yuan, 
2011).  But the government grew wary of the emerging movement and prior to the 
2006-07 elections forbade any media coverage of the elections, and particularly 
any mention of independent candidates (Fan, 2011).  With no official statistics 
and very few media reports on independent candidates during the 2006-07 
election cycle, a precise count of independent candidates during these election is 
logistically impossible to find or create and the majority of the data is drawn from 
interviews30.  Some scholars estimate that potentially tens of thousands of 
independent candidates stood for election throughout the country in the 2006-07 
local people’s congress elections, with possibly 20,000 in Beijing alone (De Lisle, 
2010; Fan, 2011).  Though other scholars believe these estimations are too high 
(Yuan, 2011), it is nonetheless certain that there was a dramatic increase in 
independent candidates in comparison to the 2003 elections.   
As the number of candidates grew in the 2006-07 electoral cycle, so did 
the diversity of the candidates.  While independent candidates in 2003 were found 
mainly in Beijing, Shenzhen and Hubei, in 2006-07 independent candidates stood 
for election in cities and provinces across the country, including at least 47 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  With the government’s prohibition of reporting on independent 
candidates, very few media outlets published any information regarding the issue.  
He Junzhi (2010) notes that “in 2006 and 2007, only one news item about an 
election lawsuit appeared in South City Newspaper, and seven cases about 
independent candidates were reported on the website World and China (available 
at: www.World-China.org).” In addition to the reports Junzhi mentions, The 
Epoch Times also published a series of three articles on independent candidates in 
China in 2006, in which they report that approximately 500 independent 
candidates stood for local people’s congress elections that year.  Due to the lack 
of official and media reports, the majority of data regarding independent 
candidates is drawn from interviews conducted by He Junzhi (2010), Yuan Zaijun 
(2011), and Li Fan (2011). 
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independent candidates in Hubei, 20 of whom participated in the city of Wuhan, 
approximately 10 in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, as well as a number in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Sichuan, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Jianxi, Jiangsu, 
Hunan, Gansu, Wenling, Wenzhou, and Shandong (Junzhi, 2010; Yuan, 2011).    
Yuan (2011) and Junzhi (2010) both categorize the independent 
candidates from this election cycle into four groups, noting that the groups are not 
mutually exclusive.  Yuan divides independent candidates into: lawyers, who 
believed in the rule of law and wanted to assert and protect their own rights as 
well as those of other citizens; economically disadvantaged citizens, both urban 
and rural, who wished to increase their social and economic standing by being 
elected; activists and intellectuals, who wished to practice their right to stand for 
election in order to promote and spread democratic practices and ideals; and 
political dissenters, who overtly opposed the rule of the CCP and believed that 
winning the elections would assist them in their fight against the Party.  Junzhi’s 
categories, while similar, do vary from those of Yuan.  Junzhi splits independent 
categories into: “idealist intellectuals,” who, as in Yuan’s analysis, hope to utilize 
the elections in order to push for the ideals democracy and rule of law; “legal 
rights defenders,” who felt that their rights had been violated and believe that a 
seat on the people’s congress would put them in a better position to defend their 
rights; “heads of state-owned sectors,” who pursued social, business, and material 
gains through the elections; and “grass-roots elites,” who also sought to improve 
their social and political status (pg. 314).   
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These categories are significant in that mainly those promoting rights and 
political reform (Junzhi’s “idealist intellectuals” and “legal rights defenders,” and 
Yuan’s “intellectuals and activists,” “lawyers,” and “political dissidents”) 
reported abuse and obstruction by the government throughout the electoral 
process (Junzhi, 2010).  Independent candidates that fell into the remaining 
categories, in which they did not pose a threat to the quota or the Party-nominated 
candidates, were mostly “tolerated” by the CCP and the electoral committees and 
were not subject to the same mistreatment and manipulation as the other 
candidates (Junzhi, 2010, pg. 331).  Those candidates that were perceived as a 
threat, on the other hand, confronted countless forms of abuse committed by the 
government in order to prevent them from winning the elections.  Yuan, Junzhi, 
and Fan all detail the harassment and obstacles that numerous independent 
candidates were forced to face in their pursuit of a seat on their local people’s 
congress, including intimidation of both candidates and voters by local police and 
government officials, detention, surveillance and phone tapping, removal during 
the final candidate deliberation stage, changes to the registration deadlines or 
voting days without notification, reorganization of electoral districts, and 
suppression of campaigning, among others.  As a result, “only a handful” of 
independent candidates were elected to seats on their local people’s congresses 
during the 2006-07 elections, making no major gains in the number of 
independent candidates elected as deputies (De Lisle, 2010, pg. 13). 
 Despite their similar findings in regards to the types of candidates and the 
mistreatment they faced, Junzhi and Yuan come to different conclusions 
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concerning the potential of the independent candidate movement to ignite future 
democratic change in China.  Junzhi (2010) remains relatively ambiguous on his 
beliefs in this regard, stating that while “on one hand, the emergence of 
independent candidates might inspire more independent candidates to participate 
in the election process and bring more competitive elections to China’ local 
people’s congress electoral system,” it is also possible that “on the other hand, the 
emergence of independent candidates might also bring more and more violence, 
bribes, and manipulation in local people’s congress elections” (pg. 332).  In the 
end, Junzhi concludes that the participation of independent candidates “may” be a 
beginning step toward “structural change,” though he states that that change might 
be “toward a new type of authoritarianism or democracy” (pg. 333), refusing to 
assert which he believes is more likely.   
Yuan (2011), on the other hand, does draw a definitive conclusion 
regarding the independent candidate movement as of 2007.  Yuan determines that 
due to the severe repression of independent candidates at the hands of the CCP, 
“at the current stage…it is highly unlikely that the participation of the grassroots 
power in Chinese local elections can lead China to political democratization” (pg. 
134).  Nevertheless, Yuan states that “there are many uncertain factors in future 
elections such as the central party’s attitude, the local power holders’ reaction, the 
level of the voters’ support, the population of independent candidates, their 
strategies and resolution etc.” (pg. 133-34), and therefore the prospect of the 
independent candidate movement spurring democratic reform in China requires 
further research.  
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Since the early 1980s, the independent candidate movement has grown 
from an isolated group of university students and professors into a nationwide 
practice, comprised of individuals from diverse backgrounds and with a variety of 
objectives in standing as independent candidates.  Yet, although the movement 
has expanded, the government has continually suppressed it, resulting in limited 
successes for independent candidates.  However, the 2011-12 independent 
candidate movement has received unprecedented attention, both in China and 
internationally, sparking anew discussion as to whether the movement has the 
potential to initiate democratic reform in China.  In the next chapter, I present a 
typology of the 2011-12 independent candidate movement, looking not only at the 
demographics but also categorizing the candidates based on their occupations and 
their goals and motives for running as independent candidates in order to 
determine whether any significant factors of the movement have changed 
resulting in an opportunity for democratization that may not have been present 
during previous elections. 
Independent Candidates in the 2011-2012 Elections  
The 2011-12 local people’s congress elections were originally intended to 
begin in July 2011.  However, the five provinces of Shanxi, Guangxi, Shaanxi, 
Xinjiang, and Jiangxi quietly began holding elections in May.  Without fanfare or 
advertisement and unbeknownst to the majority of the population, these early 
elections permitted the provinces to easily elect Party-preferred candidates 
without the hassle of managing determined and defiant independent candidates as 
during previous elections.  That is, until what is now commonly referred to in 
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Chinese media as the “Liu Ping incident”31 went viral on China’s social media 
websites towards the end of May, broadcasting news of the early elections, as 
well as of the government’s continued manipulation of the electoral system and 
mistreatment of independent candidates (Xun, 2011a).   
Just as the actions and courage of candidates Yao Lifa in 1998 (Xia, 2008; 
De Lisle, 2010) and Wang Liang in 2003 (“Beijinger’s get greater poll chances”, 
2003; “Shenzhen’s elections”, 2003) inspired the involvement of independent 
candidates in the elections, in 2011, the determination of one independent 
candidate, Liu Ping, once again triggered the upsurge in independent candidate 
participation.  However, as opposed to the successes of Yao and Wang’s 
candidacies, it was the blatant exploitation, manipulation, and harassment of Liu 
by local officials, leading ultimately to her defeat, that motivated independent 
candidates to continue their fight for political participation and representation 
(Xun, 2011a).  Liu Ping’s story, from her motives to running to her interaction 
with election and government official, provides crucial insight into and 
exemplifies key characteristics of the current independent candidate movement. 
Liu Ping, a 47-year-old (Lam, 2011a) high school educated woman and 
former worker at a state-owned iron and steel plant, attempted to run as an 
independent candidate in the Yushu District of the city of Xinyu in Jiangxi 
Province in May 2011 (Chang, 2011).  Ever since Liu had been laid off from her 
job at the at the plant in 2009 she had been petitioning for compensation for 
overtime and paid holidays that she had not received and advocating for the rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  The “Liu Ping incident” is explained in detail in the following paragraph. 
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of other co-workers as well, all to no avail. So, as the 2011-12 local people’s 
congress elections approached, Liu determined that the best way to defend her 
rights and those of her neighbors would be to run for the position of people’s 
deputy (Xun, 2011a).  Driven by the ideals summarized in her campaign slogan, 
“People’s representatives represent people! People’s representatives speak for 
people! Be the master of your rights!” Liu sought to obtain a nomination form 
from the chief of the election committee in order to gather the ten nominations 
necessary to become an initial candidate.  After being initially refused and later 
given inconsistent and misleading information as to where she could acquire the 
form by not only the chief, but also the city election committee and the 
neighborhood committee, Liu’s persistency paid off and she was finally granted a 
nomination form upon fulfilling the unlawful requirement that her ten nominators 
come with her to receive it (Lam, 2011a).   
Obtaining the form was just the beginning of the troubles Liu was to face 
throughout the election process.  A number of Liu’s nominators were approached 
by local officials and, feeling threatened, withdrew their nominations, which 
reduced Liu’s list of nominators to less than ten and disqualified her as an initial 
candidate (Chang, 2011).  Downtrodden but undeterred, Liu decided to stay in the 
election and campaign as a write-in candidate as allowed under the Electoral Law.  
Realizing that Liu was attempting to continue her candidacy, officials went to 
even greater lengths to prevent her success.  Within the week before the election, 
Liu was put under surveillance, her phone tapped, electricity turned off, home 
raided, and campaign materials and cell phone confiscated.  Two days prior to the 
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election, she was detained and held in a hotel until the election passed (Block, 
2011).   
Despite the tremendous abuses committed against her, Liu’s spirit and 
belief in the power of the actions and knowledge of ordinary Chinese citizens 
stayed strong.  On her microblog Liu reported, 
It is great to see that their awareness of citizen rights is increasing. The 
result of my participation in the district election for the People's Congress 
seat in Xinyu City, Jiangxi province is not important. The objective is in 
the process. It can raise the citizens' consciousness of their rights, which 
can monitor and counter corruptive forces. This would be the best 
outcome. (Lam, 2011a, para. 22) 
 
Liu’s participation in the elections did exactly as she hoped.  Within days, news of 
the “Liu Ping incident” rapidly spread through China’s media and ever-expanding 
blogosphere32, allowing Chinese citizens across the country access to details of a 
story that would never be published or reported on by official Chinese media 
(Xun, 2011b).   
With more than 500 million Internet users, or netizens (“China’s Internet 
users”, 2012), and more than 300 million microblog users in China today (Wee, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  The “blogosphere” is the network of interconnecting microblogs on the 
Internet in China, the most popular of which is Sina Weibo, which functions 
similar to Twitter in the United States. Due to the ability of this social media to 
rapidly spread information to hundreds if not thousands of people within minutes, 
the dissemination of what would normally in China be censored information is 
more difficult for the Chinese government to control that other forms of media, 
and has had an extremely significant impact on social movements in China, such 
as the independent candidate movement.  For more research on the impact of the 
Internet and microblogs in China see Tamara Renee Shie’s (2004) article “The 
Tangled Web: Does the Internet offer promise or peril for the Chinese Communist 
Party?” in the Journal of Contemporary China, Xiao Qiang’s (2011) article, “The 
Battle for the Chinese Internet” in the Journal of Democracy, or Rebecca 
MacKinnon’s (2011) article, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’” also in the 
Journal of Democracy. 
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2012), the news of the activist’s attempt to assert her right to stand for election 
and the government’s subsequent harassment and suppression of her campaign 
reached a larger audience than ever before possible in China, igniting anger and 
inspiring courage and action among a myriad of potential candidates (“China’s 
local election candidates”, 2011).  According to a report by the Beijing-based 
research organization the World and China Institute, by May 29, 2011, just two 
weeks after the conclusions of the elections in Liu Ping’s district in Jiangxi 
Province, approximately 100 independent candidates had declared on the 
microblog website Sina Weibo their intention to stand in their own local people’s 
congress elections (Xun, 2011a). 
In reaction to these candidacy announcements and in an attempt to counter 
the new found momentum of the independent candidates movement, an official 
from the National People’s Congress published a statement in the Chinese 
newspaper the People’s Daily, a mouthpiece of the Communist Party, stating that 
“there are no so-called ‘independent candidates,’” and that “ ‘independent 
candidates’ have no legal basis” in the Chinese political and electoral system 
(Wines, 2011, para. 8).  Yet, in spite of this clear warning against standing for 
election, independent candidates remained undeterred.  Through the use of the 
Internet, the independent candidate movement this election cycle has attracted 
unprecedented attention both within China and abroad and continued its process 
of expansion and diversification as initiated during the 2003 and 2006-07 
elections.  No longer encompassing only an isolated group of idealistic university 
students and professors as in the 1980s, the movement now spans several 
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provinces and includes participants from a variety of backgrounds and with a 
range of motivations and goals, such as worker and rights activist Liu Ping 
(Beech, 2011; “China’s local election candidates”, 2011; Demick, 2011; Foster, 
2011).   
So, who are the other individuals that constitute the current movement and 
what do they hope to accomplish by running?  Before it is possible to determine if 
these candidates represent a movement for democracy, it is crucial to analyze the 
demographics of the movement and to determine their motivations and goals in 
standing for election and defying the status quo.  The answers to these questions 
will provide a clearer picture of not only the individual candidates but also of the 
movement as whole and its potential to enact change within China’s political 
system. 
Analyzing the 2011-12 Independent Candidate Movement 
My research of the 2011-12 independent candidate movement is based 
upon data gathered and compiled from more than 100 news and magazine articles, 
blog posts and translations, and briefings and reports by nonprofit organizations, 
published between May 2011 and February 201233.  These sources range from 
major U.S. based news sources, such as the New York Times and Wall Street 
Journal, to China-based English-language sources, such as the Beijing-based 
World and China Institute and Caixin Online.  From the information given in 
these sources, I created profiles of each independent candidate, detailing their 
name, age, gender, residency, occupation, motivations and goals for the elections, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For the full list of sources used for this section, please see Appendix A. 
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the challenges they faced in running, and the outcome of their individual 
candidacy.  However, as my research does not rely on full interviews but instead 
on presumably filtered information as chosen and presented by the specific author 
or publication, creating complete profiles of each candidate was not possible.  Yet 
while the data below may not represent an entirely full or unbiased picture of the 
situation on the ground, it is a comprehensive examination of the independent 
candidate movement as presented by English-language media.  
Moreover, as in past elections, it is very difficult to calculate the actual 
number of independent candidates due to the lack of any official statistical reports 
as well as the tendency of candidates to quickly emerge and then disappear 
throughout the many stages of the elections (Yuan, 2011).  Also, due to time 
restraints, my research is drawn only from articles published between May 2011 
and February 2012, while the elections continue through December 2012.  
Therefore, although only five provinces have yet to start the election process34 
(“19 of China’s provincial regions”, 2012; “Seven Chinese provinces”, 2011) and 
news and reporting on the independent candidate movement has significantly 
decreased over the past few months, it can be assumed that had I continued 
following articles through December 2012, more news on independent candidates 
would have been reported.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  According to the most recent report from the National People’s Congress, 
as of January 3, 2012, 19 provinces and autonomous areas had completed their 
local people’s congress elections elections, seven more had begun the election 
process, and only five provinces (Hunan, Liaoning, Ningxia, Tibet, and Yunnan) 
were scheduled to hold elections later in the year (“19 of China’s provincial 
regions”, 2012; “Seven Chinese provinces”, 2011). 
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Finally, it can also be assumed that these news sources and blogs have not 
documented every independent candidate that participated in the elections thus 
far.  Instead, it is likely that such reports name only on the most vocal or active 
independent candidates, and particularly those candidates that utilized the Internet 
in their campaigns or were subject to severe repression by the government.  Thus, 
it is probable that a number of candidates who do not use or have access to the 
Internet, did not publicize their campaigns in any manner, or did not face explicit 
suppression, have not been documented.  
Who Are They: The Demographics of the 2011-12 Independent Candidates 
Estimates by news sources and researchers for the number of independent 
candidates in the 2011-12 local people’s congress elections range from 100 
(Foster, 2011; “Vote as I say”, 2011) to one million35 (Xun, 2011a).  Based on my 
research, I documented 173 independent candidates across 16 provincial-level 
divisions.  Of these 173 candidates, the names of 96 are reported.  The remaining 
77 candidates are reported as aggregates, without the identities of each member of 
the group.  Of the known candidates, 47 (or 55.3%) are male and 38 (or 44.7%) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  The most often cited estimations are those of the World and China 
Institute, led by researcher Li Fan.  Jiang Xun reports on the Institute’s website 
that, “on Sina’s Weibo at least nine people declared as self-nominated candidates 
on May 26, 18 people declared on May 27, at least 31 people declared on May 28, 
and on May 29 nearly 100 people declared themselves candidates for LPC 
elections according to the laws required.”  However, Jiang goes on to note that 
during an interview in May, Li Fan predicted that, “The number of independent 
candidates from the new round of LPC election will be more than 10 times in 
number than the previous round, close to a million people.” (Xun, 2011a)  	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are female36.  The candidates range in age from 18 to 77 years old, with an 
average age of approximately 4437.  Of the total 173 independent candidates, a 
known 70 participated (40.5%) in Sichuan, 50 (28.9%) in Beijing, 18 (10.4%) in 
Guangdong, seven (4.0%) in Guizhou, five (2.9%) in Zhejiang, and the remaining 
23 (13.3%) split between the provinces of Henan, Jiangsu, Yunnan, Jiangxi, 
Fujian, Gansu, Shandong, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and the municipalities of Shanghai 
and Tianjin38.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Beach, 2011b; Beech, 2011; Bodeen, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; Buckley, 
2011a; Buckley & Martina, 2011; Chen, 2011; China Forbidden News, 2011a; 
China Forbidden News, 2011c; China Forbidden News, 2011d; “Chinese 
Candidates Harassed,” 2012; Clearwisdom.net, 2006; Demick, 0211; Feng37, 
2011; Ford, 2011; Foster, 2011; Fung & Gao, 2012; Hancock, 2011; Hennock, 
2011; Hernandez, 2011b; “Independent Chinese Candidate,” 2011; Jacobs, 2012; 
Jiang, 2011a; Jiang, 2011b; Jiang, 2011d; Jiang, 2011h; Jiang, 2011i; Jiang, 
2011j; Jiang, 2011k; Jiang, 2011l; Jiang, 2011m; Jie, 2011; Kai Lee-see, 2012; 
Kennedy, 2011c; Lam, 2011a; M. Mackinnon, 2011; MacLeod, 2011b; Mao, 
2011; Mi, 2012; Ming, 2011; Moore, 2011; Qiangye, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011a; L. 
Qiao, 2011b; L. Qiao, 2011c; L. Qiao, 2011d; Qiao, & Weisen, 2011; Qiao & 
Fung, 2011; Qing’er, 2011a; Richburg, 2011; Rui, Jia, & Yan, 2011; Simpson; 
2011; “Vote as I say,” 2011; Wen & Qiao, 2011; Wines, 2011; “Words Matter,” 
2011; Xin & Fung, 2012; Xun, 2011a; Xuyang, 2011; Yu, 2011; Zeng, 2011). 
Due to the use of aliases as well as a lack of information, I was unable to indentify 
the gender of 11 candidates. 	  
37  Based on data complied by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Beach, 2011b; Beech, 2011; Bodeen, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; Buckley, 
2011a; “China’s local election candidates”, 2011; Demick, 2011; Fei, 2007; 
Foster, 2011; Hancock, 2011; Hennock, 2011; Hernandez, 2011b; “Independent 
Chinese Candidate,” 2011; Kirchner, 2011; LaFraniere, 2011b; Lam, 2011a; M. 
Mackinnon, 2011; MacLeod, 2011a; MacLeod, 2011b; Moore, 2011); Pedroletti, 
2011; Tan, 2011b; “Vote as I say,” 2011; Xun, 2011a Xuyang, 2011). 
 38	  	   Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Beach, 2011b; Beech, 2011; Bodeen, 2011; Buckley, 2011a; Buckley & 
Martina, 2011; Chang, 2011; CHRDnet, 2011b; “Chinese Candidates Harassed”, 
2012; Demick, 2011; Ford, 2011; Foster, 2011; Fung, 2011; “Independent 
Chinese Candidate”, 2011; Jiang, 2011a; Jiang, 2011b; Jiang, 2011d; Jiang, 
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Accordingly, approximately 89.0% of independent candidates from this 
election cycle draw from one of China’s 15 wealthiest provinces39 (Gu, 2012), 
and 79.8% from either Beijing, the capital of China with the thirteenth highest 
provincial GDP, Guangdong, the most populous province with the highest GDP, 
or Sichuan, the forth most populous province with the eighth highest GDP (Gu, 
2012).  Moreover, in Sichuan, all 70 candidates participated in the city of 
Chengdu (“Chinese Candidates Harassed”, 2012), which has more than 140 
Fortune 500 IT enterprises or tycoons and was dubbed “China Software City” in 
February 2012 (General Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 
2012, February 24).  In Guangdong, 12 of the 18 candidates participated in the 
city of Guangzhou (Jie, 2011), the capital city of Guangdong and the third largest 
city in China (United Nation Urban Agglomeration, 2010).  The distribution of 
the independent candidates illustrates that the majority of known independent 
candidates are from some of the wealthiest and most populated regions in China.  
These candidates therefore more likely have access to crucial resources, such as 
the Internet, which not only serves as a medium to advertize their candidacies and 
garner support but also provides access to information regarding politics that may 
not be available in more rural or poor regions of China.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2011i; Jiang, 2011j; Jiang 2011k; Jiang, 2011m; Jie, 2011; Jing, 2011; Kennedy, 
2011a; Kennedy, 2011b; Kennedy, 2011c; Kennedy, 2011d; M. Mackinnon, 
2011; Moore, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011b; “To commemorate the 4 June massacre”, 
2011; Xin & Fung, 2012; Xun 2011a. 	  
39  As of 2011, the provinces with the 15 highest GDP’s were, starting with 
the highest, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang, Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Sichuan, Hunan, Shanghai, Hubei, Fujian, Beijing, Anhui, and Inner Mongolia 
(Gu, 2012). 
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Despite the aggregation of independent candidates in wealthy, urban areas, 
the candidates during this election cycle held a number of jobs and professions.  
Among those whose occupation could be determined (47 of the total 173 
candidates), I divided the independent candidates into six categories based upon 
their current or most recent occupation.  The categories are “Businessmen, 
Entrepreneurs, and Professionals,” “Students and Teachers,” “Activists and 
Petitioners,” “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” “Workers,” and “Lawyers.”40  
The largest category consists of those I have labeled “Businessmen, 
Entrepreneurs, and Professionals.”   Comprising 25.5% of those with documented 
occupations, these individuals carry titles that range from advertizing executive 
and business manager to founder and CEO of a grassroots foundation and 
professional model.  They work and reside mainly in major business centers, 
including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Henan41.  
The next two largest categories are “Students and Teachers” and “Activists 
and Petitioners,” consisting of 21.3% and 17%, respectively, of the subtotal. The 
category “Students and Teachers” is composed of current university students, 
professors and teachers, current and retired, and even one high school student. 
These candidates campaigned on their campuses, located chiefly in either Beijing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40   For the full typology of the demographics of the independent candidates 
see Appendix B, Table B.1. 	  
41  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Beach, 2011b; Beech, 2011; Buckley, 2011a; Ford, 2011; Hernandez, 
2011b; Jiang, 2011j; Kennedy, 2011c; MacLeod, 2011a; MacLeod, 2011b; Qiang, 
2011b; Zeng, 2011. 
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or Guangdong, but also in Jiangxi and Jiangsu42.  The group “Activists and 
Petitioners” come from the provinces of Guangdong, Sichuan and Beijing.  While 
these candidates range from retirees to stay-at-home mothers, they are identified 
first and foremost as rights activist or petitioners, advocating predominantly for 
worker, migrant, and land rights and often driven by personal experiences during 
which their own rights were violated43. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Chang, 
2011; Demick, 2011; Jiang, 2011a; Jing, 2011; M. Mackinnon, 2011; MacLeod, 
2011a; L. Qiao, 2011b; Shu	  &	  Zho, 2011; Xuyang, 2011.	  
43  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: China 
Forbidden News, 2011c; Demick, 2011; Hancock, 2011; Jiang, 2011k; Qiao & 
Fung, 2011; Wen & Qiao, 2011; Xin & Fung, 2011. 
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Figure 1. Occupation of Independent Candidates 
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Making up 14.9% of the subtotal is the group “Writers, Bloggers, and 
Journalists,”44 which contains some of the most well known independent 
candidates due to their prolific use of the Internet and microblogs, including 
writer and celebrity blogger Li Chengpeng (Cohen & Martin, 2011), former 
columnist at the China Daily, Yao Bo (Zeng, 2011), who has more than 300,000 
followers on his Weibo microblog account (“China’s local election candidates”, 
2011), and democracy activist Chen Xi, known for his 36 political essays 
published online (Buckley, 2011c).  The writers come from a number of 
provinces, such as Guizhou, Sichuan, Beijing, Gaungdong and Gansu.  “Workers” 
form the next group and 12.8% of those whose occupations have been identified.  
They include current, retired, and laid-off workers and farmers, many from state-
owned companies, such as power, transport, and iron and steel companies45.  The 
final group, comprising only 8.5% of the subtotal, is “Lawyers,” the majority of 
whom stood for election in Beijing46.   
These categories, while they do not replicate those of the 2006-07 
independent candidates provided by Junzhi and Yuan, are very similar.  However, 
as neither Junzhi nor Yuan provide statistics as to the exact size or composition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Bodeen, 
2011; Cohen & Martin, 2011; Kennedy, 2011d; M. Mackinnon, 2011; Mi, 2012; 
Phillips, 2011; Qing’er, 2011a. 
 
45  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 2011; Buckley, 2011a; Foster, 2011; Jiang, 2011j; Kirchner, 2011; Lam, 
2011a. 	  
46  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: 
Demick, 2011; Kennedy, 2011c; Richburg, 2011; Wines, 2011. 
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these categories, it is challenging to directly compare them to my current 
categories to determine whether specific categories have grown or changed.  
Moreover, whereas Yuan and Junzhi organize their categories based upon not 
only the candidates occupation, but also their motives and goals in running, I 
decided to first categorize the candidates solely on their occupations before 
determining whether or not the individuals within each occupation shared similar 
motives and goals, further inhibiting any accurate comparison with the categories 
from the 2006-07 elections.   
Nevertheless, I will note that my distinction of “Businessmen, 
Entrepreneurs and Professionals” as its own category, and in fact the largest 
category in my study, as well as the separation of “Writers, Bloggers, and 
Journalists” from other intellectuals and comprising the fourth largest category, 
indicates, if not specifically a rise in numbers, a rise in prominence of 
independent candidates with these occupations.  That the category “Student and 
Teachers” is the second largest category illustrates that these individuals, 
primarily from universities throughout China, remain a strong driving force of the 
movement.  Overall, while I cannot quantitatively verify that the number or 
diversity of independent candidates has increased since the 2006-07 elections, it is 
clear that in spite of the harassment and suppression of the candidates, the 
movement has not diminished in either respect. 
What Do They Want: Motives and Goals of the Independent Candidates  
Through my research I have grouped the motivations and/or goals of the 
2011-12 independent candidates into seven categories based on the statements 
	   101	  
given by a total of 45 candidates.  I have separated out the candidates’ various 
reasons for running into the categories “Working for Local Issues and People’s 
Livelihoods,” “Representing and Speaking for the People,” “Defending and 
Protecting People’s Rights,” “Fulfilling their Civic Duty,” “Supervising the 
Government,” “Practicing and Promoting Electoral Rights,” and finally, 
“Advancing Democratic Reform.”47  However, these categories are not mutually 
exclusive as the vast majority of the independent candidates had complex 
campaign platforms within which they expressed a several of opinions and 
objectives that fall into a number of the above categories.   
Professor Qiao Mu’s campaign, for instance, illustrates the multi-faceted 
nature of the campaigns from this election cycle’s independent candidates.  
Professor Qiao’s campaign goals include representing and fulfilling the needs of 
his constituents.  He promises to fight for improvements on campus, such as a 
study space and better Internet connection for students.  In addition, he also hopes 
that his actions in standing as an independent candidate will encourage 
democratic political participation and education among the students (LaFraniere, 
2011b).  While his goals are progressive, he does not consider them to be 
subversive or revolutionary.  As Qiao explains, “My intention was not to 
challenge the ruling party, but to give voice to faculty and student opinion, 
promote political engagement and defend people's rights” (M. Qiao, 2011, para. 
9).  As exemplified by Professor Qiao, the motives and aims of independent 
candidates span a wide range of issues and ideals.   Yet, while the independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  For the full typology of the motives and goals of the independent 
candidates see Appendix B, Table B.2. 
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candidate movement does not posses a united platform, many of the candidates do 
share similar objectives and beliefs, which I explore below.  
Work for local issues and people’s livelihoods.  
The desire to improve the livelihoods of their fellow community members 
and to address local issues was one of the most commonly stated reasons for 
running as an independent candidate.  A total of 19 of the 45 independent 
candidates (or 42.2%), including several members of each occupation category, 
with the exception of “Lawyers,” expressed that the current government did not 
adequately manage or focus on the concerns of the local people, and therefore the 
candidates hoped to be elected so as to better conduct local affairs.  The local 
concerns raised by the independent candidates in this category range from specific 
issues such as better local transportation, education and healthcare, to general 
statements regarding the welfare and wellbeing of their neighbors48.  For instance, 
independent candidate Zhang Shiyu, a student at Renmin University in Beijing, 
campaigned on promises to install more toilets for women at the school and to 
furnish the university with improved sporting equipment (Xuyang, 2011), while 
Yu Nan, independent candidate and writer from Gansu, simply stated, “I currently 
am the most ordinary and common urban citizen, I am concerned with the 
income, and everyday affairs of all households” (Beach, 2011b, para. 8). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 2011; Bodeen, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; China Democracy 
Party, 2011; China Forbidden News, 2011b; China’s local election candidates, 
2011; Hancock, 2011; Kirchner, 2011; LaFraniere, 2011b; MacLeod, 2011a; 
Moore, 2011; Pedroletti, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011d; Qiao & Weisen, 2011; Wen & 
Qiao, 2011; Xun, 2011a; Xuyang, 2011; Zeng, 2011. 
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Yet no matter how specific or general the plea, the common thread behind 
the statements of all the candidates within this category is the aim of independent 
candidates to perform the duty that the current government is not fulfilling, 
namely supporting the livelihoods of common people and addressing the 
problems the people bring forth in an effort to improve the lives of their 
constituents.  As Guo Huojia, one of the two known independent candidates to be 
elected, stated, “My first priorities are concern for people's livelihoods, social 
security issues, and the rights of Sanshan villagers,” Guo stated (Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 
2011, para. 12).  “The villagers put me forward for the seat, so I will do my best 
to solve their problems,” he said (Moore, 2011, para. 7).  It is this sentiment 
encompasses the aspirations of the candidates in this category. 
Representing and speaking for the people. 
Sixteen independent candidates (35.6% of 45 total) campaigned on the 
idea that deputies should represent and speak for the people49.  After publication 
of Liu Ping’s original slogan, “People's representatives should be elected by the 
people! People's representatives should be speaking for the people!” (Lam, 2011a, 
para. 11), candidates around the country seized onto the concept of representation 
and reiterated Liu’s axiom in their own campaigns.  For instance, former 
journalist and editor Yu Nan, an independent candidate out of Gansu, posted on 
his microblog, “my principal is: only speak for the common people, don’t sing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Based on information compiled by the author from the following sources: 
Beach, 2011b; Beech, 2011; Bodeen, 2011; China Democracy Party, 2011; Ford, 
2011; Jiang, 2011h; Kennedy, 2011a; Kennedy, 2011c; Lam, 2011a; MacLeod, 
2011a; MacLeod, 2011b; Mi, 2012; Qiao, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011d; Qiao & Weisen, 
2011; Simpson, 2011; Xun, 2011a; Xuyang, 2011; Zeng, 2011. 
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praises of the elite, I only represent the interests of the majority of voters” (Beach, 
2011b, para. 8).  In addition, independent candidate Yao Bo from Beijing 
asserted, “My goal in seeking this election is to speak for my voters” (Zeng, 2011, 
para. 13).   
Other independent candidates also explained how, upon being elected, 
they would work keep open communication between themselves and their voters 
in order to better represent them.  For example, advertizing executive Xu Yan 
declared that he wanted to change the practice of former candidates who “never 
met voters, or communicated,” so that in the future he could work for “public 
opinion to be translated into public policy” (Ford, 2011, pg. 2).  Professor and 
candidate Wu Danghong expressed similar sentiments, pledging on his microblog 
“to keep in close contact with my constituents, listening to public opinion and 
reflecting on the public’s views” (Zeng, 2011, para. 16).  It should be noted that 
although political representation is key component of democracy, the statements 
in this category do not explicitly call for structural, electoral reform, as is found in 
other categories, but instead more receptive and responsive government officials.  
Also, unlike Liu Ping, the independent candidates who echoed her sentiments 
were not “Workers” or “Activists,” but mainly “Students and Teachers,” 
“Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals” and “Writers, Bloggers, and 
Journalists.”  
Defending and protecting people’s rights. 
Many independent candidates were motivated to run by the belief that 
once elected, they would have more power to protect and defend the rights of 
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Chinese citizens.  As explained by Liu Xiuzhen, a former transport worker and 
activist, “Some of us are rights defenders, and think we can help other 
disadvantaged groups by doing this” (Buckley, 2011a, para. 22).  Han Ying, a 
land rights activist who in her hometown fights for the rights of farmers who were 
forced from their land to make way for the construction of new condominiums, is 
one such candidate.  Han recounted, “We tried to sue the government to prevent 
demolitions.  We tried petitioning. Then I thought I would run for office as 
people's representative… Direct elections are popular this year, and I thought I'd 
have a chance to make a difference" (Demick, 2011, pg. 2).  Moreover, prior to 
running as independent candidates, a number of the candidates faced rights 
violations themselves, spurring their activism.  For example Liu Ping was 
prompted to run after her former employer failed to compensate her for holidays 
and overtime after laying her off (Xun, 2011a).  
While many of these independent candidates made blanket assertions 
regarding people’s rights, such as Yu Nan who avowed, “Brothers, sisters, you 
endorsed me, I will defend your rights on your behalf, I will veto any policy that 
does not benefit the people” (Beach, 2011b, para. 14), others addressed the 
specific rights or the rights of specific populations.  For instance, Liu Ruoxi, a 
student in Shenzhen, hoped to fight for students’ rights (LaFraniere, 2011a); and 
independent candidate Xiong Wei announced his campaign slogan as “Fight for 
the electoral rights of nine million Beijing residents who do not have Beijing 
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Hukou50 [household registration] and hundreds of millions of migrant people” 
(Zeng, 2011, para. 20).  Like Liu Xiuzhen, Han Ying, and Liu Ping, “Workers” 
and “Activists” comprise the largest portion of the twelve independent candidates 
(26.7%) who articulated comparable rationales for running for a seat on their local 
people’s congresses.  Others include “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” like 
Yao Bo, and “Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals,” like Xiong Wei.  
Surprisingly, none of the four lawyers identified in this study made statements 
that could categorize them as standing for elections in order to fight to defend 
people’s rights51. 
Fulfilling civic duty.  
Similar to, but unique from the three previous categories, this grouping is 
comprised of independent candidates who view running for public office a form 
of civic duty.  However, as opposed to “representing” or “speaking for” the 
people, these candidates wish to “serve” the people (Kirchner, 2011; Qiang, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  The Hukou system in China is a system of household registration.  
According to Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham (2008) in their article “Is 
China Abolishing the Hukou System,” through this system, “some 800 million 
rural residents are treated as inferior second-class citizens deprived of the right to 
settle in cities and to most of the basic welfare and government-provided services 
enjoyed by urban residents, ranging from small benefits like being able to buy a 
city bus pass, to much more important matters such as enrolling their children in 
public schools in cities where their parents work” (pg. 583).  Moreover, under the 
hukou system, “people do not have the right to vote for local deputies to the 
People’s National Congress if they do not have a local hukou, regardless of the 
fact that they may have been working or living in a given area for many years” 
(Loong-Yu & Shan, 2007, pg. 80). 
 
51  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011b; Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 2011; Buckley, 2011a; China Forbidden News, 2011b; 
Demick, 2011; LaFraniere, 2011a; Lam, 2011a; Phillips, 2011; M. Qiao, 2011; 
Wen & Qiao, 2011; Xin & Fung, 2012; Xun, 2011a; Zeng, 2011. 
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2011b; Zeng, 2011).  Additionally, while the language of “rights” is used by one 
of the candidates (Tan, 2011a), “rights” are not the focal point of their statements.  
Instead, these candidates focus on notions of service and duty as a driving factor 
in their campaigns.   
For instance, independent candidate Xia Shang, a businessman who stood 
for election in Shanghai, stated that one of his main reasons for running was, “to 
fulfill my civic rights and duties” (Tan, 2011a, para. 2) and “to dedicate myself to 
the service of the voters” (Zeng, 2011, para. 9).  Zheng Wei of Beijing simply 
proclaimed, “I want to serve the people!” (Kirchner, 2011, para. 4), while Cheng 
Yuting asserted that she was standing for election in order to “repay the 
community” (Hernandez, 2011b, para. 2).  Cao Tian, an independent candidate in 
Henan, was also drawn to the election by his civic consciousness.  In a 
conversation with a government official that he posted online Cao asks, “You’ve 
been a public servant for all these many years, how come you can’t just give 
someone like me a turn for once?” (Qiang, 2011b, para. 6).  Notably, only four 
candidates (8.9%) employed this altruistic outlook and language in their 
campaigns, with three of the four coming from the occupation category 
“Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals.”  While the ideals in this 
category reflect those in others, the notion of service is nonetheless distinct, 
however rare, in the current movement52. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: 
Hernandez, 2011b; Kennedy, 2011d; Kirchner, 2011; Qiang, 2011b; Tan, 2011a; 
Zeng, 2011. 
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Supervising the government.  
Another motive for competing in the election voiced by seven independent 
candidates (15.6%) was to utilize the elections as a means of supervising the 
government, exposing governmental corruption, or replacing current corrupt 
officials53.  Independent candidate Zhou Decai, a businessman in the province of 
Henan, even while recognizing his limited chances in being elected, asserted that 
“the election can expose problems in China’s system, and it’s also a way of 
putting pressure on local government officials” (Buckley, 2011a, para. 13).  Ma 
Huixia, one of only three known independent candidates in the province of 
Tianjin, ran because she feels that the only way to change the system “is for 
normal people to do the job our corrupt leaders aren’t doing” (Beech, 2011, 
October 31, pg. 2).  
Like that of Ma Huixia, these candidates’ statements often seemed fueled 
by anger at or frustration with current corrupt officials.  For instance, millionaire 
independent candidate Cao Tian, once again in conversation with a friend and 
current public official, asks: “Hasn’t [public office] always been bought and sold? 
Let me understand; how is that any different from prostitution? Which one of you 
public officials have actually been elected by the people of the republic anyway?” 
(Qiang, 2011b, para. 8).  During the same conversation, which he published on his 
microblog, Cao pledged 100 million RMB “as a guarantee to ensure clean 
government,” promising to give the money to the national treasury if he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beech, 
2011; Buckley, 2011a; Jiang, 2011h; MacLeod, 2011b; Qiang, 2011b; Richburg, 
2011; Xin & Fung, 2012. 
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participated in any form of “embezzlement, bribery or morally corrupt behavior” 
(Qiang, 2011b, para. 8).  Other candidates made similar promises.  For instance, 
vocal candidate Yu Nan vowed, “In attending the National People’s Congress 
activities I absolutely will not spend one dollar of taxpayer’s money, in attending 
the People’s Congress I will pay for my own food and board. China is most in 
need of transparency now” (Beach, 2011b, para. 6).  All of the candidates in this 
group, comprised of three “Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals,” one 
“Activist,” one “Lawyer,” one “Student and Teacher,” and one other candidate 
whose occupation is unknown, expressed a desire to bring to light and eradicate 
the rampant corruption in China’s political through their efforts as independent 
candidates. 
Practicing and promoting electoral rights.  
“My main reason for running is to let everyone know they have the right 
to vote and the right to stand as a candidate…A lot of people don't even know the 
basic procedure of elections, and I want to educate them about their rights,” stated 
Lawyer and independent candidate Li Zhiyong (Beech, 2011, para. 3).  Li’s 
statement encapsulates this next category of motives and goals of independent 
candidates.  With 19 other independent candidates (44.4%) expressing sentiments 
akin to those of Li, the aim of promoting knowledge of the electoral process and 
citizens’ electoral rights is the most commonly expressed objective by the 
independent candidates of running in the elections54.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beech, 
2011; Buckley & Martina, 2011; China Forbidden News, 201a; Foster, 2011; 
Fung, 2011; Hernandez, 2011b; Jiang, 2011h; Jing, 2011; Kennedy, 2011c; Lam, 
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Like Li, the candidates in this category emphasize not the outcome of the 
elections but the electoral process as a whole; they hope that through their actions 
they will enlighten other citizens as to their current rights under the Constitution 
and Electoral Law and inspire them to assert those rights as well.  Their aims are 
not, however, to reform the current laws, but to encourage citizens to practice 
their rights as prescribed by the laws in place.  As Yao Bo explains, “What I want 
to do is popularise knowledge about the process, to tell ordinary people they do 
have rights” (Foster, 2011, para. 5).  And even in the face of defeat, these 
candidates, like Professor Wu Qing, understand their potential to impact fellow 
citizens.  “I'm compelled to educate people about their rights and the law, that's 
what I'm trying to do” Wu stated (Xuyang, 2011, pg. 4).  “The election caused a 
great deal of discussion on campus and raised the level of involvement of the 
students and teachers, that's the positive thing coming out of this election” 
(Xuyang, 2011, pg. 5), she added.  The candidates in this category tend to be 
intellectuals or professionals, including mainly “Student and Teachers,” 
“Lawyers,” “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” and “Businessmen, 
Entrepreneurs, and Professionals.”  “Workers” and “Activists” make up the 
minority the category. 
Advancing democratic reform.  
“Even if only one of us gets elected, that’s progress” (FlorCruz, 2011, 
para. 36), stated popular blogger and independent candidate Li Chengpeng, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2011a; MacLeod, 2011b; Phillips, 2011; Ping, 2011; Qiao, 2011; Richburg, 2011; 
Tiafeng & Lin, 2011; Tan, 2011a; Xun, 2011a; Xun, 2011b; Xuyang, 2011; Zeng, 
2011. 
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promising that even if he lost he would continue to “push for democracy and rule 
of law in China in a slow but persistent way” (“Independently seeking votes”, 
2011, pg. 2).  Li was one of 17 independent candidates (37.8%) who viewed their 
participation in the local people’s congress elections as a step toward political and 
social reform in China55.  Nine of the 17, including journalist Xu Chunliu, 
explicitly championed democracy and democratic reform.  “If they [the CCP] 
really want to prove that China is becoming more open and more democratic, we 
are happy to help them prove that,” challenged Xu (M. Mackinnon, 2011, para. 
5).    
Of the 17 independent candidates in this category, five, including Xu and 
Li, are “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” with 11 of the remaining 12 
candidates being either “Lawyers,” “Student and Teachers,” and “Businessmen, 
Entrepreneurs and Professionals.”  Only one “Worker,” Liu Ping, and none of the 
documented “Activists” discussed achieving progress in political or democratic 
reform as one of their intended goals in running as an independent candidate.  In 
addition to promoting reform in general, many of the candidates in this category 
emphasized the importance of the change being initiated by the grassroots, by 
individuals stepping up to take action, as a reason for choosing to stand as 
independent candidates.  As lawyer Zhang Kai explained, “People have to pay a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011b; Block, 2011; Buckley, 2011a; “China’s local election candidates,” 2011; 
“Independently seeking votes,” 2011; Jing, 2011; Kennedy, 2011a; Kennedy, 
2011c; MacLeod, 2011a; Mi, 2012; Pedroletti, 2011; Qiang, 2011b; Qiao, 2011; 
Qing’er, 2011a; Richburg, 2011; Shu	  &	  Zho, 2011; Xun, 2011a; Xuyang, 2011; 
Zeng, 2011. 
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price to promote social progress. Someone has to go first” (Richburg, 2011, pg. 
2).  
Nevertheless, these candidates were careful to underscore that they were 
not endorsing revolution or regime change.  For example, Yao Bo states that 
while he believes “the process of democratizing China needs to take one step 
forward,” he also asserts that, “We do not want a revolution again, so there must 
be something that can replace revolution” (Block, 2011, para. 10).  Yao, as well 
as other candidates in this category, hopes instead that through his actions and 
those of his fellow candidates, “authorities will gradually accept this reality, that 
this right citizens have cannot be brushed aside… Change in China has often been 
initiated by ordinary people” (“China’s local election candidates”, 2011, para. 29).  
Yu Nan likewise asserts his aspirations for peaceful change in China.  “We don’t 
want to bomb, we want one person one vote. Democratic freedom is the global 
trend. China, it is not only for government officials, it is even more for us the 
people...This country must change, one person, one vote, save China” (Beach, 
2011b, para. 17). 
Analysis. 
 Clearly, as in previous elections, the independent candidate movement is 
not motivated by a unilateral manifesto or policy platform.  Instead, these 
candidates, coming from a variety of locations and backgrounds, possess a 
number of objectives for running for seats in their local people’s congresses that 
span a wide range of issues, both local and national.  However, upon further 
examination, it is possible to generalize the candidates and their motives into two 
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broad categories, those who express the aim to progress democracy and 
democratic reform through the elections, and those who do not.  In determining 
these broad groupings, I separated those candidates who made statements that fell 
under the categories of “Practicing and Promoting Electoral Rights” and 
“Advancing Democratic Reform,” from those candidates who did not.  While 
many, if not most of the candidates who hoped to develop democracy in China 
through their actions also expressed other goals for their candidacies, such as 
defending rights or speaking for the people, they are distinct from the other 
candidates in that the second grouping articulated only these other goals, with no 
mention of explicitly democratic aspirations.   
The first group, drawing candidates from only those two categories that 
overtly express desires from the advancement of democracy or democratic 
practices, consists of 28 of the 45 total candidates whose motivations were 
documented in this study, making up 62.2% of the whole. Of the 28 in this group, 
most candidates are either “Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals,” 
“Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” “Students and Teachers,” or “Lawyers.”  
Only 3 of the 27 candidates are known to be either “Activists” or “Workers,” 
illustrating that in the independent candidate movement, democratic ideals and 
objectives lie mainly with those who could be broadly categorized as intellectuals 
or professionals.  However, only ten of those candidates expressed solely 
democratic motives for their participation in the elections, revealing that the vast 
majority of independent candidates in the 2011-12 elections possessed reasons 
other than promoting and advancing electoral rights and democracy for their 
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candidacies.  This implies that structural democratic reform is not the driving 
factor of the independent candidate movement.  
On the contrary, the second grouping, which did not convey these same 
democratic values, makes up 37.8% of the total and is comprised almost entirely 
of “Workers,” “Activists,” and “Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals.”  
The one outlier is one candidate from the category “Students and Teachers,” Liu 
Ruoxi, who is also the only known high school student to run as an independent 
candidate (LaFraniere, 2011a).  The composition of this group and its almost 
complete absence of “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” “Students and 
Teachers,” or “Lawyers” shows that every one of the candidates from those 
categories, excepting Liu Ruoxi, expressed some sort of aim to promote 
democracy in China by running as an independent candidate.   
Notably, while the majority of “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” 
“Students and Teachers,” and “Lawyers” all express democratic sentiments and 
most “Activists and Petitioners” and “Workers” do not, the largest occupation 
category, “Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals,” is significantly 
divided in its expression of the goal of democratic reform.  The division within 
this category in terms of motives and goals for standing as an independent 
candidate exemplifies the lack of unity within the independent candidate 
movement as a whole and casts further doubts on the movement’s implication for 
democratic reform in China. 
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The 2011-12 independent candidate movement, sparked by the “Liu Ping 
incident” and spread through the extensive use of the Internet, is comprised of 
individuals from all across the country with a variety of backgrounds and wide-
ranging reasons for standing in the local people’s congress elections.  While 
“Student and Teachers” still make up a large percentage of the movement as in 
previous elections, the largest category in this election cycle is “Businessmen, 
Entrepreneurs, and Professionals,” showing a shift in the movement since the 
1980s.  “Activists and Petitioners” and “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists” also 
comprise a significant proportion of the whole, with “Workers” and “Lawyers” 
occupying the smallest share.  Although more than 60% of independent 
candidates expressed the promotion and development of electoral rights and 
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democratic reform as their aim in running in the elections, these goals were shared 
mainly by only four of the six categories of candidates.  Moreover, only ten 
candidates expressed solely democratic motives, the rest stating reasons such as 
addressing local issues, defending people’s rights, representing the people, 
supervising the government, and fulfilling a civic duty, demonstrating the absence 
of a common platform among independent candidates. 
No matter their occupation or reason for running, the independent 
candidates who participated in the 2011-12 local people’s congress elections were 
subjected to manipulation, suppression, and harassment by the government due to 
their candidacies.  In the following chapter I examine the reaction of the 
government toward the independent candidates, classifying the forms of 
suppression as either “Manipulation of the Electoral Law” or “Personal 
Harassment.”  In the end, I illustrate how the government’s suppression, as in past 
elections, continues to succeed in limiting the ability of independent candidates to 
win seats on the local people’s congresses. 
Government Reactions to Independent Candidates 
As in prior election cycles, independent candidates faced relentless 
harassment, intimidation, and suppression during their candidacies.  Carried out 
by local police, government officials, and election committees, the offenses, 
reported by 62 independent candidates in this study, took two broad forms, 
“Manipulation of the Electoral Law”56 and “Personal Harassment,”57 from which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  For the full typology of independent candidates subjected to 
“Manipulation of the Electoral Law,” see Appendix B, Table B.3. 
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they can then be broken down into nine specific categories.  Under “Manipulation 
of the Electoral Law,” I have classified the categories according to phases of the 
electoral process, namely, “Electoral Districts Organization and Candidate 
Registration,” “Candidate Nomination and Selection,” and “Election Day and 
Voting Procedures.”  The broad category of “Personal Harassment” consists of 
“Arrests and Detentions,” “Surveillance,” “Threats and Intimidation,” and 
“Confiscation of Campaign Materials,” including censorship of personal 
websites58.  
Once again, these categories largely correspond to the research of Junzhi 
(2010) and Yuan (2011).  However, unlike Junzhi who noted that only those 
independent candidates desiring democratic progress or reform were subject to 
coercion and threats by authorities, members of each of the six occupational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57  For the full typology of independent candidates subjected to “Personal 
Harassment,” see Appendix B. Table B.4 	  
58  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Beech, 2011; “Beijing’s Independent Candidates,” 2011; Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 
2011; Block, 2011; Bodeen, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; Buckley, 2011a; Buckley, 
2011c; Chang, 2011; China Forbidden News, 2011b; China Forbidden News, 
2011c; “Chinese Candidates Harassed,” 2012; CHRDnet, 2011b; Coonan, 2011; 
Demick, 2011; Fung, 2011; Fung & Gao, 2012; Hancock, 2011; Hennock, 2011; 
Hernandez, 2011a; Hernandez, 2011c; Jiang, 2011a; Jiang, 2011b; Jiang, 2011c; 
Jiang, 2011d; Jiang, 2011e; Jiang, 2011f; Jiang, 2011g; Jiang, 2011h; Jiang, 
2011i; Jiang, 2011j; Jiang, 2011k; Jiang, 2011l; Jiang, 2011m; Jiang, 2012; Jie, 
2011; Kei Lai-see; 2012; Kennedy, 2011b; Kennedy, 2011c; Kennedy, 2011d; 
Kirchner, 2011; LaFraniere, 2011a; Lam, 2011b; M. Mackinnon, 2011; MacLeod, 
2011b; Ming, 2011; “No Democracy,” 2011; Pedroletti, 2011; Phillips, 2011; M. 
Qiao, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011a; L. Qiao, 2011b; L. Qiao, 2011c; Qiao & Weisen, 
2011; Qiao & Fung, 2011; Qing’er, 2011a; Richburg, 2011; Schiller, 2011; 
Simpson, 2011; Tan, 2011a; Tan, 2011b; “The Dangerous Life,” 2011; “To 
commemorate the 4 June massacre,” 2011; Wen & Qiao, 2011; Xun, 2011a; Xun, 
2011b; Xuyang, 2011; Yilian, 2011; Zeng, 2011. 
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groups of independent candidates detailed above faced such measures, no matter 
their stated motivations or goals in standing for election.  This demonstrates that 
suppression of independent candidates has continued and perhaps increased59, 
once again severely limiting the success of independent candidates in the 
elections. 
Manipulation of the Electoral Law 
Electoral districts organization and candidate registration.  
As in the 2006-07 local people’s congress elections (Junzhi, 2010; Yuan, 
2011), the registration process was once again an obstacle for independent 
candidates in the 2011-12 elections, often on account of the determination of 
electoral districts.  A total of eight candidates reported structural impediments 
during the registration phase60.  Four candidates reported instances where their 
candidacies were obstructed or terminated due to electoral district zoning issues.  
For instance, in Shanghai, on several occasions independent candidate Liu 
Shengmin was denied information regarding the electoral district boundaries by 
his local election office, preventing him from being able to effectively campaign 
or gather the ten voters from his district necessary for him to be officially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  Since there are no statistics as to the specific number of independent 
candidates in general, let alone the number who were subject to harassment and 
manipulation, I am not able to qualitatively verify that the suppression of 
independent candidates has in fact increased. However, the conclusion that the 
abuse of independent candidates now includes candidates who have not explicitly 
stated that by running they intention is to inspire democratic reform, where 
according to Junzhi (2010) it did not in past election cycle, implies that 
suppression has expanded. 
 
60  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Branigan, 2011b; Buckley, 2011a; Chang, 2011; Jiang, 2011a; Jiang, 
2011c; Jiang, 2011g; Jiang, 2011j; Jiang, 2011k; Lam, 2011a. 
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nominated (Jiang, 2011j).  Zhang Zhiru, an independent candidate and migrant 
rights activist in Shnzhen, also noted that zoning of electoral districts in Shenzhen 
was unpredictable (Jiang, 2011k).   
Moreover, two candidates faced difficulties specifically regarding their 
residencies within their electoral districts. According to Article 24 of the Electoral 
Law (1979), “The zoning of electoral districts may be decided according to the 
voters’ residence or on the basis of production units, institutions and work units” 
(emphasis added).  Yet despite the Electoral Law, these candidates were 
disqualified on the pretext that they were not “pure residents” of the districts in 
which they wished to run.  For example, Xu Xiangyu explains, “When I went to 
register, the committee said that I didn’t have the right to stand as a candidate in 
the village, and that I had to return to my old workplace to register, which was in 
the nearest town.”  Only after Xu made known her knowledge of the Electoral 
Law and threatened to file suit did the authorities allow her to register as a 
candidate (Hancock, 2011).  Xu Chunliu was also told he was unable to register in 
his district of residency because he worked outside of it.  As a result, Xu quit his 
job in order to stand as an independent candidate (Jiang, 2011c).  
Four other independent candidates, while they did not face difficulties due 
to electoral districts, were confronted with other obstacles in registering as 
candidates.  For instance, Liu Ping (Lam, 2011a) and Zheng Wei (Branigan, 
2011b) were given misleading information about how to register.  As Zheng 
explains, “Every time I went to register they told me to wait at home and they 
would come to register me, but…no one has come” (Branigan, 2011b, para. 12).  
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In addition, both Ye Ruili (Jiang, 2011a) and Liang Shuxin (Beach, 2011a) from 
Guangdong Province were initially rejected as candidates because they did not 
meet the quota established by the government.   
Nomination and selection of candidates.  
Fourteen independent candidates, in attempting to submit their ten 
necessary nominations in order to qualify as a candidate, faced a variety of 
arbitrary rules and accusations by local officials or electoral committees, often 
resulting in the termination of their candidacies61.  For instance, Li Sihua was 
disqualified on charges of forging the signatures of his nominators (Lam, 2011b).  
More commonly however, independent candidates were required to have their 
nominators report to the election committees in order to validate their signatures 
and support for the candidates, though such a requirement is not found within the 
Electoral Law.  For example, the sponsors of Yu Nan were not only asked to 
submit their household registrations but also were subjected to interviews by the 
election committee (Hernandez, 2011a).  Professor Qiao Mu, who was also 
excluded as a candidate because of an inadequate number of supporters, reported 
that, in the end, only about 11% of his sponsors were deemed valid by the 
electoral committee (L. Qiao, 2011b). 
Often, independent candidates, such as Zhang Guolong from Heilongjaing 
Province (Jiang, 2011d) and Ye Ruili from Guangdong Province (Jiang, 2011a), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beach, 
2011a; Bodeen, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; Chang, 2011; Coonan, 2011; Demick, 
2011; Hernandez, 2011a; Hernandez, 2011c; Jiang, 2011a; Jiang, 2011b; Jiang, 
2011d; Jiang, 2011i; Jiang, 2011j; LaFraniere, 2011a; Lam, 2011a; Lam, 2011b; 
M. Mackinnon, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011b; Xun, 2011a; Xun, 2001b. 
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were given limited time to fulfill the requests of the election committees. Zhang 
was told that he had only until 1:00 p.m. the following day to summon his ten 
supporters, who had already signed his nomination form, and have them present 
their ID cards, work permits, and household registrations to the committee in for 
him to be eligible as a candidate (Jiang, 2011d).  Ye was told that he had to have 
his recommenders confirm their nomination of him in person by 10:00 p.m. that 
day, just hours after Ye attempted to register.  Ultimately, Ye was unable to fulfill 
the election committee’s demands (Jiang, 2011a). 
Even of the few independent candidates who were able to find at least ten 
eligible nominators and successfully register as initial candidates, several were 
eliminated during the second and notably opaque phase of the electoral process 
during which the election committee determines the final ballot. This phase of the 
electoral process is unique in that the election committee does not need to provide 
explanations as to why they eliminated certain candidates from the ballot.  For 
instance, candidates Xing Qingxiang, Yao Bo, Shan Yajuan and Sun Changfu, 
were left off the final ballots despite their successful registration. Candidate Yao 
Bo from Beijing grudgingly accepted the decision saying, “I assume they found 
better candidates than me” (LaFraniere, 2011a, pg. 2).  However, other candidates 
sought or were offered explanations for their disqualification.  For example, the 
head of the local electoral committee told independent candidate Xu Yimin that 
he would not win a seat on the local people’s congress because many local 
officials resented Xu for his anti-corruption efforts against them (Jiang, 2011,b).  
When Shan Yajuan asked the head of her local electoral committee about why she 
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did not make the final ballot, she was informed that the current director of the 
local people’s congress had personally ensured that she would not be on the ballot 
(Jiang, 2011b). 
Two independent candidates who did make it on to the final ballot were 
removed from the ballot prior to election day.  Zheng Dejin from Shunchang 
County in Fujian Province was taken off the ballot the day before the election; the 
election committee, after following Zheng as he visited voters in his district, 
claimed he had participated in “fraud and other illegal behavior” (Jiang, 2011j, 
Local People’s Congress Elections Watch).  The other candidate, Yu Nan of 
Lanzhou in Gansu Province, was removed from the official list the day after it 
was posted allegedly for posting campaign goals on his microblog, leaving only 
three candidates on the ballot to be elected to the three available positions 
(Bodeen, 2011; Hernandez, 2011a).   
Election day and voting procedures. 
Although the Electoral Law calls for elections to be conducted by secret 
ballot (1979, Article 34) and also prohibits bribing voters and the use of threats or 
violence to obstruct or influence voters (1979, Article 52), instances of such 
illegal actions were documented during the elections in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Sichuan, creating a hostile environment within which 
voters were persuaded to vote against independent candidates62.  For instance, 
vote buying by the government was reported in Beijing and Sichuan.  Independent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: 
“Chinese Candidates Harassed,” 2012; Fung & Gao, 2012; Hancock, 2011; Jiang, 
2011b; Jiang, 2011j; “The Dangerous Life,” 2011. 
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candidate Xu Xiangyu, an activist and retired from Beijing, reports that the village 
committee offered villagers gifts, including alcohol and cigarettes in exchange for 
the assurance that the villagers would vote for the Party-nominated candidate 
(Hancock, 2011).  Independent candidate Li Zhaoxiu from Sichuan contends that 
the practice of vote buying is systemic.  “Paying money [to voters] is part of the 
electoral landscape,” Li told Radio Free Asia.  “They are usually payments of 10 
yuan or 20 yuan per voter,” Li explained63 (Fung & Gao, 2012, para. 4).  Other 
candidates and voters report payments of 100 yuan (Hancock, 2011) and up to 
9000 yuan (Osnos, 2012) per vote. 
Intimidation and a lack of secret ballots were also prevalent during voting.  
Luo Keyin, an independent candidate in Chengdu, Sichuan, detailed his 
experience election day to New Tang Dynasty Television:  
When I was voting, the clerk said to me, 'only choose from the three 
names at the top of the list.' I chose my own name, and he then proceeded 
to take a picture of me. Is this not intimidating the everyday people! The 
ordinary people are afraid. (“Chinese Candidates Harassed”, 2012, para. 5) 
 
Xu Xiangyu also notes that intimidation by security forces and government 
officials also took place in Beijing.  Xu stated that in addition to police 
surrounding the building in which voting was taking place, “the government had 
more than 200 staff out on Election Day.  Local people were afraid of the village 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63   Twenty yuan is equivalent to just over 3.15 USD.  As of the beginning of 
2011, the average monthly salary in Sichuan Province of a “direct employee” was 
approximately 1,400 yuan (Understand China, 2011).  However, as of January 1, 
2012 the minimum monthly salary in Sichuan Province was raised 23.4%, to 
between 800 yuan (123.53 USD) and 1050 yuan (166.07 USD), or depending on 
the district (China province raises minimum wage, 2011), which will most likely 
result in an increase in average salary.  Nevertheless, for someone making the 
minimum salary of 800 yuan, a payment of 20 yuan would be 2.5% of his/her 
monthly salary. 
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party secretary,” and therefore did not feel comfortable to vote for anyone but the 
Party-nominated candidates (Hancock, 2011).   
Independent candidates in Sichuan, Guangdong, and Shanghai report other 
instances of election irregularities, including a lack of or wrong information 
regarding the time and location of voting, as well as being prohibited from 
supervising the counting of the votes64.  For example, according to independent 
candidate Liu Shengmin in Shanghai, the Party secretary removed the ballot 
boxes from the polling station, taking them to an unknown location and refusing 
to allow voters or representatives of the candidates supervise the vote count 
(Jiang, 2011j).  Similar situations in which ballot boxes were taken from the 
original polling cites to an undisclosed location by government officials were also 
documented by both Yan Tafeng and Wu Yong, independent candidates from 
Chengdu, Sichuan (“Chinese Candidates Harassed”, 2012; Fung & Gao, 2012).   
Wang Binru, also from Chengdu, clarifies the significance of being able to 
supervise the vote count, explaining that in the Wenjiang district, 
The authorities announced that their two candidates won by 2,000 votes 
and 1,000 votes, but they didn't say how many votes were cast 
overall…The election law requires that candidates win more than half of 
possible votes, but without this information there is no way to question 
[the results]. (Fung & Gao, 2012, para. 13). 
 
The significance of monitoring the vote count is heightened when recalling that 
the election committee, which is chosen, funded, and controlled by the CCP, is 
charged by law with the authority to determine whether or not the election results 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: 
“Chinese Candidates Harassed,” 2012; Fung & Gao, 2012; Hancock, 2011; Jiang, 
2011b; Jiang, 2011j; “The Dangerous Life,” 2011.	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are valid (Electoral Law, 1979, Article 42); if such a determination is made 
without supervision then independent candidates are unable to refute the outcome.  
Ultimately, this and the other election day illegalities conducted by the 
government or election committee, successfully eliminated the vast majority of 
the few independent candidates who did make it onto the final ballot or who 
attempted to run as write-in candidates. 
Personal Harassment 
Arrests and detentions.  
Other than the manipulation of the Electoral Law to disqualify 
independent candidates, arrests and detentions were the most commonly and at 
times most severe tactics utilized to suppress the candidates.  Of the 173 
candidates documented in this study, 28 independent candidates65, as well as 
seven of their supporters, were subject to arrest or detention.  Of the 35 
independent candidates and supporters who reported detentions, 12 were in 
Beijing, with others occurring in Guizhou, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and 
Sichuan provinces.  Activists, workers, student and teachers, writers, and 
businessmen were all suffered this offense; however, candidates attempting to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  This number does not include independent candidate Cao Tian.  Cao, the 
millionaire businessman running for election in the city of Zhengzhou in Henan 
Province, disappeared soon after declaring his candidacy online in June.  
However, since the circumstances surrounding his disappearance are unknown, he 
was not included in the Arrests and Detentions category (NTDTV, 2011, June 21. 
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meet with each other or explicitly organize others, such as through writings, 
protests or petitions, seemed specifically targeted66.   
The length and severity of the detentions varied with each candidate, some 
held against their will for a couple of hours, others for months at a time, some 
candidates detained at police stations, others within their own homes surrounded 
by security forces.  While most cases of arrest and detention were brief, such as 
the group of 12 candidates in Beijing, including Zheng Wei, Ye Jingchun, Zhang 
Shangen, and Yang Lingyun, who were detained for approximately seven hours at 
a local police station for questioning after endeavoring to meet at the home of one 
of the candidates to discuss campaign tactics (Qiao & Fung, 2011), other 
candidates were held through the duration of the elections, inhibiting them from 
continuing their candidacies.  For instance, independent candidate Wu Lihong, a 
land rights activist from Beijing, and her two legal representatives Qi Yueying 
and Li Shanlin, were all held for 15 days in the Chaoyang District of Beijing.  
Police abducted Wu at 2am on September 29, 2011, without the knowledge of her 
friends or family (“Beijing’s Independent Candidates”, 2011).  While the 
organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reports that Wu, Qi, and Li were 
all held at the Chaoyang District Detention House (Jiang, 2011e), an article by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beech, 
2011; “Beijing’s Independent Candidates,” 2011; Block, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; 
Buckley, 2011c; China Forbidden News, 2011b; China Forbidden News, 2011c; 
CHRDnet, 2011b; Demick, 2011; Fung, 2011; Fung & Gao, 2012; Hennock, 
2011; Jiang, 2011b; Jiang, 2011c; Jiang, 2011e; Jiang, 2011f; Jiang, 2011g; Jiang, 
2011h; Jiang, 2011i; Jiang, 2011j; Jiang, 2011l; Kai Lai-see, 2012; MacLeod, 
2011b; Ming, 2011; “No Democracy,” 2011; Pedroletti, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011a; L. 
Qiao, 2011c; Qiao & Weisen, 2011; Qiao & Fung, 2011; Qing’er, 2011a; 
Simpson, 2011; Xun, 2011a; Yilian, 2011. 
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Time Magazine states that Wu informed her brother that she had been forced to 
travel to Mount Emei in southwestern China that is commonly visited by Chinese, 
particularly Buddhists, to confess their transgressions (Beech, 2011).  As a result 
of her detention, Wu was unable to register and was effectively disqualified from 
standing for election.  
Threats and intimidation.   
Threats against and intimidation of independent candidates and their 
supporters was another widespread tactic of personal harassment used by 
authorities.  In my research, 20 independent candidates (11.6% of the total 173 
candidates) reported cases of threats or intimidation during their candidacies.  
Once again, candidates who were subjected to this form of harassment included 
workers, writers, activists, lawyers, students, teachers and businessmen with their 
motives for running crossing the spectrum as well.  This category includes a 
number of actions taken by authorities against independent candidates, including 
verbal threats, harassment of candidates’ families and supporters, and even 
physical violence67.  
Verbal threats, directed not only toward the candidates but also their 
family members, campaign volunteers, and supporters, were reported by most of 
the candidates in this category. For example, Zhang Zhiru was notified that if he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Block, 
2011; Bodeen, 2011; Branigan, 2011b; China Forbidden News, 2011b; Fung & 
Gao, 2012; Jiang, 2011d; Jiang, 2011g; Jiang, 2011j; Jiang, 2011k; Jiang, 2011l; 
Jiang, 2012; Kennedy, 2011b; Kennedy, 2011c; Kennedy, 2011d; Kirchner, 2011; 
Pedroletti, 2011; Phillips, 2011; M. Qiao, 2011; L. Qiao, 2011b; Richburg, 2011; 
Schiller, 2011; Tan, 2011a; Tan, 2011b; “To commemorate the 4 June massacre,” 
2011; Wen & Qiao, 2011; Xuyang, 2011. 
	   128	  
continued to distribute election or campaign materials he would be liable for 
“undermining elections” (Jiang, 2011k, Local People’s Congress Election Watch), 
and a consultant for candidate Liu Shengmin, was told by election officials to “be 
careful” (Jiang, 2011j, Local People’s Congress Election Watch).  Other forms of 
intimidation documented include disruption of candidates’ meetings or public 
speaking events by police (Lam, 2011a; M. Qiao, 2011), harassment of 
candidates’ places of employment or businesses by tax auditors or government 
officials (Kennedy, 2011c; Tan, 2011b), eviction (Jiang, 2011l), and restriction of 
travel (Richburg, 2011).  Two candidates, Hu Jinqiong and Gan Xingyan, both 
from Chengdu, Sichuan province, were even physically beaten, Gan ending up in 
the hospital due to her injuries (China Forbidden News, 2011b; Jiang, 2012).  
Although most candidates did continue their campaigns in spite of such 
harassment, it did result in the withdrawal of one of the independent candidates 
from the election. Xie Runliang reported, “After the police found out I was 
running, they came for a talk…I feared the impact on my life so I quit” (Bodeen, 
2011, para. 19).   
Surveillance.  
Surveillance of independent candidates by local officials and security 
forces was also reported.  Through my research, I documented that 12 of the 
candidates at one point had security forces follow them, guard their homes, visit 
them at their place of work, take photographs of them and their supports, or 
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monitor their phone calls68.  In the case of Zheng Wei in Beijing, a policeman 
guarded her home to prevent the media and foreign press from having access to 
her (Kirchner, 2011).  Professor Qiao Mu of the Beijing Foreign Studies 
University reported in an article that he wrote published by the Wall Street 
Journal,  
At our first campaign planning meeting, two security officials showed up 
disguised as students.  One took a photo of my contacts list and then they 
left in a hurry…All my phone calls were monitored and my talks with the 
team were leaked.  I was followed by security agents everywhere (M. 
Qiao, 2011, para. 3). 
 
Like Zheng and Professor Qiao, the majority of candidates under surveillance 
were standing for election in Beijing, nine of the 12 total.  Though, as with the 
other forms of personal harassment thus far, the surveillance is not limited to 
candidates of a particular occupation or with certain goals or motivations. 
Confiscation of campaign materials.  
The final form of personal harassment is the confiscation of campaign or 
election materials, including the censorship of independent candidates’ individual 
microblogs or personal websites.  Based upon my research, there are reports of 
ten independent candidates who had campaign resources or personal property 
taken from them during their candidacies, with six of ten having their microblogs, 
websites or Internet videos blocked or deleted.  While four of the six candidates 
who were censored on the Internet were up for election in Beijing, none of those 
who had their materials physically taken were campaigning in Beijing, but were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Beech, 
2011; “Beijing’s Independent Candidates,” 2011; Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 2011; China 
Forbidden News, 2011b; Jiang, 2011j; Jiang, 2011k; Kirchner, 2011; M. Qiao, 
2011; L. Qiao, 2011a; L. Qiao, 2011b; L. Qiao, 2011c. 
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instead located in Guangdong, Guizhou, Jiangsu, and Jiangxi provinces69.  Cases 
involving confiscation of materials include retired professor at Shandong 
University, Sun Wenguang, whose election campaign notice and display board 
were removed from the university were he maintains the position of retired 
worker (Jing, 2011), former worker and activist Liu Ping, whose home was raided 
and materials such as banners and her cell phone were taken (Block, 2011), and 
Wang Lixin, whose Weibo microblog was shut down in the days prior to the 
elections in Shandong province (Jiang, 2011m).   
While this form of personal harassment may seem minor in comparison to 
“Arrests and detentions” and “Threats and intimidation,” it can nonetheless be 
extremely damaging to a campaign.  Since independent candidates are not 
nominated and therefore not backed by the CCP or other organizations, they rely 
on campaign materials and the Internet to gain the recognition necessary to have a 
chance at winning the elections.  Therefore, the confiscation of their limited 
resources severely curbs their opportunities for success.  
Analysis. 
Ultimately, the government was successful in preventing independent 
candidates from being elected. As a result of the various forms of harassment, 
suppression and manipulation, only two independent candidates have so far been 
elected to seats on their local people’s congresses.  These two candidates, Guo 
Huojia and Li Youzhou were elected in the city of Foshan in Guangdong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  Based on data compiled by the author from the following sources: Block, 
2011; China Forbidden News, 2011b; Jiang, 2011i; Jiang, 2011k; Jiang, 2011l; 
Jiang, 2011m; Jie, 2011; Pedrolettie, 2011; Qiao, 2011; Zeng, 2011. 
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Province.  Guo, a farmer and land rights activist who did not report any direct 
interference in or obstruction of his campaign by local officials, explained that he 
managed to navigate the electoral rules and regulations by doing “everything 
according to the law to satisfy the government here” (Bi,	  Gao	  &	  Shen, 2011, para. 
4).  And when asked about his campaign strategy, he stated: “I didn’t really have 
one. I kept a low profile” (LaFraniere, 2011a, para. 12).   
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Guo was not the only independent candidate who was rewarded for opting 
to lay low during the elections.  Though in the end they were not elected, both Xu 
Xiangyu and Yao Bo avoided harassment by the government and security forces 
staying out of the limelight.  Xu, who ran in the Beijing November 8, 2011, 
elections, did not declare herself as a candidate until October and stated that she 
“didn’t do any kind of self-promotion.”  She was also knowledgeable of the 
Electoral Law and not easily manipulated by local election officials.  As a result, 
Xu made it on to the final ballot in Beijing’s Daxing district, though she lost to a 
local Party member (Hancock, 2011).  Yao Bo, despite being a popular blogger 
and social commentator, also recognized the advantages of running a discreet 
campaign.  “The last thing you want to do is gather people together,” he explained 
(LaFraniere, 2011a, para. 3).  Though Yao did not face abuse by officials as a 
candidate and did appear on the initial list of candidates, was eliminated by the 
election committee and was not on the final ballot (LaFraniere, 2011a). 
As illustrated by the campaigns of Guo, Xu, and Yao, those candidates 
who avoided the spotlight were less likely to be subjected to the same sort of 
suppression and mistreatment as those who did not.  More specifically, those who 
attempted to meet with and/or organize voters or other independent candidates 
seem to have met with the most challenges throughout their campaigns.  For 
instance, twelve independent candidates, including Ye Jingchun and Yang 
Lingyun, were detained in Beijing in September after attempting to gather at the 
home of independent candidate Zheng Wei (Yilian, 2011).  Following their 
detainment, these candidates remained a target of other forms of harassment 
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including surveillance, intimidation, and confiscation of materials (Branigan, 
2011b; Kirchner, 2011).  Likewise, Professors Wu Qing and Qiao Mu, who both 
sought to meet with students and voters during their campaigns in Beijing, were 
also forced to endure the obstruction of their campaigns at the hand of local 
officials (M. Qiao, 2011; Xuyang, 2011).  
Examples of the government’s efforts to prevent independent candidates 
from communicating with and organizing other Chinese citizens also encompass 
those candidates who attempted to do so utilizing the Internet.  These candidates 
include Wang Lixin (Jiang, 2011m) and Xiong Wei (Zeng, 2011), whose 
microblogs were closed down; blogger Xu Yan, who was forced to quit his 
advertizing job after his employers and family were threatened (Bodeen, 2011); 
and most notably, Chen Xi, who was sentenced to ten years in prison on the 
charge of “inciting subversion” (Hennock, 2011) for his 36 online political essays 
(Buckley, 2011c).   
As a result of the government’s crackdown on independent candidates, not 
only were the vast majority disqualified to run, but several were deterred from 
wanting to run again in the future.  As Han Ying reflected, "After what I've 
experienced, I don't think I'll run…I've seen the dark side of the Chinese 
government" (Demick, 2011, pg. 2).  Independent candidate Xia Shang was so 
dismayed by the government’s reaction against him that he decided to abandon 
his campaign in the midst of the elections.  Xia posted on his microblog this 
statement of withdrawal: 
My original intent in standing in the People's Congress election was to 
abide by the constitution and fulfill my civic rights and duties within the 
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framework of election law.  However, since I first announced my 
candidacy, I have been surrounded by constant obstacles and setbacks. 
The series of recent horrible public incidents, however, has opened my 
eyes to the true situation and led me to lose all confidence in the current 
regime.  I now feel a strong sense of shame at the thought of taking part in 
the upcoming election.  To stand in the election would be do sully myself 
through association with the regime, and serve as affirmation and respect 
for it.  This it does not deserve. As such, I hereby declare my withdrawal! 
(Kennedy, 2011d, para. 2). 
Yet, despite the intense suppression and minimal successes, many independent 
candidates remained undeterred.  As Xu Chunliu reflected, “At least I learned 
about the whole process of elections this time…I want to stand in the election 
again next time, in five years”  (Jie, 2011, para. 13).  
 Throughout the election the government employed a number of different 
tactic in order to deter and suppress the candidacies of independent candidates.  
The methods included manipulation of the Electoral Law in all stages of the 
electoral process, as well as personal harassment, such as arrests, detention, 
surveillance, threats, and confiscation of campaign materials.  In the end, the 
government was victorious in their mission of limiting the success of independent 
candidates: only two out of 173 documented independent candidates were elected 
as deputies to their local people’s congresses.  Nevertheless, many candidates 
remain optimistic and plan on pursuing candidacies in the next elections, leaving 
hope of success for independent candidates in the future. 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Suggestions for Further Research 
So does the current independent candidates movement represent an 
opportunity for democratization in China?  As stated earlier, Jason Brownlee 
(2007) defines an opportunity for democratization as “an opening in which the 
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fundamental parameters of public life are uncommonly contested and vulnerable 
to change by the actors involved” (pg. 24).  After analyzing both the institutions 
and actors involved in the independent candidate movement, I assert that the 
independent candidate movement does constitute an opportunity for democracy 
within China, fulfilling the requirements laid out by Brownlee in his definition.  
First, through their participation in the elections, independent candidates satisfy 
Brownlee’s stipulation of contesting “the fundament parameters of public life” 
(pg. 24).  By standing as independent candidates, these individuals directly 
challenge the established practice of the Party of determining the candidates for 
the local people’s congress elections.  In doing so, independent candidates openly 
question and reject the authority of the CCP, a practice that is known to have 
severe consequences and is not taken on lightly by citizens in China.   
Secondly, although there has not been an increase in the number of 
independent candidates elected to the local people’s congresses, the fact that 
independent candidates have and continue to win elections, no matter how few in 
number and in spite of the extraordinary measures the government undertakes to 
prevent their success, reveals that the government’s systems and policies are in 
actuality “vulnerable to change by the actors involved” (Brownlee, 2007, pg. 24).  
Moreover, the hostile and aggressive reactions from the government and the CCP 
toward the independent candidates show that the government recognizes its own 
vulnerabilities.  Nevertheless, according to Brownlee, such an opportunity does 
not necessarily lead to future democratic change or reform.  So while I contend 
that the independent candidates’ participation in the local people’s congress 
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elections does amount to an opportunity for democratization, the more substantial 
and pressing question is whether the movement will in fact result in further 
democratization in the future.   To answer this question, a number of points must 
first be discussed. 
First, in spite of the growing number of independent candidates 
participating in the local people’s congress elections over the past three decades 
and the increased publicity of the movement during the 2011-12 elections in 
particular, the number of independent candidates actually elected to positions on 
their local people’s congresses has not significantly increased.  This year, in 
comparison to the five independent candidates elected in 2003 and the “handful” 
(De Lisle, 2010) of independent candidates elected in 2006-07, the number of 
known candidates elected may have in fact decreased.70  Thus far only two known 
independent candidates have been elected to seats on their local people’s 
congresses, representing less than 0.0001% of China’s more than 2 million local 
people’s congress deputies.  The lack of an increase in electoral success for 
independent candidates in the face of considerable escalation in participation 
illustrates the extensive power and control that the government and the CCP 
maintain over the electoral process, in particular, and China’s political system, in 
general. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	   That the number of independent candidates elected has actually decreased 
from previous years cannot be stated with certainty for two main reasons.  First, 
this years elections have yet to conclude, leaving room for more independent 
candidates to be elected.  And	  secondly, as has presented a problem throughout 
this study, the exact number of independent candidates, elected or otherwise, in 
unable to be accurately determined due to the lack of academic research on the 
subject as well as the absence of official statistics. 
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Moreover, with each local people’s congress itself being comprised of 
between 40 and 450 deputies, depending upon its level and the size of the 
population it represents (Electoral Law, 1979), the potential impact of these two 
elected independent candidates on the actions and procedures of the people’s 
congress on which they sit is minor. Even if more independent candidates are 
elected in the coming months of elections, or in future elections, the positions to 
which they are elected still occupy a very low level within the overall political 
system in China.  Local people’s congresses do not have the power to affect 
national policy or even to independently draft local legislation; and while their 
powers of supervision and representation have increased over the past two 
decades, local people’s congresses are still required to act in accordance with 
Party policy.  Thus, even if independent candidates are elected and possess the 
will to push for reform, they, as well as the other members of the local people’s 
congresses, still remain under the thumb of the CCP, leaving little possibility for 
independent candidates to effect dramatic democratic change in the face of the 
Party’s significant authority and influence in China. 
Second, although the independent candidate movement has expanded to 
include individuals from a variety of backgrounds and occupations, the movement 
as a whole is divided in terms of the candidates’ goals and motives for standing in 
the elections.  As opposed to the 1980s when the movement was comprised 
mainly of university students and professors pushing for structural democratic 
reform, today it consists of a number of factions, which I have categorized based 
on the occupation of the candidates.  Of the six categories, only three, “Students 
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and Teachers,” “Lawyers,” and “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” consistently 
express the promotion of electoral rights and democratic reform as a reason for 
running as independent candidate.  The composition of the faction expressing 
democratic ideals is not surprising considering students and intellectuals have 
long made up a significant portion of the members of past democratic movements 
in China.  On the other hand, candidates in the groups “Activists and Petitioners” 
and “Workers” for the most part did not include the advancement of democracy as 
a goal of their candidacies.  Instead, these candidates hoped to gain political and 
social power as deputies on the local people’s congress in order to address local 
issues pertaining to the livelihood of their communities or to speak for and protect 
the rights of minority or oppressed populations.   
Notably, the category “Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals” is 
divided in the candidates’ stated desire for democratic reform.  That such a split 
occurs within this specific category is noteworthy in that not only is 
“Businessmen, Entrepreneurs, and Professionals” the largest category in the 
2011-12 movement, but it is also composed of candidates with the highest social 
status due to China’s emphasis on economic development over the past two 
decades.  Therefore, these candidates also possess the greatest capabilities, with 
the possible exception of “Writers, Bloggers, and Journalists,” to reach and 
influence the population at large and direct the focus of the independent candidate 
movement toward democratic reform.  However, the split among the candidates in 
regards to their goals and motives inhibits their ability to do so. 
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Furthermore, of all the candidates whose motives were documented in this 
study, only 10 expressed solely democratic ideals as their aim in running in the 
local people’s congress elections.  Accordingly, nearly 80% of the independent 
candidates included reasons other than the promotion of electoral rights or the 
advancement of democracy for participating as independent candidates.  This 
suggests that while over 60% did include democratic sentiments, these sentiments 
were not the driving force for the majority of independent candidates.   
Moreover, of those who did express the desire for democratic reform, 
many clarified that their aim in running was not to overthrow the regime, but to 
assert their rights and promote reform from within the current political system.  
For instance, Tong Zongjin, an associate professor at CUPL, told Caijing that “I 
hope to find a third path, one that drives forward institutional reform while 
recognizing the legitimacy of the current system” (Shu	  &	  Zho, 2011, para. 6).  
Even outspoken social critic Li Chengpeng emphasized, "My purpose of running 
in the election is not to rebel or overthrow the government" (FlorCruz, 2011, para. 
11), but instead to “push for democracy and rule of law in China in a slow but 
persistent way” (“Independently Seeking Votes”, 2011, pg. 2).  In place of 
revolution, Tong, Li, and several others (Beach, 2011b; Block, 2011; Zeng, 2011) 
hoped their participation would gradually lead to the formation of a more 
competitive, representative, and democratic political system in China, not 
necessarily revolution or the ousting of the CCP, once again limiting the potential 
impact of the independent candidate movement on democratization in China. 
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Third, not only is there an absence of a unified, democratic platform 
among the independent candidates in China, but there is also a lack of 
coordination and organization among the candidates and their supporters.  
Although the elections have provided independent candidates a rallying point, the 
candidates have yet to form a united opposition force.  Howard and Roessler 
(2006) and Van de Walle (2006) both point to the formation of cohesive 
opposition forces and parties as a significant condition for democratic transitions.  
Howard and Roessler (2006) assert that “the more divided the opposition parties, 
the more susceptible they are to government manipulation, cooptation, and 
repression” (pg. 371) and conclude in their study that electoral success by 
opposition forces in authoritarian regimes depends upon the ability of the 
opposition “to put aside differences and form a coalition” (pg. 376).  Yet 
examples of organization among independent candidates in this current movement 
are few, and those that do exist have only occurred within cities or districts and 
not between them.    
The instances in which independent candidates did attempt to meet with 
one another or congregate voters and supporters were all met with obstruction by 
local officials or security forces.  Examples of the government’s targeting of 
independent candidates endeavoring to organize are seen in the narratives of Han 
Ying (Demick, 2011) and Zheng Wei (Yilian, 2011) from Beijing, Liu Ping in 
Jiangxi (Lam, 2011a), and Professor Qiao (M. Qiao, 2011), among others, all of 
whom were prevented from carrying out their efforts at coordination and 
assembly.  The government’s censoring of personal websites, blogs, and online 
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publications also impedes the potential organization of candidates and their 
supporters, reducing the ability of candidates to communicate to others not in 
their immediate geographical location.  On the other hand, candidates who 
maintained a low profile, did not meet with other independent candidates, and did 
not publicize their campaigns were not viewed as significant threats and therefore 
were not subjected to the same treatment.  Therefore, the targeted harassment, 
intimidation, and suppression of independent candidates who did publicize their 
campaigns and attempt to meet and communicate with other candidates and their 
supporters should be interpreted not only as an endeavor to prevent independent 
candidates from winning in the current elections, but also to obstruct any 
possibility of independent candidates forming a unified, cohesive opposition 
movement.  
Based upon these three key points, the failure of independent candidates to 
increase their electoral success despite a growth in participation, the division 
among independent candidates in terms of their goals and motives in standing in 
the elections, and the lack of organization and coordination across the movement 
as a whole, I contend that the independent candidate movement will not 
immediately result in structural democratic reform in China.  The democratic 
reform is just one of many objectives independent candidates aimed to pursue by 
competing as independent candidates, implying that democratization in China is 
not the main motivating force of the movement and therefore that the movement 
is unlikely to directly result in such reform.  Furthermore, the government’s harsh 
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candidacies and attempts at organizing a cohesive opposition illustrate the clear 
imbalance of power between the independent candidate movement and the CPP 
and underscores the unlikelihood of the CCP willingly or peacefully relinquishing 
their hold on power anytime soon.  
Instead, I contend that the full impact of the independent candidate 
movement on the advancement of democracy within China’s political system will 
gradually manifest itself in the coming years and decades.  Independent 
candidates have been standing in the local people’s congress elections since 1980.  
Although their efforts over the past three decades have been met by limited 
success and severe suppression and persecution, the movement has nevertheless 
continued to grow.  As opposed to being deterred by the obstacles in front of 
them, independent candidates have been further motivated by the government’s 
harsh responses, as demonstrated in the recent surge of independent candidates in 
reaction to the “Liu Ping incident.”  Such determination and motivation, coupled 
with the newfound ability of independent candidates to gain not only support 
among voters but also to encourage others to participate as candidates via the 
Internet (Block, 2011; Ford, 2011; Foster, 2011; Zeng, 2011), suggests that the 
movement is likely to expand in future elections.  
As the movement grows, I predict that the candidates’ goal of educating 
the public as to their electoral rights and stirring and promoting citizens’ civic 
consciousness through their participation in the elections will increasingly be 
fulfilled. “Practicing and Promoting Electoral Rights” was the most commonly 
cited reason by independent candidates (44.4%) for running in the local people’s 
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congress elections and, I argue, is also the objective that was most successfully 
achieved.  Elections have been widely shown to have the potential to act as 
“instruments of democracy” (Powell, 2011; see also Huntington, 1991; Langston, 
2006; Schedler, 2011; Xia, 2008).  And although independent candidates were not 
widely elected, by standing as independent candidates these individuals were not 
only able to assert their own rights but to educate others as to the rights they 
possess under current Chinese law as well (Huang, 2011; MacLeod, 2011b; 
Phillips, 2011; Shu	  &	  Zho, 2011).  Through the sharing of their stories online, 
independent candidates have raised awareness and discussion of the local people’s 
congress elections and electoral rights in China to an unprecedented level, 
informing millions of Chinese citizens across the country of their constitutional 
right to stand as independent candidates and explaining the process necessary to 
do so. 
Furthermore, their candidacies have sparked extensive discussion about 
the role of the government in China and debate over the need for and potential of 
a democratic Chinese political system (Beach, 2011b; Kennedy, 2011c; Qiang, 
2011b; Schiller, 2011).  By speaking out about the needs of the people in their 
communities, independent candidates have exposed to millions the gap existent 
between the public’s wants and the government’s actions.  Additionally, by 
detailing the obstruction of their campaigns and the extent of the government’s 
manipulation of the electoral system, independent candidates have further reduced 
the government’s legitimacy.  So, while the independent candidate movement has 
yet to challenge the CCP to the extent that electoral and democratic reform is 
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immediately necessary for the CCP to avoid revolution or collapse, it is beginning 
to expose the scope of the government’s oppression and inspire Chinese citizens 
to assert their electoral rights.  With continued pressure from the independent 
candidate movement and increasing public knowledge of political rights and 
democratic practices and ideals because of this and other like-minded movements 
and individuals, the CCP will eventually be forced to make the choice of either 
taking steps to appease the ever-growing demand for political participation and 
representation in China, ultimately leading to a more open, competitive, and 
democratic political system, or dramatically increasing their suppression of those 
demanding political reform, potentially leading to greater political dissatisfaction 
and unrest among the populace and the possibility of revolt or revolution. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 There were a number of restraints on my research throughout this study.  
First, and most significantly, due to language, time, and monetary restraints, I was 
not able to travel to China to conduct interviews of independent candidates, 
voters, or government officials for this study.  Further, as I have never been to 
China, my analysis and conclusions on the independent candidate movement are 
therefore based entirely on the reports others as opposed to my own direct 
observations of the situation.  Though I made the effort to gather articles from a 
wide variety of English-language sources in order to gain a broader perspective of 
the issue at hand, that I required the sources to be English-language also severely 
limited my research base and in turn my perspective on the issue.  Moreover, as I 
primarily relied on blog and news articles and not complete interview transcripts, 
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I was subject to the prejudice, partiality, as well as editing of the writers, bloggers, 
and journalists who produced those articles, leading to incomplete and potentially 
extremely biased information on the candidates and the overall situation.   
In addition, as stated earlier, my research was only conducted through 
February 2012, while the election continue on through December 2012.  Even 
though the majority of the elections were completed by the conclusion of my 
research, I was nonetheless unable to document every independent candidate for 
this election cycle.  Finally, as my work on the independent candidate movement 
in China is a single-case case study, the conclusions of this research are not 
generalizable to similar cases in different countries.  The experiences of 
independent candidates in China must first be compared to those of independent 
candidates in other authoritarian regimes, accounting for the variance in political 
systems and contexts between regimes, in order to establish whether the 
independent candidate movement as a whole constitutes a political trend that can 
be utilized to analyze elections regionally or globally. 
There are a number of gaps in the current literature on the independent 
candidate movement, presenting diverse opportunities for future research on this 
topic.  This study and those by Junzhi (2010) and Yuan (2011) focus on the 
demographics and motives of and structural obstacles faced by independent 
candidates during their candidacies, with the aim of indentifying whether the 
movement constitutes a step toward structural democratic change in China.  These 
studies also concentrate on independent candidates specifically during the 
electoral period, neglecting the experiences the candidates prior to and following 
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the elections and leaving a several questions unanswered.  For instance, do the 
few independent candidates who are elected fulfill the promises and assertions 
they made during their candidacies, such as addressing local issues or 
communicating with their constituents?  Or do they fall in line with Party policy 
and expectations?  As for the independent candidates who failed to be elected, are 
they preparing for the next round of elections or have they abandoned the cause?  
Are they attempting to recruit and organize others to stand as independent 
candidates in future elections?  And if so, how?  Addressing these questions 
would lead to a more complete picture of the independent candidate movement 
and its ability to bring about democratic reform in China.   
Moreover, current studies speak solely to the beliefs and experiences of 
the candidates, ignoring those of other crucial actors who are crucial to the 
independent candidate movement, namely voters.  Independent candidates rely on 
garnering the support of voters in order to win the elections, however, the views 
and behavior of voters specifically in regards to the election of independent 
candidates has not been sufficiently examined.  For examples, what are the 
reasons voters do or do not support independent candidates?  Are they pressured 
by government to vote for Party-nominated candidates, as the independent 
candidates assert, or do other causes exist?  Are voters even aware of the 
existence or extent of the independent candidate movement?  And if so, do the 
voters believe the movement has the potential to lead to further democratization in 
China?  By analyzing the voters’ perspective, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the independent candidate movement could be established. 
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Finally, continued research efforts are necessary to track the development 
of the independent candidate movement in future elections.  This study and those 
by Junzhi (2010) and Yuan (2011) conclude that if in fact the independent 
candidates will eventually bring about democratic change in China, the current 
movement constitutes only an early step in that reform.  Free, fair, and 
competitive elections are necessary in order for democracy to exist.  Therefore, 
the progress, or lack of progress, of the independent candidate movement is a 
crucial indicator of democratization in China and should be pursued as a subject 
of research for scholars interested in the potential for democratization in China.  
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The following tables constitute the typology of the 2011-12 independent 
candidate movement as compiled by the author from the sources in Appendix A. 
Table B.1. Demographics of the Independent Candidates 
Name Gender Age Province Occupation 
Cao Tian Male 43 Henan Businessman 
Chen Qian Female  Sichuan  
Chen Xi Male 57 Guizhou Writer 
Cheng Hai Male 59  Beijing Lawyer 
Cheng Yuting Female 23 Beijing Professional model 
Chi Weitian Male 22  Guangdong Student 
Dai Xiuying Female  Tianjin  
Gan Xingyan Female  Sichuan  
Guo Huojia Male 59  Guangdong Farmer 
Han Ying Female 37   Beijing Activist 
He Peng Male  Jiangsu  
He Shilin   Zhejiang  
Hidden Dragon   Zhejiang  
Hu Jinjing Female  Sichuan  
Hu Jinqiong Female  Sichuan  
Huang Yanming Male  Guizhou  
Hou Guiying Female  Sichuan  
Huo Taian Male  Yunnan  
Ju Hongyi Female  Beijing  
Li Biyun Female  Guangdong Activist 
Li Chengpeng Male 43 Sichuan Journalist, writer 
Li Chunxiao   Sichuan  
Li Kunpeng   Beijing  
Li Renke Male  Guizhou  
Li Sihua Male  Jiangxi Teacher 
Li Youzhou Male 37 Guangdong  
Li Zhaoxiu Male  Sichuan  
Li Zhiyong Male 41 Guangdong Lawyer 
Liang Shuxin Male 35  Guangdong Founder of organization 
Liang Yongchun Male  Zhejiang  
Liao Shuangyuan Male  Guizhou  
Lin Bin   Fujian  
Liu Hong Female  Beijing Newspaper columnist 
Liu Ping  Female 47 Jiangxi Laid-off worker 
Liu Ruoxi Male 18 Guangdong High school student 
Liu Shengmin Male  Shanghai Business manager 
Liu Sumin  72 Beijing  
Liu Xiuzhen Female 57 Beijing Retired transport worker 
Liu Yongfang Female  Sichuan Land rights activist 
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Name Gender Age Province Occupation 
Luo Keyin   Sichuan  
Ma Huixia Female  Tianjin Entrepreneur 
Pang Yinping   Beijing  
Qiao Mu Male 41 Beijing Professor 
Shan Yajuan Female  Heilongjiang  
Shao Lihua Female  Beijing  
Sun Baomei Female  Beijing  
Sun Changfu   Heilongjiang  
Sun Wenguang Male 77 Jiangsu Retired professor 
Tong Zongjin Male  Beijing Professor 
Wan Qingtao Male2  Guangdong Newspaper commentator 
Wang Binru Female  Sichuan  
Wang Jian Male 32 Zhejiang Advertising executive 
Wang Lixin Male  Shandong  
Wang Rongwen Female  Sichuan  
Wang Xiuzhen Female  Beijing  
Wang Zhongxiang Male 50 Tianjin Power company foreman  
Wei Zhongping Female  Jiangxi  
Wu Danhong  Male  Beijing Professor 
Wu Lihong Female  Beijing Activist 
Wu Qing Female 74 Beijing Retired professor 
Wu Yong Female  Sichuan  
Wu Yuqin Female  Guizhou  
Xia Shang Male  Shanghai Entrepreneur 
Xie Runliang Male 41 Jiangsu Poet 
Xin Guohui Male  Sichuan Activist 
Xin Guohui's Wife Female  Sichuan Activist 
Xing Guohui Female  Sichuan  
Xing Qingxian Male  Guizhou  
Xiong Wei Male  Beijing Director of think tank 
Xu Chunliu Male 31 Beijing Journalist 
Xu Guoqing Male  Guizhou  
Xu Xiangyu Female 59 Beijing Activist 
Xu Yan Male 27 Zhejiang Advertising executive 
Xu Yimin Male  Jilin  
Xu Zhiyong  Male 38 Beijing Lawyer 
Yan Tafeng Female  Sichuan  
Yang Lingyun Female 40 Beijing  
Yao Bo Male 39 Beijing Columnist, blogger 
Yao Jincheng Male  Fujian  
Ye Jingchun Female 55 Beijing Insurance saleswoman 
Ye Jinghuan Female   Beijing  
Ye Qing  Female   Beijing  
Ye Qingchun Female   Beijing  
	   189	  
Name  Gender Age Province Occupation 
Ye Ruili Male   Guangdong Student 
Yu Nan  Male 47 Gansu Professional 
Zhan Jiang Female 34 Beijing  
Zhang Dejin Male  Fujian Laid-off worker 
Zhang Guolong Male  Heilongjiang  
Zhang Shangen   Beijing  
Zhang Kai Male  Beijing Lawyer 
Zhang Shiyu Female 21 Beijing Student 
Zhang Yaozhou Male    
Zhang Zhiru Male  Guangdong Migrant rights activist 
Zheng Wei Female 52 Beijing Retired worker 
Zhou Decai Male  Henan Businessman 
Zhou Xiuling   Beijing  
Note: The absence of data for a particular independent candidate indicates that no 
data was found regarding either the gender, age, province, and/or occupation of 
that candidate. 
Table B.2. Motives and Goals  
Name 
Promote 
Electoral 
Rights 
Defend 
Rights 
Local 
issues 
Speak 
for 
People 
Supervise 
Government 
Advance 
Democracy 
Civic 
Duty 
Cao Tian     X X X 
Chen Qian        
Chen Xi      X  
Cheng Hai        
Cheng Yuting X      X 
Chi Weitian        
Dai Xiuying        
Gan Xingyan        
Guo Huojia  X X     
Han Ying X X      
He Peng X     X  
He Shilin        
Hidden 
Dragon        
Hu Jinjing        
Hu Jinqiong  X X     
Huang 
Yanming        
Hou Guiying        
Huo Taian        
Ju Hongyi        
Li Biyun  X   X   
Li Chengpeng X  X X  X  
Li Chunxiao        
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Name 
Promote 
Electoral 
Rights 
Defend 
Rights 
Local 
issues 
Speak 
for 
People 
Supervise 
Government 
Advance 
Democracy 
Civic 
Duty 
Li Kunpeng        
Li Renke        
Li Sihua        
Li Youzhou        
Li Zhaoxiu        
Li Zhiyong X       
Liang Shuxin   X     
Liang 
Yongchun X       
Liao 
Shuangyuan        
Lin Bin        
Liu Hong    X  X  
Liu Ping  X X  X  X  
Liu Ruoxi  X      
Liu Shengmin X       
Liu Sumin        
Liu Xiuzhen  X      
Liu Yongfang  X X     
Luo Keyin        
Ma Huixia    X X   
Pang Yinping        
Qiao Mu X X X X  X  
Shan Yajuan        
Shao Lihua   X X    
Sun Baomei X   X X   
Sun Changfu        
Sun 
Wenguang X     X  
Tong Zongjin      X  
Wan Qingtao        
Wang Binru        
Wang Jian    X  X  
Wang Lixin        
Wang 
Rongwen        
Wang 
Xiuzhen        
Wang 
Zhongxiang X       
Wei 
Zhongping        
Wu Danhong    X X  X  
Wu Lihong   X     
Wu Qing X       
Wu Yong        
Wu Yuqin        
Xia Shang X  X    X 
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Name 
Promote 
Electoral 
Rights 
Defend 
Rights 
Local 
issues 
Speak 
for 
People 
Supervise 
Government 
Advance 
Democracy 
Civic 
Duty 
Xie Runliang        
Xin Guohui        
Xin Guohui's 
Wife        
Xing Guohui   X X    
Xing 
Qingxian        
Xiong Wei X X    X  
Xu Chunliu   X   X  
Xu Guoqing        
Xu Xiangyu   X     
Xu Yan   X X    
Xu Yimin        
Xu Zhiyong  X     X  
Yan Tafeng        
Yang 
Lingyun   X     
Yao Bo X X X X  X  
Yao Jincheng        
Ye Jingchun X  X X    
Ye Jinghuan    X    
Ye Qing         
Ye Qingchun        
Ye Ruili        
Yu Nan   X  X  X  
Zhan Jiang        
Zhang Dejin        
Zhang 
Guolong        
Zhang 
Shangen        
Zhang Kai X    X X  
Zhang Shiyu X  X X X   
Zhang 
Yaozhou        
Zhang Zhiru        
Zheng Wei   X    X 
Zhou Decai     X   
Zhou Xiuling        
Total Number 20 12 19 16 7 17 4 
Note: An “X” indicates that that independent candidate expressed that motive or 
goal for running in the local people’s congress elections. 
 
 
 
	   192	  
Table B. 3. Independent Candidates Whose Candidacies were Obstructed by the 
Manipulation of the Electoral Law 
Name 
Electoral 
Districts, 
Registration 
Nomination, 
Candidate 
Selection 
Election Day, 
Voting 
Cao Tian    
Chen Qian    
Chen Xi    
Cheng Hai    
Cheng Yuting  X  
Chi Weitian    
Dai Xiuying    
Gan Xingyan    
Guo Huojia    
Han Ying    
He Peng    
He Shilin    
Hidden Dragon    
Hu Jinjing    
Hu Jinqiong    
Huang Yanming    
Hou Guiying   X 
Huo Taian    
Ju Hongyi    
Li Biyun    
Li Chengpeng    
Li Chunxiao    
Li Kunpeng    
Li Renke    
Li Sihua  X X 
Li Youzhou    
Li Zhaoxiu   X 
Li Zhiyong    
Liang Shuxin X X  
Liang Yongchun    
Liao Shuangyuan    
Lin Bin    
Liu Hong    
Liu Ping  X X  
Liu Ruoxi    
Liu Shengmin X  X 
Liu Sumin    
Liu Xiuzhen    
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Name 
Electoral 
Districts, 
Registration 
Nomination, 
Candidate 
Selection 
Election Day, 
Voting 
Liu Yongfang    
Luo Keyin   X 
Ma Huixia    
Pang Yinping    
Qiao Mu  X  
Shan Yajuan  X  
Shao Lihua    
Sun Baomei    
Sun Changfu  X  
Sun Wenguang    
Tong Zongjin    
Wan Qingtao    
Wang Binru   X 
Wang Jian    
Wang Lixin    
Wang Rongwen    
Wang Xiuzhen    
Wang Zhongxiang    
Wei Zhongping    
Wu Danhong     
Wu Lihong    
Wu Qing    
Wu Yong   X 
Wu Yuqin    
Xia Shang    
Xie Runliang    
Xin Guohui    
Xin Guohui's Wife    
Xing Guohui    
Xing Qingxian  X  
Xiong Wei    
Xu Chunliu X   
Xu Guoqing    
Xu Xiangyu X  X 
Xu Yan    
Xu Yimin  X  
Xu Zhiyong     
Yan Tafeng   X 
Yang Lingyun    
Yao Bo  X  
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Name 
Electoral 
Districts, 
Registration 
Nomination, 
Candidate 
Selection 
Election Day, 
Voting 
Yao Jincheng    
Ye Jingchun    
Ye Jinghuan    
Ye Qing     
Ye Qingchun    
Ye Ruili X X  
Yu Nan   X  
Zhan Jiang    
Zhang Dejin  X  
Zhang Guolong  X  
Zhang Shangen    
Zhang Kai    
Zhang Shiyu    
Zhang Yaozhou    
Zhang Zhiru X   
Zheng Wei X   
Zhou Decai    
Zhou Xiuling    
Total Number 8 14 9 
Note: An “X” indicates that that independent candidate experienced that type of 
manipulation at the hands of the government, local officials, and/or the electoral 
committee. 
 
Table B. 4. Independent Candidates Who Faced Personal Harassment during their 
Candidacies 
Name Arrests, Detention Surveillance 
Threats, 
Intimidation 
Confiscation 
of Materials 
Cao Tian   X  
Chen Qian X    
Chen Xi X    
Cheng Hai     
Cheng Yuting     
Chi Weitian     
Dai Xiuying     
Gan Xingyan   X  
Guo Huojia X X   
Han Ying X X X   
He Peng     
He Shilin   X  
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Name Arrests, Detention Surveillance 
Threats, 
Intimidation 
Confiscation 
of Materials 
Hidden Dragon     
Hu Jinjing     
Hu Jinqiong X  X  
Huang Yanming X    
Hou Guiying     
Huo Taian     
Ju Hongyi     
Li Biyun X    
Li Chengpeng     
Li Chunxiao     
Li Kunpeng     
Li Renke X  X  
Li Sihua X    
Li Youzhou     
Li Zhaoxiu     
Li Zhiyong   X  
Liang Shuxin     
Liang Yongchun     
Liao Shuangyuan X    
Lin Bin     
Liu Hong     
Liu Ping  X  X X 
Liu Ruoxi     
Liu Shengmin   X  
Liu Sumin X X   
Liu Xiuzhen   X  
Liu Yongfang     
Luo Keyin     
Ma Huixia     
Pang Yinping     
Qiao Mu  X X X 
Shan Yajuan     
Shao Lihua     
Sun Baomei     
Sun Changfu     
Sun Wenguang X  X X 
Tong Zongjin     
Wan Qingtao     
Wang Binru     
Wang Jian     
Wang Lixin    X 
Wang Rongwen X    
Wang Xiuzhen X  X  
Wang Zhongxiang     
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Name Arrests, Detention Surveillance 
Threats, 
Intimidation 
Confiscation 
of Materials 
Wei Zhongping   X  
Wu Danhong      
Wu Lihong X X   
Wu Qing     
Wu Yong     
Wu Yuqin X    
Xia Shang   X  
Xie Runliang   X  
Xin Guohui X    
Xin Guohui's Wife X    
Xing Guohui     
Xing Qingxian    X 
Xiong Wei    X 
Xu Chunliu     
Xu Guoqing X    
Xu Xiangyu X    
Xu Yan   X  
Xu Yimin     
Xu Zhiyong    X X 
Yan Tafeng     
Yang Lingyun X    
Yao Bo     
Yao Jincheng     
Ye Jingchun X X  X 
Ye Jinghuan     
Ye Qing   X   
Ye Qingchun  X   
Ye Ruili     
Yu Nan      
Zhan Jiang X X   
Zhang Dejin  X   
Zhang Guolong     
Zhang Shangen X    
Zhang Kai     
Zhang Shiyu     
Zhang Yaozhou    X 
Zhang Zhiru  X X X 
Zheng Wei X X X  
Zhou Decai     
Zhou Xiuling     
Total Number 24 12 20 10 
Note: An “X” indicates that that independent candidate experienced that type of 
personal harassment. 
